Nearly two weeks after the Kabul conference, which witnessed 70 plus countries taking part along with Hillary Clinton and Ban-ki Moon, the UN Secretary General, the end game is getting clearer. There seems to be a consensus at the international level, in terms of agreeing to President Karzai’s request that the security of Afghanistan be totally handed over to the Afghan National Army (ANA) and his government taking ‘total ownership’ of the administration. Meaning, that the international forces, by 2014 would have left completely, and that Karzai will be in absolute charge. What are the implications of this process, leading to a 2014 exit? What should be India’s strategies to meet the likely fallouts?

The above development of Karzai taking ownership of Afghan security and government should be read with three other recent developments – all of which have grave implications for India’s investments in Afghanistan and its likely strategies in the future. First was the peace jirga, held by Karzai a month before in Kabul, which suggested that the government of Afghanistan should start a process of negotiation with the Taliban. Second development was a meeting (now denied), sometime during May-June, between Karzai and Sirajuddin Huqqani (of the notorious Huqqani network, responsible for the attack on Indian investments, including the embassy in Kabul), brokered by none other than Gen Kayani, Pakistan’s Army Chief. Third development was the conclusion of Pakistan-Afghanistan Trade agreement (which excluded any transit rights to India).

All the above three developments, if seen together would show a pattern emerging, which includes the following. First, the decision by Karzai and his government to negotiate with the Taliban. What are they likely to negotiate? A general amnesty for the Taliban in return for Mullah Omar and Sirajudin Huqqani laying down their arms and promising a good conduct? Or a sort of understanding between the Taliban and Karzai in power sharing? The latter seems to be the most plausible outcome of this negotiation, which will fructify once the American led international troops start leaving Afghanistan. This is why Karzai seems to be in a hurry to ask the international force to leave, despite understanding the limitations of his ANA. The international community (especially the US) understands this; it appears, there seems to be a tacit approval for such a negotiation.

Second is the growing reliance of Karzai on Islamabad, especially on Pakistan’s Army and its ISI. This reliance is perhaps a tactical understanding; Karzai, perhaps believes there is no other option than to deal with the devil, which will otherwise lead to his downfall and the collapse of his regime. Pakistan, especially its ISI, by constantly pursuing a twin strategy of supporting the Taliban, yet undertaking select military operations against it, seems to have convinced Karzai and the US, there is no other way to deal with the situation, other than talking to the Taliban. The recent trade agreement between Pakistan and Afghanistan should be seen from this perspective.

Now, what happens to the Indian investments, which are more than a billion dollars now? What happens to New Delhi’s political investment in Karzai as a bulwark aimed at scuttling Pakistan’s influence? What are India’s options now?

First option is to cut losses and get out of Afghanistan. This is what the entire gamut of countries and donor agencies have concluded; Kabul conference deadline is an expression of this exit strategy. From US to Australia, countries have made huge investments – precious lives have been lost, and billions of dollars went in the drain (or in select Afghan pockets!). These counties have decided to cut their losses and get out; enough is enough seems to their mantra. India could also pursue the same strategy; it certainly is an option.

Second option is to start a negotiation with the Taliban. Since its return is imminent after 2014, if not before this deadline, why not talk to the Taliban and tell them that New Delhi would be only interested in building Afghanistan’s infrastructure, from roads to bridges and hospitals. Or, New Delhi could pressurize the US and Karzai, that it is willing to agree to their decision to negotiate with the Taliban, with a condition that its economic investments will be protected after 2014.

Third option is to explore working with the Northern Alliance (or what is left out of it) and considering the option of being present militarily, at least in the Northern Afghanistan.  Boots on the ground is an option that needs to be debated, instead of simply overthrowing it. The hypothesis that it would have negative implications on the Indian Muslim community needs to be tested. Such a substantiation (or accusation) that the Indian Muslim community will keep its religious interests in the forefront at the cost of national interest is unfounded. Did they ever object to the Indo-Pak wars or the huge Army presence in Kashmir valley?

Let there be a debate on all three options – both in the Parliament and outside. We have not run out the options; but the time is running out.

(This is a part of a series on Af-Pak region; forthcoming articles will focus on issues relating to the Afghan National Army, Chinese investments and the Afghan-Pakistan transit agreement)