Until recently, everyone in Afghanistan and Pakistan was well aware of the hostility that Karzai nurtured against Islamabad. However, the recent events, especially during April-June 2010 make one suspect, whether there is a change in Karzai’s end game vis-à-vis Pakistan.

Consider the following three events in particular, which are highlighted in international and Pakistani media. In late June, there were numerous reports in Pakistani media regarding the meetings that Karzai held with the ISI Chief – Gen Shuja Pasha and the Army Chief Gen Kayani. Of particular interest is the report alleging Kayani arranging for a meeting between Sirajuddin Haqqani and Hamid Karzai. According to Al Jazeera, Kayani not only arranged the meeting, but also took part in it. The linkage between the Haqqani network and Pakistan has been well known in the international circles. Pakistan, especially it’s military and the ISI have invested substantially in the Haqqani network, which is considered to be their trump card in Afghanistan once the American-led international troops leave. It is also widely believed that Pakistan has used the Haqqani network to target the Indian interests in Afghanistan. The attacks that were carried out on the Indian embassy in Kabul are believed to be the handiwork of the Haqqani network.

Second, was the sacking or the resignation of two important officials in Karzai’s bureaucracy – Amrullah Saleh, the intelligence chief of Afghanistan, who headed the National Directorate of Security (NDS) and Mohammad Hanif Atmar, the Interior Minister of Afghanistan. While both were reported to have resigned for their failure to prevent the attack on the Afghan peace jirga, there is an understanding that they were asked to leave. Amrullah Saleh, in particular was totally against the ISI’s involvement in Afghanistan. He has been quoted as saying: “The ISI is part of the landscape of destruction in this country, no doubt, so it will be a waste of time to provide evidence of ISI involvement. They are a part of it.”

Amrullah Saleh is a Tajik and a protégé of Ahmed Shah Masood, the most famous Afghan Mujahideen leader from the Panjshir Valley. Of all the Mujahideen leaders who fought the Soviet, Masood was well known for his hostility towards Pakistan and its ISI. He was never on ISI’s payrolls, and waged a war with the Soviet troops on his own, with the help of other Tajiks. He was also against the Taliban and al Qaeda; the fact that he was assassinated days before 9/11 reflects the research that the Taliban and al Qaeda had carried out. The Taliban and al Qaeda were well aware, if there were to be an American response, Masood would become central to any such strategy. As the intelligence chief, Saleh is against any negotiations with the Taliban, whether it is the Haqqani network or the Quetta Shura. As highlighted above, he is also against the ISI.

The third event which needs to be noticed in this context is a report, announcing the understanding between Kabul and Islamabad, in terms of training few Afghan military officials by Pakistan. The number may be small – perhaps in dozens, but the symbolic value of such an understanding is significant. Currently, the bulk of this training is undertaken by the US aid – amounting to more than US$27 billion, and by India.

What do the above events indicate? Are they unrelated, or hint towards a pattern? Is Karzai changing his strategy – in terms of how he sees the Afghan end game vis-à-vis Pakistan’s role? Everyone understands that Karzai is in favour of reaching an understanding with the Taliban. He cannot be blamed for that. Once the Americans, under the leadership of Obama, made it clear that the US was not intending to stay for long in Afghanistan, Karzai had to take care of his future in Kabul. Karzai cannot afford a Taliban takeover resulting in one more body of an ex-Afghan President hanging in the UN compound (or anywhere outside), badly mutilated and castrated! What did the international community do then, in 1996, when this happened to Mohammad Najibullah?

Perhaps, Karzai has already made a plan – to reach out to the Taliban, or at least reconcile with those who are willing to work with him. For long, the US has also been searching for a moderate or a good Taliban. Pakistan has been projecting the Haqqani network as the moderate/good Taliban, with whom Karzai and Obama could deal with.

Sacking of Amrullah Saleh, perfectly fits into this strategy. Saleh is against any negotiation with the Taliban and is an avowed anti-ISI and anti-Pakistani man. There could never have been an understanding between Karzai and Haqqani, as long as Saleh continued as the intelligence chief. Perhaps, this was the precondition from the Pakistani side, for any rapprochement between Karzai and Haqqani. Obviously, the training of few Afghan officials in Pakistan is a part of a new confidence building strategy.

Karzai has every right to take decisions based on what he considers as his best interest. Will he become another Rajapakse, who deftly played Indians and Pakistanis and got what he wanted? What will happen to the Indian investments in Afghanistan?

Related Links

"Karzai and Kayani met Haqqani: Al Jazeera,"

"Pakistan puppet masters guide the Taliban killers," The Times, 13 June 2010,

"Gen Kayani denies secret Karzai-Haqqani meets," Dawn, 01 July 2010,

"Some Afghan military officers to get training in Pakistan," Washington Post, 01 July 2010