The recent incident in New Delhi which resulted in the radiation poisoning of five scrap metal workers has highlighted concerns about the country’s nuclear safety and security.

The incident coincided with the Nuclear Security Summit which would focus on these issues in the context of preventing terrorists from gaining access to nuclear materials. In addition, a Nuclear Safety and Liability Bill is under consideration by India to fix liability for nuclear incidents in the country. According to the Department of Atomic Energy, the Board of Radiation and Isotope Technology is the principal supplier of the radiological substances to licensed authorities, and follows a strict supply, monitoring and retrieving mechanism to ensure the safe use and disposal of radioactive waste. How radioactive substance managed to find its way into a crowded market in Delhi, and it took five days for the authorities to deal with this problem reflects poorly on India’s radiation detection arrangements but also on its management of radiological substances..

Radiological waste is any material which releases radiation that has been or will be discarded as being of no further use. While it may have lost its utility for its authorized purpose, it can become a deadly weapon in the hands of anti-social elements, including terrorists, who can use the material to make a ‘radiological dispersal device’ or RDD. A RDD is referred to in common parlance as a ‘dirty bomb’, a bomb which can disperse radiological material over an area and cause death, injury and widespread panic, depending on the lethality of the explosive device. It is established that terrorist groups like al Qaeda have persistently attempted to acquire radiological materials for making a nuclear device, or a far more easily manufactured RDD.

The incident in Delhi is not the first example of radiological material making its way into unauthorized hands. Unfortunately, while the Indian Prime Minister has repeatedly maintained that India has an ‘impeccable’ record in nuclear security and safety, there have been many documented instances of such incidents that should be of concern to the security establishment.

One of the earliest such incidents involving accidental radiation occurred on 27 July 1991 when a number of labourers were affected by radiation poisoning at the heavy water plant in Rawatbhata in Rajasthan. In November 2009, over 50 workers at the Kaiga Nuclear plant were hospitalized after they showed symptoms of radiation poisoning. Investigations into this incident showed that the workers had ingested Tritium, which was maliciously mixed in a water cooler at the plant.

In another incident, workers at the Waste Immobilization Plant (WIP) at Tarapur were affected by radiation when a co-worker had deliberately placed a few drops of radiological waste in the working premises. The incident came to light when instruments kept in the laboratory for measuring radiation registered abnormal radioactivity.

The absence of simple security measures has frustrated investigations into these incidents of radiological poisoning. The Minister of State in the PMO, Prithviraj Chavan, admitted in the Indian Parliament that the government had not installed CCTV cameras in the nuclear facility. According to him “the government would install cameras and CCTVs in all such areas.” However, in facilities at Kalpakkam, security norms were not in place when a leak led to the mixing of two kinds of radioactive wastes leading to increased radioactivity in the area. Six workers were affected, and investigations showed that there were no monitors to detect the radiation level in the area, and that the workers were not wearing personal thermo luminescent dosimeters, which registers the radiation received.

Safety and security at nuclear mining sites and facilities are also repeatedly belied by reports of thefts and uranium smuggling rings operating in the states of Jharkhand and Meghalaya. In a shocking admission, former Jharkand Chief Minister Madhu Koda admitted that a ‘uranium-filled analyzer’ was reportedly stolen from a federal atomic facility near the densely-populated town of Rajrappa. In addition, facilities at cargo entry points and scrap yards warrant attention by the security agencies regarding the import of radiological waste materials from abroad. The Indian customs authorities have not yet installed radiation detection equipment at ports of entry making it very easy to smuggle dangerous nuclear material into the country.

Repeated incidents involving radiological waste from abroad have failed to jolt any national consideration of this issue. Even more telling is that the National Disaster Management Authority has not been able to move ahead on the subject of radiation terrorism as plainly evident in the slow pace with which the investigations on the Delhi incident is being handled. A major review of the preparedness in India to face the threat of nuclear terrorism and these radiological incidents is strongly warranted, especially due to the proposed increase of nuclear facilities in the country.