Ajmal Kasab: Battle Won; What about the War?
07 May, 2010 · 3119
D Suba Chandran assesses the impact of the verdict on Ajmal Kasab
The court has given the verdict on Ajmal Kasab, the lone gun man, who was captured alive during the terrorist attack in Mumbai in October 2008. The court after serious deliberation of the arguments put forward and against, and based on evidence, has convicted Ajmal Kasab. Whereas the Government of India considers it a message to Pakistan, the electronic media is on an over hype of whether Kasab should be hanged or given a life sentence. Is the conviction of Kasab an end of a terror story, or a beginning of a process? Clearly, the battle of 26/11 is won, but is India’s war against terror over?
The trial and verdict on Kasab should not be seen as against an individual. The conviction does not mean the end of the terror threat to India. It only signifies the beginning of a process. Ajmal Kasab has not acted on his own, and is a part of a larger network – the Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) led by Hafiz Saeed and supported sections of Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI). The verdict does highlight the role of LeT and the support base it has within Pakistan.
Will the verdict dampen the spirit of LeT, leading to an eventual stopping of militant attacks against India? This is unlikely, after 26/11, there was enormous pressure on the LeT to lie low, if not disband its network. Pakistan masqueraded Hafiz Saeed’s arrest, only to be released later by the Lahore High Court, on the basis that there was not substantial evidence. True, there was not substantial evidence, because the Pakistani government did not want to provide it to the courts. One is sure, if the Indian government would have produced similar evidence to any court in India, Hafiz would have walked free.
Clearly, Pakistan did not want to take action – military or legal against Hafiz Saeed and his LeT. What it wanted in terms of clear evidence from India was more political nitpicking than any sincere effort to nab LeT. Any amount of evidence would not have convinced the Government of Pakistan, because it did not want to get convinced. As a result, the Indian government also started slowing down in building a legal case against LeT to convince Pakistan. In this process, the legal questions on Hafiz and LeT, for political reasons, diluted the initial popular response in Pakistan to 26/11. In the immediate aftermath, there was so much of condemnation of the Mumbai attacks; but unfortunately, as the Government of Pakistan dragged its feet on legal issues, the public opinion inside Pakistan also started slowly changing. Whereas for India, 26/11 is an emotional issue even today, for the government and people of Pakistan, it is more a legal issue.
Given this difference, Pakistan is unlikely to take any effective action against the LeT. Nor, will there be popular pressure within Pakistan forcing Islamabad to curb the activities of Saeed. Unfortunately, India is not the US, and Lashkar and Hafiz Saeed are not al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden. What legal evidence did the US give to Pakistan for Musharraf to take a u-turn after 9/11?
The primary issue between India and Pakistan on terrorism is not the question of legality or proofs. It is also not the question of capability of Pakistan’s military and its ISI to dismantle LeT. Given the fact that LeT draws its cadres from Punjab and not from the lawless FATA region, with clear safe havens across the border, controlling LeT should not be an issue of capability. Rather, it is the question of whether the government and people want LeT to be controlled.
LeT is likely to continue its attacks. In fact, it has already started in J&K. It is only a matter of time before it starts striking on one of India’s urban centers. This time, the attacks will be calibrated and not on Mumbai scale. There will be random terror attacks in smaller cities, like Jaipur, Varanasi and Hyderabad, or attacks on smaller scale in big cities, before another Mumbai type mega attack.
This is what India should be worried and concerned about. How to force Pakistan to act against LeT and how to prevent any future militant attacks in mainland India? Kasab is a small fry in the larger picture. With the conviction India has won the Mumbai battle. But the war against terrorism remains the bigger challenge. This should be a long drawn war; Kasab trial and verdict should be seen as the beginning of this arduous and painful task ahead.