While many are aware that China overtook Japan as world’s second largest economy in 2010, very few are aware that, as per a report generated by the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) and corroborated by reputed think tanks like SIPRI, China has also emerged as the world’s most powerful military after the US, relegating Russia to the third position. While China’s military rise is globally accepted, many countries that could be at the receiving end of its increasing military might are busy reporting various issues related to China’s military modernization, its exact quantum of growth, strategic intentions and the likely impact on the security situation in Asia – Pacific region. Sadly though, politics and diplomacy, rather than objectivism, have crept into some of these reports, as evident in the latest US report on Chinese military power – 2010.

Pentagon has been reporting on Chinese military power since 2001 as mandated by the 2000 National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA). Since then, it has systematically profiled China’s ascending military power and has been credited on at least three counts. First, it has been highlighting non-transparency issues in Chinese military and security affairs. As the 2010 report reveals, there are still many uncertainties regarding how China will use its expanding military capabilities. These uncertainties could increase the potential for misunderstanding and miscalculation. While China never purchased the ‘non-transparency’ theory being marketed by Pentagon, it has, nevertheless, taken incremental steps such as biannual white papers on defence and exclusive websites for the Chinese PLA and Ministry of National Defence (MND). Second, these reports also highlight various aspects of Chinese military modernization such as strategic changes and defence budget, reliable information on which are not available from other sources. Third, the American initiative has also encouraged other countries to study Chinese military modernization and prepare reports reflecting their threat perspective. Although not regular, Japan and Taiwan have been reporting on Chinese military modernization, often sounding more alarmist than their American counterparts. The Defence of Japan 2009 (Annual White Paper), for instance, has been critical of China’s decision-making and behaviour concerning its military. Its 17-page exclusive section on China calls upon Beijing for increased transparency concerning its military affairs by disclosing specific information pertaining to China’s defence policies and military capabilities. 

The US report was initially being published in February every year, since the 2000 NDAA stipulates that the report has to be submitted to the specified congressional committees not later than March 1 every year. However, in 2010, the report was not published in time adding to the anxiety of lawmakers in US Congress and China watchers elsewhere. Washington perhaps did not want to rub China the wrong way since it needed the latter’s participation in the Nuclear Summit at Washington in April 2010. Also, there were reports that China, which had criticized all such reports in past, was exerting diplomatic pressure on US to either do away with the report or tone down the contents. The 2010 report is, therefore, less probing than previous reports. It does little justice to its congressional mandate of reporting on ‘current and future military strategy of China’; rather it is veered around ‘military and security developments involving the PRC’ as evident from this year’s title of the report. The pacifism is further evident from an exclusive chapter on Sino – US military contacts, reflecting Pentagon’s desire to reach out to China.

The US report is not the only one to soft peddle Chinese military modernization. A series of SIPRI reports under its programme ‘China and global security’ have been projecting a benign view of China’s military modernization and pooh-pooh any threat perceptions of the neighbouring countries. Even in areas where China’s contributions have been rather negative (read nuclear non-proliferation) or marginal (read peacekeeping operations), China has been portrayed as a lead player. It is debatable if China with a history of nuclear collaboration with Pakistan (in flagrant violation of international norms) or with less than 2000 active personnel in UN peacekeeping operations (sent with business interests) could be called a responsible military power. It would be interesting to watch how long other prominent think tanks like RAND and Brookings, largely funded from domestic American sources, will not join the bandwagon and stop adhering to objective canons while assessing and reporting on Chinese military power.

Either way, the clamour to publish primary reports on China’s military modernization is here to stay. Subjectivity apart, these reports do help in developing different perspectives on Chinese military modernization and facilitate the engagement policies of many countries with China. Unfortunately, India is a laggard in this global race for reporting on Chinese military power or its military expenditure. The sporadic couplets in India’s Ministry of Defence’ Annual Report notwithstanding, there is hardly any study to substantiate India’s concerns. The reports by Pentagon may not be of much help since they are Taiwan-centric and do not study in detail Chinese capacity building exercises near Indian borderlands. There is, therefore, a need to study Chinese military modernization from an Indian perspective as well.  

Note: The views expressed are those of the author and do not represent those of the Government of India.