Now a “Peace Council” is in place to negotiate with the Taliban. (See Af-Pak Diary V: Now a Peace Council to Negotiate with the Taliban) Reports mention, that the negotiations have already started, though they are not clear, who is being spoken to from the Taliban’s side. Who is supporting and opposing this process? Who are being talked to? Will the Taliban be willing to take part in the negotiations? What will be its end game, vis-à-vis the negotiations?

In terms of support, clearly, it is led by Hamid Karzai. Though the Peace Council consists of different section, one is not sure, whether this process has the support of minority communities in Afghanistan, especially the Uzbeks, Tajiks and the Hazaras. All the above communities have suffered greatly at the hands of the Taliban and is unlikely, that they have forgotten their past and are willing to negotiate with the Taliban for the future.

However, Karzai is strongly backed by two actors – the US and Pakistan, for pursuing the negotiations with the Taliban. The entire search for the ‘good/moderate’ Taliban by the US is an effort to reach out, engage them in a dialogue and reach an understanding, enabling the American troops to leave Afghanistan. For Pakistan, it is a part of their much abused strategic depth, to have a friendly regime on their western neighbourhood, who will be amenable to Islamabad and more importantly, resist any strong Indian presence. For Karzai, it is purely an effort to save his regime and perhaps, protect personal security. Obviously, he does not want to end up on a pole, like the previous President – Najibullah.

Where does the Taliban’s interest lie, in the above matrix? The answer is complex, for the problem starts with who is defined as the Taliban, from the perspective of the negotiations that the Afghan Peace Council is engaged with. Taliban today is not a monolithic entity, as it used to be when the American troops landed. There are three distinct components today, emerging out of the erstwhile Taliban.

First component is the most important – led by Mullah Omar, and referred to as the Quetta Shura. With its primary base in Kandhahar, Mullah Omar is considered to be the undisputed leader of the Taliban amongst all the Pashtun communities on both sides of the Durand Line. At least, publicly, Mullah Omar is accepted as the leader of the Taliban. The second component is led by the Huqqanis – loosely referred to as the Huqqani network, led by Maulvi Jalaluddin Haqqani and his son Sirajuddin Haqqani. The Huqqani network’s reach and influence is primarily limited to Eastern Afghanistan, bordering Pakistan, primarily around the provinces of Paktia and Paktika. The third component is the Pakistani Taliban, better known as the TTP.

Of the three components (if not factions or groups) of the Taliban, the Quetta Shura is the most important, due to its hold over Southern Afghanistan. It is highly anti-American and less pro-Pakistani in its approach, which is also reflected in its end game in Afghanistan. It is the Quetta Shura which is bleeding the international troops and has been reported to have mentioned that negotiations can take place only after the exit of international troops. Knowing well, that the US is looking for an exit, Mullah Omar is aware, that if he could prolong and tire the troops, by increasing the cost, their exit is only a matter of time. This component is less likely to engage in a protracted negotiation, leading to an understanding between Karzai and Mullah Omar. Even if they do, it will be a tactical compromise to fool the international community.

The second component – led by the Huqqanis is in fact already in a dialogue with Karzai. Thanks to their close linkages with the Pakistan Army and the ISI, and the support base that this network has in the FATA and parts of the NWFP, they are considered as the ‘Peshawar Shura’. The Haqqanis are not born Taliban; rather they are late converts. They fought the Soviet troops, as Mujahideen and were closer to Hekmetyar, once upon a time. Once considered to be an asset of the CIA, the Huqqanis later became stooges of the ISI. Their alleged former linkages with the CIA and the contemporary patronage by the ISI, will factor heavily in their negotiations with the Peace Council. In fact, both the US and the ISI will project this as the Kazai-Taliban negotiations, to fool their own people and the rest of the international community.

Meanwhile, the third component – the Pakistani Taliban is likely to concentrate more inside Punjab and Sindh. One could already see the protracted battles inside Pakistan at the societal and military levels.

The real power behind the Taliban banner, Mullah Omar, is likely to play a waiting game, tire the international troops further, especially when Obama is talking about exit. Why would they be willing to negotiate, when they know, the war is already won, and today they are only fighting battles?

(This is a part of a series on Af-Pak region; forthcoming articles will focus on issues relating to the Afghan National Army and Chinese investments)