With the American exit from Afghanistan getting nearer, many actors are now considering the option of negotiating with the Taliban. What should India do? So far India’s stated position hinted against any rapprochement with the Taliban – good or bad. Given the fact that India has invested hugely –politically, economically and strategically in Afghanistan, should New Delhi revisit this option?

Consider the following issues. First and foremost, the US is desperate to reach a deal with the Taliban. The entire idea of ‘good’ or ‘moderate’ Taliban is aimed for the American people and the international community, the need for negotiations with a section, which is not essentially bad. Especially after making that exit statement at the policy level, Obama will have to reach an understanding with the Taliban, for he and his administration believe that Karzai will be unable to sustain on his own.

Second, Hamid Karzai is also keen on reaching an understanding with the Taliban. The ‘peace jirga’ that he assembled last month in Kabul was an obvious effort to get the popular support for his decision to negotiate with the Taliban. His reasons are simple and straightforward, since Obama has already made his intentions clear to leave Afghanistan, Karzai has to ensure his personal safety and that of his regime. He is well aware that neither the Afghan National Army nor the Afghan Police is ready to take over and provide stability. He is also aware that there is no popular support for his regime, since his efforts to provide better governance is yet to reach the grassroots. The Afghan bureaucracy is highly corrupt and Karzai has been unable to deal with the same. Nor has he been able to create an economy outside of aid and drugs.

Once the international troops leave, Karzai will have serious issues in protecting Kabul itself, leave alone other major cities. He will face an onslaught from three directions – Hekmetyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, the Haqqani network from Jalalabad, and the Quetta Shura from Southern Afghanistan. Will the ANA be able to handle this three-pronged attack? Will Karzai continue to get the support of the leaders of the erstwhile Northern Alliance? How will the ethnic minorities – Tajiks, Uzbeks and Hazaras respond to this?

Karzai has already come to a conclusion that it is in his best interest to negotiate with the Taliban. As mentioned in Afghan Diary-I. Karzai cannot afford a Taliban takeover which would result in one more body of an ex-Afghan President hanging in the UN compound (or anywhere outside), badly mutilated and castrated, as happened to Mohammad Najibullah.

Pakistan has always been a strong supporter of this idea – talking to the Taliban. In fact, the idea of talking to the Taliban was propagated by Islamabad; the Americans only added an additional tag – ‘moderate’ or ‘good’ to convince themselves and the rest of the international community. Pakistan’s interest in supporting this dialogue is also easy to comprehend. This will provide them the strategic depth in Kabul, with one of their stooges either ruling or at least sharing power. It will also ensure that they win some of their lost image among the Pashtuns for taking a u-turn after 9/11. And more importantly, it will also enable them to talk to the other components of the Taliban, especially the TTP and the now increasingly attention gaining – Punjabi Taliban. Perhaps, these were the reasons behind the alleged meeting between the Army Chief Kayani, Sirajuddin Haqqani (of the Haqqani network) and Hamid Karzai.

If all the three major actors in Afghanistan are today willing to negotiate with the Taliban, what should India do? Given the fact that New Delhi has invested over a billion dollars in building roads, bridges, hospitals and other related activities, India has to digest the fact that it will have to face an ugly reality in Afghanistan. If there is a negotiation between Karzai and Taliban (with direct and indirect support from the US and Pakistan), what can India do?

India’s options are limited, yet there are few. First, India could object to any negotiation with the Taliban. Given the fact that the US is its ‘strategic partner’ India can voice its serious reservations about any such strategy vis-à-vis the Taliban. Second, on moral grounds, India can keep away from any such negotiation with the Taliban, irrespective of what Kabul, Islamabad and Washington do. In this case, India’s investments – economic and infrastructural will go down the drain, along with numerous other efforts aimed at building capacity in Afghanistan – from defence to education. In case of any future crisis involving Kabul, as it happened ten years ago after the hijacking of Indian Airline flight, New Delhi will be left stranded with no linkages within the government.

The third option is to put a rider to the negotiation of the three actors with the Taliban; that in principle, India will agree to the outcome, provided its investments are protected. Of course, neither the US nor Karzai can guarantee that. Finally, India can also open a dialogue with the Taliban.