President Barrack Obama released another review of the Af-Pak situation on 16 Dec 2010. Weeks in formulation and after careful deliberations by top officials, the summary still leaves too many questions unanswered. Unlike the Bruce Riedel report of March 2009, which bore the imprint of the author’s intimate knowledge of the region and conditions, this is a paper prepared by a high level committee of principals and represents the Administration’s policies formed over two years. It attempts to reconcile the differences between the US military’s call for more troops and time, the Republican Party’s desire for a military victory and the political and economic costs of the war.

Ultimately, it is domestic compulsions that trumped other issues. The Af-Pak war is already America’s longest conflict in history. Along with another major war that is not quite over, other geostrategic issues calling for urgent attention around the globe, and an economy in tailspin, there is in practice only one option. It is to disengage as early as possible under whatever terms and with least loss of face. Everything else is extraneous.

The strategy should have attempted to find a realistically achievable plan that would have balanced these compulsions while countering the al Qaeda-Taliban nexus to harm the free world. The Presidential Review falls short of these objectives.

It is in fact an exit strategy without a plan. One that is based on assumptions that are highly questionable, a goal that is increasingly unattainable, and a timeline, that though more flexible, is still unrealistically short.

The US and International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) today has over 1,50,000 soldiers in Afghanistan and a certain presence in Pakistan. This is the largest ever deployed there and much larger than the Soviet 8th Army at its peak. Yet, the Afghan Taliban remains capable of disruption and destruction in much of the eastern and southern parts of the country. The al Qaeda and its senior leadership are safe in Pakistan and probably not unduly troubled. The Taliban leadership too remains intact and has probably moved to bases in cities. No counterinsurgency operation has ever succeeded when a sanctuary is available and there can be none better than the borderlands of Pakistan and ISI support. US drone strikes have proved utterly counterproductive even when successful. With guaranteed collateral destruction, it is instead a potent recruiting tool for terrorists.

Cooperation with the Pakistan Army and the ISI is far from satisfactory as the Wikileaks disclosures have so clearly identified. They have an independent objective and strategy different from the Pakistan Government and counter to US interests. No amount of dollars can change this mindset of the Pakistani military, as Ambassador Anne Patterson reported. Pakistan’s Army or its radicalized citizens have yet to accept that the Taliban threatens Pakistan’s very existence. Till then the US will remain the greater ‘enemy’.

Obama’s West Point speech on December 1 2009 signalling July 2011 as the ‘beginning of draw down’ of US forces from Afghanistan was the biggest policy mistake of recent times. While the speech addressed growing domestic public concerns over an open-ended commitment, it had an entirely separate message for the terrorists. It told them that they could win by just sitting out the war. The November 2010 NATO declaration at Lisbon, that its forces will remain till 2014 and beyond does not impress. NATO military capability except for the US is declining and popular support for prolonging the commitment just does not exist.

In a situation where the terrorists are not weakening, where Pakistan is unwilling to engage in a manner that matters and the al Qaeda is morphing into a global franchise, international terrorism has not lost support. Recent attempts to strike in Europe reflect the reality.

What then are the alternatives to Obama’s strategy? There are two distinct variants on offer and neither is satisfactory. One is the “cut and run” school propagated by Robert Blackwill, a renowned realist with a clear though narrow perspective of securing US interests. Called Plan B in a Foreign Affairs article, it would split Afghanistan into a Pashtun-controlled territory in southern Afghanistan. By obliterating the Durand Line it may lead even to an early break up of Pakistan. This may not be a major concern to the US but its regional implications are likely to be serious. Would it also mean a sharing of nuclear assets among its components?

The other is a ‘regional solution’. Seeking the help and support of all neighbouring and regional players to contribute to and support stabilization operations, under international or UN control. This would include all countries from Turkey to Bangladesh and others in between or outside who are ready and able. There are far too many geopolitical difficulties that will prevent adopting this approach and without Iran, there will be little chance of success. Pakistan too opposes this and particularly a possible role for India in it.

The 2010 Af-Pak Review provides little hope or comfort. There is instead a deepening sense of an impending unravelling.