Speakers: Dr. Amitabh Mattoo, Mr. Prem Shankar Jha & Prof. Riyaz Punjabi 

 

 

The views of the panelists concerning the present situation in Kashmir were: 

 

 

·                     The last decade has seen a steady worsening of the situation in Kashmir . Though in 1996, the situation seemed to be peaceful and the popular mood was that of hope. However, these hopes were belied in the latter part of the decade.

 

·                     On being elected to office, the Jammu & Kashmir, Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah, had made several promises, including conducting panchayati elections, providing 20,000 jobs, activating the State Human Rights Commission, and to publish and translate the Autonomy Committee report. However, none of this was put into practice and the alienation of the people from the government increased. Moreover, the Central government was seen as hostile to the interests of Jammu & Kashmir.

 

·                     The security situation in the Kashmir valley has degenerated from bad to worse, with foreign mercenaries coming into the Kashmir valley. These mercenaries are highly motivated and attack the security installations and not the local population. The unified command of the security forces has almost broken down. Intelligence networks are in a fractured state. The local police is demoralised. The policy of rehabilitation of militants has not worked out effectively.

 

·                     Pakistan is determined to keep up pressure on Kashmir . Pakistan believes that sustained international pressure will bring India to the negotiating table. Pakistan is unapologetic about the Kargil conflict and this non-compromising attitude is reflective of the hardline attitude of the Pakistan military regime. India needs to strongly articulate its interests in the international arena by putting forward a coherent Kashmir policy. Further, contrary to projecting Kashmir as a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia , India should make the international community realise that it is the role of Pakistan in South Asia that needs to be investigated. And this needs to be done in context of the mounting evidence against Pakistan about its involvement in cross-border terrorism and drug trafficking. The forthcoming visit of the American President has Kashmir on its agenda and India should use his opportunity to strongly put forward its case.

 

·                     There has been a great change in the situation in the Kashmir valley between 1994 and 1998. In 1997-8, the situation in the Kashmir valley was largely under control. Tourism was picking up. Upto 1,000 militants had surrendered, and another 31,000 were dormant and seeking political participation. Further, there were many political splits among the various organisation like the JKLF, active in Kashmir . However, the government was unable to capitalise on the improving situation and squandered its gains.

 

·                     The Farooq Abdullah government is increasingly unpopular because of its corrupt practices. Moreover, the Centre had adopted a hostile policy to the Abdullah government, refusing to write off its debts and release the funds allocated by the Centre to the state. Owing to the lack of any economic development, the people especially the middle class in Kashmir , was becoming increasingly alienated from the government. In fact, many possible solutions to the problems in Kashmir , such as open platform for discussions with various organisations in Kashmir , or lifting the ban on the JKLF, were ignored by the government. Since India did not capitalise on the situation, Pakistan gained from it. It renewed attacks on the Indian security forces and the number Indian casualties spiraled. In fact, at present the total number of casualties of the militancy in Kashmir may well have crossed the number of Indian army casualties in Kargil.

 

·                     Pakistan 's internal politics contributes to keeping the Kashmir issue alive. General Musharraf can only remain in power by continually increasing pressure on Kashmir . Otherwise, he become a liability in the predominately Punjabi-speaking Pakistan army. And he is doing so, to the extent of repeated nuclear sabre-rattling against India . In the face of continued Pakistani support to the guerilla war in Kashmir , the Indian army needs to re-evaluate the situation in terms of the number of casualties it is willing to absorb over an indefinite period of time. If not, then it means having a decisive war with Pakistan .

 

·                     Third party intervention seems to be a viable option to solving the Kashmir issue. This is where the US may step in help. Clinton is of the view that South Asia is a nuclear flashpoint and hence the earlier the Kashmir issue is resolved the better. However, one must be realistic about the fact that US will not act till such time its own interests are threatened. In fact, for India a far more productive policy would be to encourage a deal between the US and Pakistan wherein the US bail out Pakistan economically in return for a commitment to stop abetting cross-border terrorism.

 

·                     Kashmir is undergoing four simultaneous crises concerning its security, society, governance and that of an inadequate national response to the troubled region. The crisis of security is of recent vintage since there were some positive developments since 1996 when militancy ceased owing to the smashing of communication networks between the militants and the Pakistan army. People initially responded well to Farooq Abdullah's government and the security forces' overtures realizing that terror was becoming an end in itself. In the 1996-99 phase, militants were dormant, reorganizing through the die-hard militants. The media rediscovered its freedom while political life appeared to blossom. Kargil changed all that, with the infiltration of Pakistani and Afghani mercenaries who have disrupted the tentative but promising relations between the armed forces and the people in the Valley. Incidents like the attack on the Badamibagh cantonment have created fear among the people all over again.

