In 2008, Anne Patterson, the US Ambassador to Pakistan cabled  Washington that "our major concern is not having an Islamic militant steal an entire weapon but rather the chance someone working in government of Pakistan facilities could gradually smuggle enough material out to eventually make a weapon."  Further diplomatic cables articulated grave concern that, “despite pending economic catastrophe, Pakistan is producing nuclear weapons at a faster rate than any other country in the world.”  Chinese support for the Pakistani nuclear program - an open secret - facilitates this continuous growth.  How has the US responded to the Sino-Pakistani nuclear engagement?  How have current developments, which include the destabilization of Pakistan, affected US policies?  What are US policy options in a nuclear South Asia? 

Critics of the 2008 Indo-US Nuclear Deal argue that China deepened its involvement in Pakistan’s nuclear power production in riposte to the Indo-US deal.  According to Ashley Tellis, “these claims do not stand-up.”  For Tellis, an astute if not disinterested observer, the key difference is transparency. “The U.S.-India nuclear initiative is different from the Sino-Pakistani deal. While leaders in the U.S. and India publicly debated the terms of their agreement before signing it, authorities in China have been silent about the conditions of its sale of nuclear technology to Pakistan.  China joined the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) in 2004.  At the NSG’s last meeting, China did not respond to basic questions about its economic cooperation with Pakistan, especially concering issues like whether there is an actual contract, what the terms of the deal are and when the agreement was finalized. The cloud surrounding Sino-Pakistani nuclear cooperation creates two related concerns: First, it can increase the paranoia deriving from the political instability in Pakistan and how the Chinese are dealing with that reality. Second, it can contribute to the belief that the Chinese are not taking responsibility for the implications of this instability.      

Patterson noted in a leaked February 2009 cable that “China has reportedly agreed to help Pakistan build two additional civilian nuclear reactors, neither of which is grandfathered under Nuclear Supplier Group agreements. Neither project is expected to begin for at least five years, and we have expressed our concerns about this proposed deal to both China and Pakistan.”  In the July 2010 NSG meeting in New Zealand, the Obama Administration expressed similar concerns as had been expressed by Patterson in 2009.  At the New Zealand meeting, the US objected to the Sino-Pakistan nuclear deal, arguing that China would be in violation of its responsibilities as a member of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) regime which explicitly forbids the export of nuclear technology to countries that are not party to the NPT.  China contends that since its agreement with Pakistan predates China’s entry into the NSG, it does not need NSG approval for transferring the two new nuclear reactors. In 2008, the Bush administration  sought a waiver from the NSG for the Indo-US Nuclear Deal to make the deal consistent with the norms of the international non-proliferation regime.  

In a September 2009 diplomatic cable released recently by Wikileaks, a senior British Foreign Office official, Mariot Leslie, told US diplomats that Britain had "deep concerns about the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear weapons.”  In response, the Pakistani High Commissioner to the UK, Wajid Shamsul Hasan, said that the Pakistani nuclear program had a "foolproof control and command system.”  Mr Hasan also invoked Pakistan’s sovereignty in refusing US aid to upgrade its nuclear security standards.  Perhaps greater transparency on the part of the Chinese and Pakistanis on the nuclear security standards of the Pakistani programs would allay doubts by the US, UK, and other nations.  The disclosures made by WikiLeaks reveal the backdrop behind the Obama administration’s decision in July 2010 to object to the two new Chinese reactors purchased by Pakistan.  Based on these disclosures and recent US nuclear policy enunciations in New Zealand in July, and reiteration of US support for  Indian nuclear technology in November 2010, the US position on the Sino-Pakistani nuclear engagement is skeptical, if not inimical.  Chinese transparency could calm these worries.