In the wake of continued Naxalite violence, the Centre’s latest meeting with the Chief Ministers of Naxal-affected states on 14 July sought to review current strategy, with special attention given to increasing inter-state coordination. What new policy resulted from this meeting? Was the goal of increased coordination achieved? More importantly, is the often-stressed goal of coordination between states, often taken for granted as positive, really a viable component of a successful counter-Naxalite strategy?

Judging from the public remarks of the Prime and Home Ministers, the government is holding fast to the rhetoric of a two pronged strategy of development and police action. Chidambaram’s eight point plan indicates that the strategy will remain one of law and order, with a nod to development schemes. Towards the goal of increasing coordination, the most newsworthy of the eight points called for the creation of a ‘Unified Command for anti-Naxal operations’ among the state governments of the worst-affected states, Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and West Bengal. Headed by the Chief Secretaries of the respective states, the Unified Command will also have as members the states’ Director General of Police, Development Commissioner, Inspectors General of state police and CRPF, IB and state intelligence officials, and a retired Major General of the Army. Other new security measures included pledges to provide more helicopters for logistics support, additional SPOs, and an increase in funding to police stations.

Aside from these law and order measures, the plan pledged to set up a group to modify the implementation of development schemes, to improve road connectivity, and to consider a Special Development plan in affected areas with emphasis on roads, education, health care, and drinking water.

If the thrust of this meeting was to increase coordination between states, it would seem that the Unified Command achieves this goal. However, can the goal of coordination be taken for granted as a positive development? PM Singh and HM Chidambaram frequently harp on this theme. Chhattisgarh CM Raman Singh has even expressed need for an ‘integrated action plan’. But will such efforts actually yield benefits?

On one hand, coordination could certainly be a positive development if it means greater communication, intelligence sharing, and cooperation amongst states, as the CPI-Maoist operates across state boundaries.

However, the potential problem of increased coordination, or even more so integration, is that it could reduce the states’ flexibility to redress the localized nature of social justice grievances, which is ultimately the long-term solution that, thus far, has been ignored. If a Unified Command is a sign of a more centralized, one-size-fits-all security strategy, then coordination is a false hope that distracts from the root cause of Naxalism.

On a more basic level, coordination strategies themselves focus on only treating the symptoms of the problem, rather than the conflict’s origin. If a strategy is misguided, coordinating such a strategy will not help matters.

The root cause of Naxalite support originates from a wide variety of social justice grievances, which neither of the state’s two policy prongs, development nor police action, directly address. While both could potentially help, no person picks up a gun and joins the Maoist cause because of lack of access to education, healthcare, drinking water, or good roads. Millions in India go without these essentials, yet have not taken up arms against the state. Similarly, paramilitary force alone cannot remove the impetus to join such a violent movement in the long-term.

Violation of rights and similar social justice grievances more than any factor translate to Naxalite support. These grievances operate on a localized basis, which makes it more difficult for the Centre or a Unified Command to resolve. While a common theme in most cases would be land and forest rights, specific grievances could include physical abuse by authorities or dominant groups, unfair employment practices, discrimination, or humiliation. Each village may have a unique, local history as to how it came to support Maoist leaders, and so ultimately, state, district, and local administration are best equipped to solve these problems.

The pledge to implement PESA is the only point in this eight point plan specifically designed to address social justice grievances and restore rights to the populations in affected regions. With this lone exception, and considering the justified skepticism surrounding the 14 year old law’s implementation, very little is new in the plan.

As the casualties mount, accusations of New Delhi hiding behind the constitutional provision of law and order being a state problem will grow. Demands for the Army and Air Force will escalate. Unfortunately, even if the Centre was inclined to undertake these calls for stronger intervention, its ability to solve the problem, rather than treat its symptoms, on a long-term basis would seem extremely limited.  Rather than focusing on coordinating its policies, it would be more useful to revisit what the strategy should be in the first place.

While the consolidation of left-wing extremism into the CPI-Maoist has spurred the Centre’s efforts at coordination, the reasons behind the Maoists’ support remain local. Treating the symptoms of these social grievances, CPI-Maoist support, may require coordination, but eradicating the cause still ultimately requires a local solution.