An earlier article (http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/towards-regional-stability-establish-an-indo-pak-nuclear-commission-3227.html) called for the establishment of an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission on the model of the Indus Water Commission (IWC) 
between the two countries. It was also suggested that unlike the Indus Commission, which is official and technical, the Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission, whilst functioning as an official institution, could also have adequate provisions for a strategic dialogue amongst the security community on both sides. The technical aspect of the Nuclear Commission could work alongside a track-1.5 initiative, to avoid a major shortcoming of the Indus Water Commission.

What are the strengths of this suggestion? Three specific strengths could be identified: First, such a Commission will provide a formal and institutional structure to the ongoing unstructured dialogue, primarily led by the track-II initiative and occasionally discussed by the two governments as a part of their Composite Dialogue.

The second major strength would be continuity and permanence. As the Commission is being suggested as an official and permanent body, it would ensure continuity to the nuclear debate between the two countries. Given the new doctrines and counter-doctrines enunciated by India, Pakistan and its militaries, it is important that the two countries are in a continuous dialogue with each other. Such a nuclear dialogue needs to be intensive and protracted so to prevent misunderstandings. Besides, it would strengthen the existing agreements and pave the way for expanding newer ones. Perhaps, due to this lack of permanency and continuity, India and Pakistan have been unable to reach any major agreements in the past two decades; after the agreement on not attacking each other’s installations signed in 1988.

The third major strength of an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission would be in terms of its insulation vis-à-vis regional security developments. A serious problem with any bilateral dialogue between India and Pakistan has been its failure to insulate a negative development elsewhere. A terrorist attack always exerts extra pressure on any Indo-Pak dialogue; at times, it even disrupts the process. Besides, even if there are no major negative developments, the multiple dialogues within a single large Composite Dialogue (with eight issues) also pose a problem. If there is no positive development on one issue, it has a domino effect on other issues. A permanent and continuous Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission, like that of the Indus Water Commission, will be able to insulate itself from other regional developments and non-progress in other issues within the Composite Dialogue.

Now, what are the weaknesses? Both India and Pakistan have been wary of any formal dialogue. Despite the Pakistani rhetoric of re-starting the peace process and the Indian rhetoric of a Composite Dialogue, both countries are making piecemeal responses to international pressure. There is no sincere attempt to revive the bilateral dialogue. In a non-dialogue environment, it is impossible to establish a nuclear commission.

The second major weakness of an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission would be associated with the reluctance of both India and Pakistan to share any credible information on their nuclear assets, doctrines and related issues. Since both countries would like to keep their nuclear programme confidential and their weapons programme even more so, the proposed Indo-Pak nuclear commission that envisages regular interaction on these matters may perhaps be premature.

The third major weakness of the idea would again be the sharing of information with the strategic community, as envisaged in the Nuclear Commission. The hard reality is that the multiple security institutions within India and Pakistan do not share nuclear-related information. What is the level of sharing within the nuclear bureaucracies, militaries and the foreign ministries in the respective countries? If security establishments are wary of sharing information within their own countries, how can they be expected to share it at bilateral levels?

What are the opportunities? While the above weaknesses are important, the environment for establishing such an institution is not totally gloomy. Both countries have an agreement that calls for not attacking each others’ nuclear installations. The Lahore round of Composite Dialogue makes an explicit attempt to debate nuclear issues. More importantly, the strategic community in both India and Pakistan is extremely anxious to have a structured dialogue on nuclear issues, thanks to the proliferation of new doctrines. At the State level, both countries are concerned about the nuclear deals with the US and China and would like access to more information at the official level. Finally, the global environment demands a better understanding on nuclear issues. With the Global Zero movement gaining momentum and the pressure on the CTBT and FMCT likely to build further, the environment is ripe.

What could be the likely threats to an Indo-Pak Nuclear Commission? An initial hesitation of the governments even after the commission is established; thus using it only as a nominal measure wherein there is no effective sharing of information. The hotline between the DGMOs is a perfect example of a CBM not being fully exploited. Even the Indus Water Commission, in recent years, is not functioning to its full potential. It could thus happen to the Nuclear Commission as well.

However, despite its weaknesses, the track-II initiative has to convince India and Pakistan that a structured and institutionalized nuclear dialogue is imperative. Though the primary weakness of this idea comes from how the State perceives it, in the long run, both India and Pakistan may consider the joint Nuclear Commission useful.