Every year, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) comes out with an Annual Report like many other ministries in the Government of India. Considered as a key document on India’s defence policy, the report covers the financial year and is published sometime in the months of April or May. However, unlike countries like the US and China whose defence documents are eagerly awaited, the Indian report hardly gets any TRP ratings in the media and often goes unnoticed. Hence, when the MoD report for the year 2009-10 was published recently, very few took note of it.

Part of the reason could be that the MoD report is overtly transparent. Call it a bane or boon of democracy, the report is structurally comprehensive and is a virtual report card on different aspects of MoD’s functioning, leaving little scope for guess work. However, the report does miss out on a realistic expression of security concerns facing the country. India may have heaved a sigh of relief on the conclusion of the civil war in Sri Lanka, but new fronts such as increased maritime piracy in the gulf of Aden and a concurrent increase in Chinese presence in the area add to the volatile security environment around India. Internally, the Maoists defy the Central Government’s authority almost on a daily basis. The management of these concerns has challenged New Delhi for quite some time. Unfortunately, there is no pecking order to facilitate India’s response, as the report shows.

Lack of prioritization also prohibits India from formulating and showcasing a grand strategy as a response to myriad security challenges. There have been some policy responses to Chinese strategic consolidation in border areas, with India declaring its intention to improve the same on its side of the LAC. Many would, however, like to know how India would respond to the menace of maritime piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the resultant Chinese presence or the increasing problems for US-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan or the increasing internal problems in Pakistan.

Perhaps there is space to streamline India’s security concerns that should also focus on developing a correlation between the security and development aspects of Honourable Prime Minister’s vision of ‘inclusive growth’ with equal consideration for financing, planning and doctrinal aspects. The Chinese defence policy since 1978 and the White Papers on Defence since 1998 have been highlighting China’s approach and changes on the above issues. China has been seeking peaceful peripheries so that it could concentrate on its developmental goals. It redefined the very concept of ‘security’, imbibing developmental aspects. There is no reason why India cannot emulate the Chinese example.

The Annual Report also needs to market adequately the positive developments, for instance, India’s defence sector having some implication in international relations. India has been one of the largest contributors to the UN Peacekeeping operations with over 9000 manpower commitments in some of the most dangerous conflict spots. A major portion of these troops are from the infantry who bear the brunt in these war zones. And yet, there is no commensurate advertisement of our contribution to UN peacekeeping. Witness on the other hand, the Chinese marketing of their peacekeeping operations both in their official documents and through ‘sponsored’ publications in SIPRI. One must know that China has less than 2000 manpower commitment, with no participation of infantry, since the focus is on engineering units to manipulate lucrative deals in host countries.   

The report need not be couched with diplomatic sweeteners and must call a spade a spade! While Chinese military modernization with double digit growth and strategic consolidation and infrastructure building in Sino – Indian border areas was quite evident; Indian official reports were silent, leaving others to bring home the point. It was only last year that the report was candid enough to note the developments and showcase India’s concerns. Unfortunately, these genuine concerns have again been put under the carpet in this year’s report.  

The Annual Report should enunciate Indian perspective on security, the short term and long term policy objectives to underline this perspective and the proposed institutional and organizational changes to implement this perspective. While the MoD has an excellent History Division to write the history of military operations, it does not have a research cell that could support the formulation of a futuristic Annual Report. This also explains why much of the report is repetitive over the years with very little futuristic research.  

Apart from the reports by the Standing Committee of Parliament on Defence, India does not publish much on defence on regular basis. The ‘Defence Minister’s Directive’ is confidential and meant only for top brass of defence forces. The draft National Security Strategy and defence planning guidelines are still being discussed and evaluated by the Integrated Defence Staff (IDS) Headquarters. Hence, it is all the more imperative to make the Annual Report of the MoD meaningful by drafting it along realistic contours. 

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