All Counter Insurgency (CI) Operations can be broadly classified into three stages:

Clear Stage, which commences when insurgent violence has led to complete breakdown of state machinery. Military operations are of paramount importance in this stage and the aim of this stage is to achieve complete military ascendancy over the insurgents.
Hold Stage, where the violence levels and residual insurgent military capability can be effectively handled by state police and CPMFs and the Armed Forces maintain a precautionary stance. There is a thin line dividing the build and hold stages and inept management of the hold stage can see a reversion to the clear stage.
Build Stage, is reached when insurgent activity is at its nadir and the gains of military operations are consolidated upon through developmental activities. The Civil Administration holds the centre stage in this phase.

The anti Naxal operations are still in their ‘clear’ stage. The lack of a clearly defined end state for the of armed forces in the anti Naxal grid will result in prolonged deployment without a clearly defined objective. The end state of armed forces deployment should therefore be to inflict heavy causalities on Maoists insurgents and force them to the negotiation table under conditions laid down by the government.

Force structuring of the Army deployment in the northeast and J&K is based on coy operating base (COB) dependent grids with approximately a brigade or sectoral Area of Responsibility (AOR) spreading over a district. An element of ground holding is inherent in these deployments as insurgencies in these areas are secessionist in nature. If the deployment pattern of one brigade per district is applied to Naxal affected areas then approx 120 brigades will be required.  This is neither practicable nor possible. The Armed Forces will have to be employed as the ultimate offensive punch in anti-Naxal operations, akin to Special Forces employment in conventional operations and cannot be deployed on a typical COB based grid.

It takes approximately an hour for an insurgent cell to execute an act of violence and get away from the scene. It is to beat the insurgents in time and space that the CI grid consists of COBs that can reach any location in their AOR within an hour.

Traditionally the Army operates on a COB based grid in the hinterland whereas the CPMFs have been operating in urban and semi urban areas. In the context of anti-Naxal operations it could be prudent for the police /CPMFs to man the CI Grid and carry out area domination in the hinterland. Special Forces teams of the Army could be stationed at the district HQ to carry out precise intelligence based offensive operations at short notice.

The British forces in Basra successfully executed the ‘hunter-killer’ concept for conduct of Counter-Terrorist operations in Iraq. The Rhodesian Special Air Services (SAS) followed a similar technique namely ‘Fire-Force’. The concept ensured reduced response times by launch of platoon sized forces by helicopters to hunt down insurgent cells at extremely reduced reaction times. The employment of these hunter killer teams which could react in reduced time frames over large distances negated the requirement of a spread out and manpower intensive COB based deployment. Heli-lift capability of a platoon if provided to Special Forces teams located in district HQ would not only ensure speed of action but help in beating the insurgents for time and space. Provision of heli-lift capability to the army would ensure swift and surer response with a leaner deployment and give it omnipresence.

So, what needs to be done? Coy sized Special Forces teams of the Army with a platoon heli-lift capability need to be stationed at district HQ to carry out high impact, precise and intelligence based operations. A Special Forces Battalion Headquarter would be responsible for conduct of operations in a state. States such as Chattisgarh, Jharkhand and Orissa which are more severely affected can have up to two headquarters deployed.

There would be requirement to clearly define the Command and Control arrangements. The Apex bodies at each State should be headed by the Political Executive and not bureaucracy. The armed forces representative should be the Military Commander responsible for operations in the specific state. Seniority consideration should not be the governing consideration.Army should not resort to traditional COB based deployment as this will result in defensive operations such as road opening, convoy protection and base security. It must be employed as the cutting edge.

The operations of the Army should feed on the intelligence obtained from state police forces deployed in the hinterland. There will be a requirement of a fully functional Joint Operations and Intelligence Centre at each district HQ to share intelligence.Legislations to provide legal protection to Army Personnel operating in Naxal affected areas such as Armed Forces Special Powers Act will have to be enacted prior to employment of the Armed Forces in these operations.    

To conclude, military solutions to insurgencies are seldom possible.  Deployment of the Army in anti Naxal ops, if inescapable, must be made towards achievement of a clearly defined end state within a given timeline. It must not degenerate into an indefinite ground holding operation.