The defeat of terrorist threat in Southeast Asia is impassable without a conclusive step taken by Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines, especially to fight against the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) and the Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), who possess strong links to al Qaeda. Support provided by Australia, New Zealand and the United States to these countries has been invaluably imperative. However, without a firm commitment and support from the local countries through close cooperation, the eradication of the military organizations, the closing of borders to the passage of terrorists from state to state and the legislation of strict laws against terrorism and the odds of winning such a war are minute.

The legacy of threat in Philippines has paved the way to a second hub for the world terror. The island of Mindanao, and particularly the adjacent and remote Sulu Archipelago where the militant organization ASG maintains bases, could become a safe haven for jihadi cadre who fled Afghanistan after the 2002 US-led invasion. The al Qaeda influence appears to be channeled through regional and local organizations such as JI and the ASG. In many cases, this cooperation has taken the form of ad hoc arrangements of convenience, such as helping procure weapons and explosives. Security difficulties are a major impediment to foreign investment and development of resource-rich Mindanao Island. Islamist militants from Indonesia and Malaysia continue to cross to Mindanao to train, gain battle experience and avoid capture. Due to limited financial resources, inadequate salaries, corruption, low morale, limited cooperation between police and prosecutors, and other problems in law enforcement, terrorists continues to use the country as a base to organize, raise funds, train, and operate.

The current concern and challenge for the Aquino government is “decimation of terrorism and insurgency in the country.” Although pledges and promises have been made by the new government, it still remains a question whether it will be successful in bringing stability in the region or not. Aquino has pledged to provide weapons and equipment for the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), to double defence spending, to 2 per cent of GDP to combat terrorism. The AFP has deployed members of a Philippine Navy elite unit to areas of Tawi-Tawi and Zamboanga, which are considered to be strongholds of the Abu Sayyaf Group. But will these measures be enough to quell twin insurgencies? The government had promised to settle religious conflicts, resume talks and review the structure of the process of negotiations. Such measures and efforts were taken in the past but it had failed to bring peace in the region.

Moreover, on the verge of settling this conflict, people in Mindanao continue to suffer brutal military/police torture and degrading incarceration in Camp Bagong Diwa, notorious for the massacre of Moro suspects. Millions of US tax dollars fund the torture methods of the police and military establishment. It is important to note that the struggle against terrorist organizations must not come at the cost of people’s human rights.

The gross step taken by President Aquino for a general Ceasefire instead of revival of stalled peace talk has raised various questions on his peace policies. Is ceasefire a suitable and substantial measure to combat terrorism? Is immediate ceasefire agreement premature at this stage when talks have yet to resume?

The real problem-solving track is mainly through negotiation, complemented by various confidence-building measures on the ground, preventing the transfer of funds to terror groups from both internal and external agents, a military approach accompanied by other counter-insurgency measures, such as social, economic, material, cultural, and educational including downgraded negotiation which is usually localized.

Terrorism continues to pose a virulent threat not because of the lack of counter measures but because of terrorist groups’ enormous resilience to vigorously adapt to the changing environment and to diligently innovate their strategies and tactics based on their successful or failed operations. The continuous abduction and beheading of hostages by groups of Islamist extremist group is in retaliation for military operations against the terror group across Basilan.

Therefore, the effectiveness of the measures taken can only be successful if it is implemented at the ground level. Any humanitarian intervention in an area, to be truly effective, must begin with an understanding of the historical context. It is also important to grant equal opportunities to the Christian majority so that it won't play into the propagandist messages of the Islamic terrorist organizations. There is a need of good governance, delivery of basic social services, economic recovery, substantial development and security reform.  ASEAN should push not only for economic but also peace and regional stability in Southeast Asia. There is a need for a tripartite review of the Implementation of Final Peace Agreement between the government and the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) The new government must pay more attention to soft approaches, it should go beyond the use of military forces, and economic development initiatives should be taken in the conflict affected areas to undermine local support for militant groups. It is too early to give a judgment on the new government policies but they have to navigate a rocky road to achieve their goals of alleviating poverty, corruption and creating peace in Southern Philippines.