History, they say, has a way of repeating itself, first as a tragedy, and then as a farce. These dour thoughts have reared up after news leaked out in end-March that Pakistan and China had finalized a civilian nuclear deal.  China was to provide loans and technical assistance to Pakistan for building two atomic power plants. It has now been revealed that China has signed a US$2.375 billion agreement for supplying two 340MW power reactors to Pakistan. Beijing would also loan some 80 per cent of the project cost. These reactors, designated Chashma-3 and Chashma-4, will be erected alongside Chashma-1, attained criticality in 2000, and Chashma-2, that will became critical in 2011.

So, where does history enter this picture? Here it needs digressing to recall that India and the United States had reached an agreement in July 2005 envisaging civilian nuclear technology cooperation, which fructified into a ‘123 agreement’ in 2008 to amend the US law and permit nuclear technology exports to India. The remarkable aspect of this ‘123 agreement’ is that India had been sanctioned earlier and made ineligible to receive civilian nuclear technology, ever since its nuclear testing in 1974 and again in 1998. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) stipulates that nuclear technology cooperation is only available to NPT signatories. India, along with Pakistan and Israel, are the three countries that are non-signatories to the NPT, termed ‘holdouts,’ and ineligible therefore to acquire nuclear technology. The United States, incidentally, has been the main protagonist of non-proliferation, and is an original signatory to the NPT.  Why then, did the United States take the extraordinary step to make India an exception to the NPT’s provisions, and the injunctions of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), established to control and restrain nuclear technology transfers even to NPT signatories.

Many reasons can explain this American benevolence, like President Bush’s personal inclinations alongside his policy to checkmate China and mould the Asian security architecture. China had sought, unsuccessfully, to obstruct the nuclear deal at that time. It encouraged dissenters in the NSG to question the propriety of the nuclear deal by making India an exception to its guidelines. A strong demarche by India and American pressure dissuaded China from continuing with its obstructive tactics.  More insidiously, China had voiced its right to offer Pakistan a similar deal, despite the latter’s appalling non-proliferation record. Indeed, China could hardly indict this appalling record after assisting its evolution. There is ample evidence that China supplied the design information for making a nuclear device to Pakistan, besides supplying sensitive nuclear equipment and ballistic missiles, with their associated production technology.  

The basic point worth stressing here is that Pakistan has been assiduously seeking a civilian nuclear deal from China, but also from the United States to gain parity with India. The Bush administration categorically refused to consider a US-Pak nuclear deal due to its proliferation concerns; read AQ Khan. The Obama administration has not been categorical, but has urged that China must seek prior approval from the NSG to wage its battle there. The US cannot pursue any other policy at this juncture with the NPT Review Conference in session. Whether China will bash on regardless is another matter. Chinese officials have argued that the supply of Chashma-3 and Chashma-4 was included in the earlier agreement of 1985 pertaining to the supply of Chashma-1 and Chashma-2.  This position has been disputed by the United States and India. The Chinese reluctance to place this matter before the NSG only reflects its lack of confidence in being able to persuade that body to concur, in appreciation of the blatant proliferation record of both Pakistan and China. Will the two partners go ahead to consummate their nuclear deal? Will China blink after creating a scare in the NPT Review Conference and establishing its centrality, if only in the spoiler role?

Apropos, the Indo-US nuclear deal is gaining adverse attention from the non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT. They have highlighted the iniquity of India being allowed to retain its nuclear weapons and gain access to nuclear technology, despite being a non-signatory to the NPT. The role of the United States is significant here. An official statement by Washington reiterated the legal position that China must seek the NSG’s concurrence before transferring the two nuclear reactors to Pakistan. But, at a recent Ministerial-level meeting in Washington between the two countries the United States appreciated Pakistan’s energy needs and agreed to assist its conventional energy program. Did the Obama Administration also agree to China transferring the reactors to Pakistan, while objecting for the record? Speculative, perhaps? But, the answers to these questions will unfold very shortly.

How will a Sino-Pak nuclear deal reaching fruition after the Indo-US nuclear deal affect the NPT Review Conference? Hasten its demise? Watch this space.