 

·                     The crisis of governance apparent since 1996 has led to people following the militants on certain occasions. For instance, the attack in January on the Special Operations Group was ostensibly due to reported attempts at extracting money from the villagers and therefore the militants are perceived as saviors. The dare-devilry of the militants is both impressive and fearsome for the people. Suicide squads have existed in the Valley during the 1990 uprising as well, but the difference is that previously they were composed of local youth while foreign mercenaries exists now. Militants are intent on creating mayhem and demoralize the Indian security forces and hence have communicated to the local populace that though they need not join them but they should not oppose them.

 

·                     There are uncanny similarities between the Islamist movements in Dagestan, Chechnya and Kashmir where the Wahabbi movement is very strong and proceeds on the assumption that they will liberate Muslims from foreign yoke, weed out unIslamic elements in society and use force to achieve their purposes. There is a discernible belt of Wahabbi assertion right from J&K to the Central Asian Republics .

 

·                     The culture of guns has led to the crisis in society in the Valley. Violence as a social norm has ruptured familial ties. The proliferation of guns has introduced violent settling of scores and retributive justice. Deference to elders is another casualty. The constant propaganda from Pakistan Television extolling the martyrhood of 40-50,000 Kashmiris has undermined the ability of the moderates to mobilize support for a political solution. The middle class Kashmiris who had previously supported the militants now resent the sway of violence but are unable to extricate themselves from a situation where lower-rung Kashmiris dominate the protest movement.

 

·                     The Abdullah government is a profile in misgovernance. Administrative anarchy is the order of the day with a complete failure of accountability. Senior officials do not even file income tax returns regularly. The employment policies of the Abdullah government are a farce. The J&K government has appointed 100,000 people in the government sector, which logically should have amounted to the welfare of at least 600,000 people given the average family size. But this has not stemmed the alienation since local politicians dispensed the jobs through bribes. The newly employed were mostly accommodated in security services who can actually find no work. Most do other occupations like farming and habitually arrive for work at month's end to collect paychecks which is a needless burden on the exchequer. It is generally very difficult to ensure bureaucratic integrity. Bureaucrats have arrogated to themselves the role of the politicians further marginalizing the political process.

 

·                     Lamentably, the rest of India tends to view Kashmir as a problem that will be solved if the Kashmiris can be made to behave. There is no denying that the situation is bad and that there is a war at hand with the terrorists but India at large must take steps to ensure that Kashmiris are on its side. No business house or associations ventured to Kashmir when things were looking up since 1996. There is no effort to integrate people at the cultural level. All that the Kashmiris are dished out are puerile television serials about militants who discover a love for India and surrender weapons. The fact that most of the valley has only 2 hours power supply a day along with two TV channels does not draw the people any closer to India.

 

·                     The autonomy reports that the J&K government finalized are worth considering. There are two reports dealing with the question of state autonomy and regional autonomy. Sadly there is no inkling among the policy makers to debate the validity of these reports. A debate on autonomy is somehow perceived as a precursor to secession. The domino theory is used to eviscerate any talk of decentralization as an option in J&K. People who hold this view forget that the mishandling of Article 356 is an issue for virtually every state in India . In any case, the current Home Minister L. K. Advani espoused the states’ decentralization plan way back in 1984. Autonomy as an option has to be introduced as a discussible item if any headway is to be reached.

 

 

 

Discussion:

 

 

Comments: 

 

 

·                     There has always been alienation in the state bureaucracy and police in Kashmir right from 1947. Secondly, one cannot have a caste system among the various states by providing special status to Kashmir .

 

·                     The Kashmir issue can only be solved through military means and for the moment governance must take as backseat.

 

·                     In the present international scene, a military solution to the Kashmir necessitates a favorable international opinion.

 

Response: 

 

 

·                     We are fighting on three fronts in Kashmir . The first is a war to win the hearts and mind of the Kashmiri people. The alienation Kashmir is all pervasive because of the free hand given to the security forces in Kashmir . Politically, the Supreme Court has upheld the special status for Kashmir and to repeal Article 370 would be political denial for the Kashmiris. Secondly, the security and military analysts have to work out the best way to fight a limited war with Pakistan and explore options for making Pakistan pay for its actions in Kashmir . Thirdly, India has to garner international opinion in its favor. This requires successful diplomatic projection of India 's Kashmir policy internationally.

 

·                     India has to raise Pakistan 's threshold for limited war. India may need to cross over the LoC, not to threaten the existence of Pakistan but to provide tactical depth for itself in fighting with the guerillas in Kashmir . India has to probe and find ways and means to do this; may be in terms of commando action in PoK or even an air attack.

