The ousting of Thaksin Shinawatra created new divisions in the Thai society which are beyond repair, and the recent two months extended crisis bears witness to this. Since international influence played a vital role in bringing about democracy in Thailand in 1992, inevitably it is interesting to know, what exactly are the ASEAN, US, UN and EU responses to the recent Thai crisis? How is it comparable to the international response mooted out in 2006 coup? In what ways could the international community be more proactive towards future Thai political crisis?

ASEAN response to Thailand was initially quite lukewarm as at the 16th ASEAN summit held on 8th April 2010, the concentration was on Myanmar’s internal political situation and the upcoming elections whereas Thai crisis was not raised. Later individual statements of concerns were raised by Vietnam, Singapore and Indonesia and finally a statement was issued by ASEAN which mentioned that ‘peace, stability and the development of Thailand are crucial for driving the region towards the target of becoming the ASEAN community in 2015.’ The ASEAN Intergovernmental Commission on Human Rights (AICHR) was considerably active as it urged the two parties to negotiate and also decided to appoint a regional fact finding team to investigate human rights’ violations.

US response to this crisis was quite a proactive one as several incidences of active behind the curtain diplomacy have emerged. Though there are no indications of the suspension of aid as yet, the State Department issued a statement encouraging the parties to seek negotiation. Secretary Kurt Campbell visited Thailand in March and called upon both the parties to resolve their disputes peacefully and also met former Thaksin cabinet minister Jaturon Chaisaeng, currently one of the red shirts leaders and Noppadon Pattama, a former foreign minister and legal advisor to Thaksin to this end. Additionally few rounds of discussions during those two months of turmoil were hosted by Eric John, the US ambassador, with Niphon Phromphan and Jaturon Chaisaeng, to find out some solution so as to help Thailand overcome its political predicament.

The UN and EU responses were quite measured as Thailand from the outset refused any external intervention in its internal affairs. On 15th May, UN chief, Ban Ki Moon strongly urged both sides for a dialogue in order to deescalate the situation and resolve the matters peacefully; this was in response to the clashes which occurred after Abhisit Vejjajiva shelved the plans for elections in November. EU also released a similar statement and reciprocated the need of an external mediation.

It’s clear from the above international responses that most of the international actors could not make a sustained effort to bring the political crisis under control, partly because of Thailand’s stance on non-interference in its internal affairs and also because many of them were restricted by their own interests in Thailand. ASEAN was bound by its norm of ‘non-interference’ whereas US was keen upon not alienating one of the most important strategic allies in the Southeast Asia that ensures its presence in the region, the importance of which is further accentuated with a rising China. When two notable actors were unable to act in a decisive way, UN and EU did not stand much chance of influencing the situation either. However, the fact should not be overlooked that compared to the 2006 coup, international response over the present crisis was somewhat a proactive one. ASEAN during 2006 neither issued any statements of concern nor condemned the overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra. United States suspended $29 million in military aid and withheld a free trade pact then under negotiation.  These were quickly reinstated after 2007 parliamentary elections when People’s Power Party (PPP) came into power headed by Samak Sudaravej and Somchai Wongsawat, eventually no action was taken by US when PPP was ousted. Similarly, UN Secretary General Kofi Annan and EU had only made a formal appeal to restore democracy. Interestingly, none of the parties had called for the restoration of the Thaksin government.

Thus comparing the international responses over these crises, it could be easily judged that ASEAN this time acted enthusiastically as it issued many statements and encouraged the parties to involve themselves in a negotiation; US skill fully utilised its democratic leverage too. As a regional grouping, ASEAN will have to play a pivotal role in future Thai crisis, since it has embarked upon a process to form an ASEAN community by 2015. Solidarity and constructive engagement are essential factors for a strong foundation of a community. Lessons should be learnt from the recent Greek crisis and the common stand of EU on this matter or the way the not so distant Honduras coup was dealt by the Organisation of American States (OAS), whereby Jose Miguel Insulza, the Secretary General of OAS gave an ultimatum to the de facto government to reinstate President Manuel Zelaya. ASEAN and the international community need to establish proper mechanisms for dealing with political turmoil in Thailand as the social fabric of the country is already in tatters and only international mediation could resolve the matters for good.