As a prelude to the forthcoming NPT Review Conference that begins next week and will last for most of May, President Obama has accelerated the global non-proliferation agenda. The US Nuclear Posture Review was announced earlier this month, which seeks to reduce the role of nuclear weapons in US national strategy; a new arms limitation agreement [new START] has been negotiated between the United States and Russia to drastically reduce long-range missiles in their nuclear arsenals; and, finally, the Nuclear Security Summit has identified the security and safety of nuclear materials as constituting the present nuclear non-proliferation danger. The Iranians held their own rival summit thereafter, and secured the presence of 60 countries, in contrast to the US Nuclear Security Summit that had 47 countries attending. 

However, the United States has conceded that it is unable to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), as promised last fall. The US Senate has to reach this decision by a two-thirds majority, meaning 67 out of 100 votes. President Obama and the Democrat Administration do not have these votes unless some Republicans indulge in cross-voting. This has occurred before, but whether it will happen again for ratifying the CTBT is uncertain. The new START agreement is also in trouble. The United States and Russia had agreed to lower their strategic warheads to 1,550, and limit their nuclear delivery vehicles -- missiles, submarines and bombers -- to 700. Another 100 are permitted in reserve. Again, two-thirds of the US Senate must vote in favor of this new START agreement before it can enter into force. But Republican Senators have serious objections to the provisions in the new START that bars Washington from arming ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic missiles with missile interceptors. Obama officials have argued that new START does not limit its missile defense options, because they were never in favor of pursuing such efforts, but this explanation has only heightened skepticism. The issue in contention between the two former adversaries, in truth, is missile defenses, which the United States is committed to establishing to assure the security of its partners and allies. The Russian Duma also needs to ratify the new START Agreement. But Russia views US missile defenses as designed to degrade its deterrent and permit the United States to acquire a preemptive nuclear capability. Whether new START will be ratified by the two countries is quite uncertain.

These issues could arise in the Conference. Other battle lines are evident. The United States will call for strengthening the grand bargain that upholds the NPT and is embodied in it; that bargain envisages that nuclear weapon powers shall move towards eliminating their nuclear stockpiles; in lieu, the non-nuclear weapon states shall refrain from acquiring nuclear weapons, but all member states are entitled to pursue peaceful atomic energy programs. The United States will call for stronger action against Iran, which is assiduously pursuing its uranium enrichment program with a cavalier disregard for its obligations under the NPT. Similarly, North Korea has also flouted its commitments to the NPT by pursuing a clandestine nuclear weapons program and conducting two nuclear tests. It has transferred nuclear technology to Pakistan, Myanmar and Syria. The United States will, most likely, press for enhancing the existing sanctions upon Iran, perhaps imposing them on petroleum products to exploit Iran’s limited refining capacity. A premium would also be placed on North Korea returning to the Six Party talks and capping its military nuclear program.

For its part, Iran has raised the stakes in its own parallel Summit to rail against US double standards by highlighting its benevolence towards Israel—which has assured Iran an attentive ear in the Middle East and Gulf countries. Further, Iran has also publicized the exceptional treatment meted out to India under the Indo-US nuclear deal, which permits India to obtain nuclear technology and retain its nuclear weapons. Now China seems favorably inclined to providing a similar nuclear deal to Pakistan, and it would be difficult for the United States to seriously object. Consequently, all three holdouts—Israel, India and Pakistan—are likely to be accommodated within the NPT structure. What message does this convey to the other non-nuclear weapon states in the NPT? Iran seems likely to exploit their resentments against these anomalies in the NPT.

It is worth recalling that the last NPT Review Conference in 2005 ended badly with the 189 member nations assembled being unable to reach consensus on any substantive issue. Several issues remain in contention at present.  These contentions should manifest themselves in the first few days of the Conference; the remaining time will be spent in a slugfest between the contending antagonists; hence the prospect of a consensus document emerging at the end of this exercise is quite uncertain.