 

Comments: 

 

 

·                     The war in Kashmir is unique, hence we may needs a new force to deal with it. The militancy in Kashmir is not being funded by Pakistan alone. If Pakistan is going bankrupt, then where is the money to fund the militants in Kashmir coming from One needs to probe this issue of funding further.

 

·                     The US rhetoric that Kashmir is a nuclear flashpoint in South Asia does not stand in face of historical scrutiny. China and the erstwhile Soviet Union , two nuclear powers, fought a war without going nuclear.

 

Response: 

 

 

·                     The West is with India on the issue of terrorism. However, they are asking India questions regarding governance, and human rights. Kashmiri people did not feel alienated since 1947, it set in with the economic crisis. During the last 50 years, a large middle class has emerged and they are dissatisfied with the performance of the government.

 

Comment: 

 

 

·                     There is enough goodwill and expertise within J&K to create a domestic Track II. It will produce an informed and concerned input into policy forming. The problems of Kashmir are peculiar to the region and have to dealt with accordingly. There is no need to raise a new force to deal with the problem in Kashmir . There is tremendous support in the border districts of J&K for the security forces and an enduring fellow feeling with the Kashmiri people in PoK. The Kashmiri people view their brethren in PoK as held under bondage and are willing to liberate them. This is proved by an incident that took place in Kashmir in April 1979. After Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was hanged in April 1979, there was a spontaneous reaction in the border areas of Kashmir . The local administration, fearing a law and order situation called in reinforcements. However, the situation unfolded to reveal that the processions were made up of the people who wanted to march into PoK to liberate it. Similar incidents have happened in the Kupwara sector in the past two years indicating great support for the army. This is representative of a difference of feelings in Srinagar and in the border areas.

 

Comment: 

 

 

·                     The autonomy reports contain nothing new that has not already been tried in Kashmir . The only contentious issues it raises are the use of Article 356 and the appointment of Sadar-e-Riyasat (a governor like position). The latter refers to a proposal to appoint the Riyazat in the state not by New Delhi 's diktat by the legislative Assembly. There is a feeling that allowing the discredited Farooq government the option to choose the Riyazat will mean that the Hurriyat Conference will have little to show for its efforts at achieving autonomy since Farooq will claim the credit. Its probably a better idea to play that “card” after Farooq exhausts himself politically.

 

Response: 

 

 

·                     The leaders of the Hurriyat do not have adequate leverage to negotiate autonomy on behalf of the Kashmiris, since most leaders can claim barely any allegiance beyond their immediate localities. He felt that no security apparatus could win the fight against terrorism unless the people's support is enlisted. In the early 1980s the chant “ Kashmir banega Afghanistan ” was a laughable slogan. But going by the number of Afghani mercenaries’ in Kashmir now one wonders if that might turn out to be true. The speaker  felt that the Riyazat option should be played immediately since time is running for political options.

 

Comment: 

 

 

·                     Why Kashmir was given a special status by Article 370 when the instrument of accession that Hari Singh was similar in wording to instruments of accession that other princely states signed.

 

Response: 

 

 

·                     Though the instrument of accession was the same for all princely states, Maharaja Hari Singh appended a letter that stated that he would cede authority to the Indian Union on matters of defence, foreign policy, communications but retain a “special position” for the Kashmir province. In fact, Hari Singh wrote letters to Sardar Patel protesting the violation of Kashmir 's special status. That letter had to be factored into the Constitution and hence Article 370 was introduced.

 

Other Comments: 

 

 

·                     Responding to the China angle in the Kashmir dispute, one of the speakers mentioned that China is in an extremely dangerous economic situation; the current economic crises should occupy China for at least the next 10 years. The state owned economic enterprises that employ around 100 million Chinese are in trouble while the medium-size business sector that boomed after the 1985 reforms is on the verge of collapse. Connected to this is the possibility of a foreign exchange collapse. The Chinese leadership is in a state of panic and is trying to shore up its authority by being belligerent towards the United States . Faced with economic chaos, China 's attitudes and policies towards India might get very unpredictable and hence tackling China in the future is a very serious matter for Indian foreign policy.

 

·                     A participant disagreed with the opinion that Pakistan government controls the militants active in Kashmir . He felt that that may have been true in the past but now it is the militants that are determining Pakistani government agenda in Kashmir by upping the ante. Even if the Musharraf's regime wishes to comply with the American demand to clamp down on terrorism it cannot. He said that the objective of the militant was to create a wedge between the populace and the armed forces and thus exacerbate the divide. The spurt of militant raids might be an attempt to impress their funders. Inasmuch as Farooq is discredited, he felt that he was still the only viable option with which autonomy could be effected.