The accelerating advancement in biotechnology has given rise to fresh fears of bio-terror among experts. They apprehend that the newfound ability of scientists to produce life from scratch holds potential risks of synthesizing deadly pathogens that could fall into wrong hands. In May 2010, Washington Post reported that scientists had succeeded in creating a cell by artificial genetic instructions. This process of synthetic biology could also redesign life by generating molecules that imitates natural organisms. Bio-defence experts fear that extremists could use this technology to intentionally design and release harmful pathogens to infect innocent people.  Observers fear these diseased pathogens could become biological weapons in the hands of terrorists.

The fear of terrorists unleashing bioterrorism is not hypothetical. Several incidents of bioterrorist attacks have been documented. In 1984, the Rajneeshees poisoned more than 750 individuals in Oregon (United States) by contaminating the salad bars of local restaurants with Salmonella typhymurium in an attempt to influence a local election. Between 1990 and 1995 the Aum Shinrikyo cult is known to have used biological agents (with anthrax and botulinum toxin) to spread terror. In April 1990, the cult group outfitted three trucks with aerosol sprayers to release liquid botulinum toxin with the engines’ exhausts on the Diet, the U.S. Embassy in Tokyo, and two U.S. naval bases and the airport in Narita. Between June and August of 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo sprayed gallons of liquid anthrax in downtown Tokyo. Aum Shinrikyo members used sprayers fitted on the roof of their headquarters on two occasions and disseminated anthrax for four days. It also conducted two attacks against the Diet and the Imperial Palace and the Tokyo Tower. In June 1994, Aum Shinrikyo used an automobile fitted with a sarin dispenser to attempt to kill three judges hearing a case against the cult. Although the judges survived the attack, it lead to the death of seven people who were living in the same neighbourhood. The infamous anthrax attacks in the United States starting from September 18, 2001, killed five persons and infected 17 others, but terrorized a nation scarred by the 9/11 attacks on New York and Washington. In this case a biologist Bruce E Ivins who worked in the government's bio-defense laboratories at Fort Detrick in Maryland mailed the deadly anthrax spores to several news media offices and two Democrat US Senators. Al Qaeda is also reported to have sought dangerous pathogens to spread terror.

Counterterrorism experts believe that rapid scientific and technological advancements are making sensitive areas of biotechnology accessible. These developments raise new concerns. Amateur scientists with malignant intent might produce deadly pathogens for nefarious purposes. Unethical scientists could exploit these revolutionary achievements to carry out cloning for criminal purposes. Under US federal law 82 pathogens and biological toxins like anthrax and smallpox are classified as extremely dangerous to public health. Yet complete genetic sequences through DNA synthetic technology makes it possible to access the blueprint for manufacturing these pathogens. Much of the information on genetic sequencing is available in the internet. Publicly available databases on the genome of deadly pathogens make it easier to procure them. With the DNA available the scientists can sequence the organism and insert it in a recipient cell to develop the pathogen. Once this process is completed it can be used to recreate or enhance a pathogen to pose a threat. A plausible scenario is that terrorists purchase the DNA sequence of a harmful pathogen through the internet, and employ synthetic biology to modify the pathogen in a laboratory. Since terrorism involving weapons of mass destruction is no longer a hypothetical threat, experts have expressed concerns that the proliferation of knowledge and technology can be used by terrorists.

Skeptics might argue that modifying pathogens in a laboratory is a near impossible task for terrorists. One would need a minimum graduate level education in biotechnology and suitable experience in genome sequencing to produce deadly pathogens. However, synthesizing sequences is no longer rocket science; the technology is available and is cheap. Hence, there is definitely a risk. In 2005 scientists were able to use synthetic biology to recreate the 1918 influenza virus. In 2008 the SARS virus was reconstructed by scientists. Potentially, it would be possible to modify and enhance bacterial pathogens causing smallpox into more potent strains. Science and technology consultant Ethel Machi and policy analyst Jena Baker McNeill foresee that “by 2020 malefactors will have the ability to manipulate genomes in order to engineer new bioterrorism weapons.” Terrorists could also accidentally infect themselves with deadly pathogens and then move out to infect others. Terrorists with a suicidal bent of mind are capable of such actions.

Synthetic biology is a significant risk with dire consequences. The potential misuse of synthetic biology portends enormous penalty politically, economically and psychologically. Enhancement of DNA and other synthetic biology technology must be regulated. In addition, a sound policy premised on credible human intelligence must be applied to thwart any strategy of the terrorist to unleash a bio-terror attack.