The writing on the wall seems clear: Despite initial international opposition, the ‘grandfathered’ nuclear agreement between China and Pakistan will not result in any sanctions against either party. India must reconcile itself to having fought for its right to peaceful nuclear energy cooperation while Pakistan is presented with the same right on a platter by China. Futile attempts made to scuttle the Sino-Pak nuclear agreement by prodding nuclear hardliner states like Austria, Ireland, New Zealand and Switzerland, among others, that had been opposed to the Indo-US nuclear, obviously paid no dividends. What should India do now in response to the agreement?

India has been known to express its opposition to Pakistan’s covert nuclear program. Former Prime Minister Moraji Desai in 1979 told American negotiators that India would “smash” Pakistan’s nuclear sites, explicitly stating a military option against Pakistan. This modality would be both inadvisable and avoidable. India has yet to exhaust its diplomatic options to deal with the present combine that are acting against Indian interests in South Asia and have extended their interests to Southeast Asia and East Asia. It would be prudent to undertake an assessment of the implications of the nuclear agreement before counter measures are taken.

A major hurdle to India adopting a hard approach is its policy of pursuing a nonprovocative stance towards it neighbours, despite the lack of reciprocity. India’s repeatedly snubbed overtures to China and Pakistan indicate the strong ties between China and Pakistan and their basic anti-Indian behavior. It is therefore in India’s interests to adopt a harder approach against this axis which would have a far stronger negative bearing on Indian security.

An immediate implication of the nuclear fuel transfer between China and Pakistan would mean that the rules of the international regime governing global nuclear trade would be thrown out of the window. China’s proliferation history is well documented, and its anti-Indian policies are evident despite diplomatic niceties to the contrary.  It would therefore be prudent for India to put China on notice by strengthening its alliance with the United States and China’s competitive neighbours like Japan, Vietnam and Taiwan, especially in the nuclear areas.

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s Tokyo visit earlier this year was marked by its potential for Indo-Japanese nuclear trade. While sensitivities over nuclear sales to India remain, the underlying message is that the relations between the two countries are being geared towards jointly tackling growing Chinese assertiveness in the region.
Similarly, relations between Vietnam and India were given a boost during the Prime Minister’s visit to the region. India should build upon its agreement with Hanoi in 2007 which called for cooperation in the field of nuclear energy between the Department of Atomic Energy and Vietnam’s Ministry of Science and Technology.

Besides, India needs to evolve a stronger diplomatic posture against the Sino-Pakistan nuclear deal which remains shrouded in secrecy and ambiguous assurances. India should push the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to  ensure  that the nuclear agreement between Pakistan and China is governed by its  Additional Protocol safeguards, which provide for “free communications… including attended and unattended transmission of information generated by Agency containment and/or surveillance or measurement devices.” This implies that the IAEA will have access to real-time information generated by its on-site surveillance devices rather than by physically accessing that information after inspecting the safeguarded site. This would also address Indian concerns of nuclear fuel being diverted from peaceful purposes.

Further, Indian policy makers will have to address an added factor which has inspired the China-Pakistan nuclear deal, which is the Indo-US nuclear deal. It sowed the seeds for greater nuclear proliferation. Therefore, India should highlight the inherent flaws in the present nonproliferation regime and work towards gaining an international consensus for a rule-based reform of that regime. With the leadership in the United States and Russia having tasted success for nuclear reforms with the ratification of the New START agreement, it is believed that a platform has been raised for further disarmament measures. India’s contribution to such measures can work towards creating an isolationist policy on the Sino-Pakistan agreement.  

India’s international standing would also be given a fillip if India uses the opportunity to positively contribute to global disarmament by making a preemptive move, for example, on the FMCT. Such a measure would put Pakistan on the back foot, adding international scrutiny to its nuclear allies.    

These approaches should be actively pursued as legitimate Indian responses to the Sino-Pakistan nuclear agreement.