The adoption of the 18th Constitutional Amendment Bill by Pakistan’s Parliament and its assent by President Asif Ali Zardari on 19 April 2010 is an event whose importance cannot be minimized. Its significance emanates not merely from the fact that an incumbent President has signed off his own powers voluntarily but also that an all-party committee of parliamentarians prepared the bill, just as the 1973 constitution which it restores.

The conventional view of Pakistani politics is that being a military-dominated country, such a drastic constitutional change cannot come about peacefully. In fact, there were apprehensions in the last few months that the country was heading towards a military coup. While such apprehensions have been belied, the implications of this important political development need to be examined for internal stability as well as foreign and security policy of Pakistan.

The last two years have witnessed a simultaneous process of restoration of civilian rule as well as reassertion of military’s power. The successful conduct of parliamentary elections in February 2008 was followed by the exit of General Pervez Musharraf in August 2008 and the reinstatement of Chief Justice Iftikhar Chaudhry in March 2009. Some of the achievements of the PPP-led government are the 7th National Finance Commission Award and a package of rights for Balochistan.

The military earned its kudos by starting military action against Taliban militants in Swat in May 2009, extending it to South Waziristan in June 2009 and to North Waziristan in 2010. It is said that action in North Waziristan which is the stronghold of al Qaeda was the result of a deal with the US whereby the Pakistani army would be allowed to play a dominant role in all strategic decision-making. The army was allowed to arrest nine leading Afghan Taliban leaders, including Mullah Baradar, so that it could call the shots while negotiating the final dispensation in Kabul. The army’s leading role also became obvious by the presence of the army chief General Ashfaq Kayani, as an important interlocutor in the strategic dialogue with the US in Washington in March.

The strategic dialogue in Washington which gave Pakistan the most important role in the Afghan settlement is the prime example of civil-military harmony on security-related issues. If that be the case, can the same be said about political issues? Would the 18th amendment have been possible without the support of the army? Does it mean that Pakistan is headed for a good working relationship between the civilian government and the army?

Working on this hypothesis, it is important to examine the implications for India. There are three issues which currently bedevil India-Pakistan relations, apart from Kashmir. The three issues are Balochistan, river waters, and Pakistan sponsored terrorism as alleged by India.

It has been alleged by Pakistan that India has contributed to the rise of nationalist agitation in Balochistan in the last few years. But, Mushahid Hussain, a senior leader of PML (Q) and a former chairman of the Parliamentary Committee on Balochistan wrote in Newsline of June 2009, “The track record of the federal government in dealing with Balochistan is truly abysmal …. There is a long trail of missed opportunities, broken promises and outright deception in dealing with a proud people who rightly feel they have neither received the respect they deserve nor been treated with dignity by the central authorities, who have a propensity to use force to impose their diktat.”

Pakistan has alleged that river waters are being stolen by India. But, Pakistan’s Foreign Minister Shah Mehmood Qureshi stated in an interview to a Pakistani news channel on 2 April 2010, “The average canal supplies of Pakistan are 104 million acre-feet and the water available from the farmgate is about 70 million acre-feet. Where do the 34 million acre-feet go? It is not being stolen in India; it is being wasted in Pakistan.”

As regards India’s complaint about Pakistan sponsored terrorism, read the following lines in The Herald of February 2010, “If you live in central Punjab and are interested in waging ‘jihad’ against India, all you have to do is follow three easy steps. One: sign up at a recruitment office; you can find at least one of these in almost every town in the region …. Two: attend a three week long training programme … at a camp in Muzaffarabad or Manshera. Three: cross the border into Indian-administered Kashmir with arms and instructions provided by the people who recruited and trained you.”

If we accept the fact that Pakistan’s military and civilian authorities have tended to work together on matters pertaining to domestic politics and those related to the United States and Afghanistan, it would be fair to assume that they are in complete unison on matters pertaining to India as well. While the adoption of the 18th amendment could provide hopes of a true democratic revival in Pakistan, it will be a matter of deep despair if the consequence will be a hardened national stance against India.