Prospects of a Limited War in South Asia
02 Feb, 2000 · 320
Wg Cdr NK Pant reckons that a limited war with India will help Gen. Musharraf hold on to power for an indefinite period
General Pervez Musharraf’s threat to teach India a lesson is a highly irresponsible statement coming from Pakistan's Chief Executive. That successive generations of the Pakistani leadership are hell-bent to carry on with their revengeful agenda of is obvious from the repeated Indian offers for establishing confidence building measures(CBMs) which have fallen on deaf ears. Since the hand of friendship extended on several occasions during the last fifty three years of our freedom, including have been spurned, there is no alternative left for Indian policy makers but to start paying back in the same coin.
In a recent seminar, the Indian defence minister George Fernandes did well to refute the popular belief in military junta in Islamabad that its recently acquired nuclear umbrella will discourage New Delhi from a conventional armed retaliation against the decade long proxy war being waged by Pakistan’s Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) aan army in Jammu and Kashmir. The defence minister was emphatic that, while possession of nuclear weapons can only deter the use of nuclear weapons, the field remains open for conventional war. This strong assertion was in response to General Musharraf’s nuclear sabre rattling, when declared that Islamabad will resort to the use of nuclear weapons if it was threatened by India. General VP Malik, chief of the army staff lent operable military credence to the defence minister’s political exposition , in the same seminar by stating that future wars may remain limited because of credible deterrence obtaining. In his view, the constraint of not crossing the Line of Control (LoC) will not be applicable in a future war.
In the Indian context, any conflagaration on the LoC or the western frontier will be limited because of India’s large land mass and resources, whereas for Pakistan, because of its smaller size lack strategic depth, it will prove to be total war pushing it to the brink of abyss. The covert and overt hostile activities brazenly supported by it from across the border has vitiated the atmosphere to the extent that an armed conflict, albeit a limited one, can not be totally ruled out in the changed hostile circumstances. The conflict can take place despite international pressure and the existence of a nuclear deterrent on both sides, and despite an existing agreement not to attack each other’s atomic plants.
Here, it may not be out of place to mention that of a limited state of war with India will suit General Musharraf and his coterie of generals, as it will help them to hold on to the reins of power for an indefinite period by deflecting the attention of the populace from the political void and economic chaos prevailing in Pakistan. In the strict sense of the word, Pakistan is already at war with India for the last one decade by sending armed bands , groups, irregulars and mercenaries to carry out acts of aggression. Seen in this context, India has the full right to retaliate in self defence, justifying the use of military force.
The availability of nuclear weapons with both sides may restrict the limited war from escalating. It will be limited in terms of geography but have clearly defined yet restricted objectives. Such a restrained action is certainly against the concept of total military conflict in which the contenders are willing to make any sacrifice to obtain complete victory. Total war necessitates the mass mobilisation of manpower and orientation of all the organs of state for a national war effort.