Armed Forces in Anti-Naxal Operations-I: Identifying the Problem
15 Sep, 2010 · 3235
Lt. Gen (Retd.) Tej Pathak eluicidates the shortcomings of the Counter-Insurgency Operations in Naxal affected areas
(Part I of a two-part analysis on the complexities in deploying armed forces in Naxal affected areas)
“There is nothing in the purely military pages of Mao, Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara or other manuals of guerrilla warfare which a traditional guerrillero or band leader would regard as other than simple common sense.” -Eric Hobsbawm
About 10,000 people, including police, rebels and civilians, have been killed over the past two decades in Maoist related violence. More than a fourth of the country’s 600 odd districts are now severely affected by Maoist insurgency. The government reacted predictably saturating the affected areas with State and Central Police/ Para-Military Forces. Operation Greenhunt has so far resulted in 312 Security Forces casualties as against 294 insurgent casualties. What began as an all-out offensive is now a large scale holding operation. Central Para-Military Forces (CPMF) mainly the CRPF deployed in the anti Naxal grid were ill equipped to tackle the menace, which soon became apparent, giving rise to the demand for deployment of the Armed forces in anti-Naxal operations.
Armed Forces are the instruments of last resort and their employment should never be resorted to as routine. The Indian executive establishment (Political and Bureaucratic) would be holding a record of letting problems of governance fester till violence is resorted to. Even when the armed forces are called and semblance of normalcy restored, the establishment is never in a hurry to address issues of governance.
Maoist ideology feeds off the actual and perceived socio-economic deprivation of tribal and landless classes. The movement derives its strength from popular support of the deprived masses. Development and economic progress will mitigate this, but whether peace will bring development or vice versa is an endless debate. To the military planner this popular support poses a major challenge in effective intelligence and counter intelligence for launch of effective Counter-Insurgency(CI) Operations. There are areas where only the writ of the Naxals run and the state machinery is absent.
Key to the setbacks in combating Maoist insurgency is a one-size-fits-all doctrine. State responses have consisted of pumping in forces for conventional, ground-holding operations in the hope of displacing guerrilla forces; maintaining high force levels over sustained periods of time and using military to push forward with development and political initiatives to deprive insurgents of their political legitimacy.
The basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that lead to the destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity. The strategy of pumping coy-sized security units into the Maoist heartland and attempting to dominate the territory around them is one manifestation of this thinking. The problem is that successful insurgents have no fixed centre of gravity — no bases that conventional forces may overwhelm.
The problem with such a CI-Grid is that security of operating and logistics bases, road opening over long stretches of un-metalled roads and other administrative requirements eat heavily into force levels available for offensive Counter-Insurgent operations. Increased force levels in this treacherous terrain have resulted in increased vulnerabilities. Increased force levels rather than having the Maoists on the run have resulted in more convoys to target with IEDs, more patrols to ambush and more bases to raid.
Lack of coordination and synergy of operations and intelligence sharing between the various security agencies is a major impediment to success of the anti Naxal operations. Joint Operations Committees at district level have been set up to achieve better synergy between the state and central police and intelligence agencies, however, the degree of co-ordination leaves much to be desired.
The CRPF and state police have found it hard to adapt to the changed operational requirements. The Maoist insurgents on the other hand have morphed from the country-made weapon wielding force of their nascent years to a highly trained force with modern weapons and IED operating capability. However, specially trained police forces like the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh have met with remarkable success. Though the Training of police and CPMFs at Army’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) and establishment of Special Training Centres like the one at Kanker, Chattisgarh are welcome measures, it must be appreciated that the training capacities are limited vis-à-vis the requirement.
“There is nothing in the purely military pages of Mao, Nguyen Giap, Che Guevara or other manuals of guerrilla warfare which a traditional guerrillero or band leader would regard as other than simple common sense.” -Eric Hobsbawm
About 10,000 people, including police, rebels and civilians, have been killed over the past two decades in Maoist related violence. More than a fourth of the country’s 600 odd districts are now severely affected by Maoist insurgency. The government reacted predictably saturating the affected areas with State and Central Police/ Para-Military Forces. Operation Greenhunt has so far resulted in 312 Security Forces casualties as against 294 insurgent casualties. What began as an all-out offensive is now a large scale holding operation. Central Para-Military Forces (CPMF) mainly the CRPF deployed in the anti Naxal grid were ill equipped to tackle the menace, which soon became apparent, giving rise to the demand for deployment of the Armed forces in anti-Naxal operations.
Armed Forces are the instruments of last resort and their employment should never be resorted to as routine. The Indian executive establishment (Political and Bureaucratic) would be holding a record of letting problems of governance fester till violence is resorted to. Even when the armed forces are called and semblance of normalcy restored, the establishment is never in a hurry to address issues of governance.
Maoist ideology feeds off the actual and perceived socio-economic deprivation of tribal and landless classes. The movement derives its strength from popular support of the deprived masses. Development and economic progress will mitigate this, but whether peace will bring development or vice versa is an endless debate. To the military planner this popular support poses a major challenge in effective intelligence and counter intelligence for launch of effective Counter-Insurgency(CI) Operations. There are areas where only the writ of the Naxals run and the state machinery is absent.
Key to the setbacks in combating Maoist insurgency is a one-size-fits-all doctrine. State responses have consisted of pumping in forces for conventional, ground-holding operations in the hope of displacing guerrilla forces; maintaining high force levels over sustained periods of time and using military to push forward with development and political initiatives to deprive insurgents of their political legitimacy.
The basic military objective in war is to conduct operations that lead to the destruction of the enemy’s centre of gravity. The strategy of pumping coy-sized security units into the Maoist heartland and attempting to dominate the territory around them is one manifestation of this thinking. The problem is that successful insurgents have no fixed centre of gravity — no bases that conventional forces may overwhelm.
The problem with such a CI-Grid is that security of operating and logistics bases, road opening over long stretches of un-metalled roads and other administrative requirements eat heavily into force levels available for offensive Counter-Insurgent operations. Increased force levels in this treacherous terrain have resulted in increased vulnerabilities. Increased force levels rather than having the Maoists on the run have resulted in more convoys to target with IEDs, more patrols to ambush and more bases to raid.
Lack of coordination and synergy of operations and intelligence sharing between the various security agencies is a major impediment to success of the anti Naxal operations. Joint Operations Committees at district level have been set up to achieve better synergy between the state and central police and intelligence agencies, however, the degree of co-ordination leaves much to be desired.
The CRPF and state police have found it hard to adapt to the changed operational requirements. The Maoist insurgents on the other hand have morphed from the country-made weapon wielding force of their nascent years to a highly trained force with modern weapons and IED operating capability. However, specially trained police forces like the Greyhounds of Andhra Pradesh have met with remarkable success. Though the Training of police and CPMFs at Army’s Counter Insurgency and Jungle Warfare School (CIJW) and establishment of Special Training Centres like the one at Kanker, Chattisgarh are welcome measures, it must be appreciated that the training capacities are limited vis-à-vis the requirement.
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