Obama’s ‘Surge Strategy’ in AfPak: the Indian Perspective
13 Apr, 2010 · 3093
Suba Chandran highlights the implications of Obama’s surge strategy for India
While there have been numerous criticisms about Pakistan’s cooperation or lack of it in the War against Terrorism, there has not been sufficient focus towards understanding the American end game in Afghanistan. Is the ‘Obama surge’ a primary objective or a mere strategy to achieve something else? What is likely to be the success of Obama’s surge, and what will that imply, especially for India?
What does the US want in Afghanistan? While it entered the country after the devastating event of 9/11, almost ten years ago, where does the American interest lie in Afghanistan today? Has there been a change in what Washington wants today, vis-à-vis what it wanted originally in 2001, when it invaded Afghanistan, with almost unanimous support from the international community? Is Obama today looking for the complete neutralization of Taliban, al Qaeda and their radical vision, and ensuring a democratic polity for Afghanistan, or is he only looking for a way out of Afghanistan, with acceptable damages to the al Qaeda?
It appears, for Obama and the US, democratic Afghanistan is neither an immediate nor a long-term objective; if democracy happens to be collateral of another objective or strategy, it is welcome and thereby desirable. What is more important for the US in Afghanistan is a stable government, irrespective of who will form it, as long as they do not give any space to the al Qaeda. If Karzai is unable to lead the US into this objective, and if a section of the Taliban is willing to undertake this cleansing, such a dispensation is acceptable.
The American end game today is the elimination of top al Qaeda leadership and ensuring a stable regime in Afghanistan, leading to an early exit of American troops. The entire debate on moderate Taliban is a part of this larger American end game in Afghanistan. The US is well aware, that Karzai is unlikely to provide a stable government and the Taliban is unlikely to relent. If a section of the Taliban, headed by Mullah Omar or anyone else, is willing to sever their connections with the al Qaeda and serve its top leadership in a platter to the US, they may ultimately become ‘good’ Taliban. Who knows, they may even get a noble prize for peace!
Such a strategy suits Pakistan. This is why the military and ISI are two timing the Taliban and the US. In fact, the US would silently prefer this two timing, though publicly oppose it. This is the only way that the CIA could reach out to the Taliban leadership, in their search for the moderate/good Taliban. The rest of the international community is equally hypocritical. From the UK to Australia, how many countries, whose troops are today fighting in Afghanistan, are willing to take the War on Terrorism to its logical conclusion, by effectively neutralizing Taliban and al Qaeda and establish a stable and democratic Afghanistan? In fact, the War on Terrorism is a misnomer; it is just a War on al Qaeda, to be precise, on Osama.
Then what does the surge strategy aim for? Any military official, who has some experience of fighting an insurgency similar to the one in Afghanistan will conclude without much difficulty, that the current level of numbers, including the surge in troops, will not be able to secure even two provinces of Afghanistan. Insurgency cannot be fought with insufficient troops, and through drones and technology alone. It is a long drawn war, with a clear message to the opponent that the government is willing to invest time and patience, and not a series of battles with a hint that the troops are looking for an early exit; that is required in Afghanistan. The Indian and Pakistani Generals who have fought in J&K, Northeast and Balochistan will attest to this.
The surge appears to be aimed at finishing the war and arriving at a result. It is almost like a T-20 game, when the need is for test match, that too, a prolonged series. Obama’s surge is programmed for an exit, with a hope that the troops surge would force the Taliban to negotiate. Until last year, the Taliban has not given any indication of giving up its fight. Whereas the White House and the Americans (along with the international community) are looking for a T-20 finish, the Taliban is willing to play a Rahul Dravid game – to take time, stay put and face the bouncers, but wear and tear down the opposition. The surge is aimed to create a crack in the wall, thereby forcing the Taliban to negotiate, providing the much needed space and a face saving exit for the US.
What will happen to India’s investments – political and infrastructural, once Obama’s surge finds a ‘moderate’ and ‘good’ Taliban and the Americans exit? Back to the 1990s, in which Afghanistan saw the world through the ISI; or the moderate Taliban being thankful to New Delhi for creating necessary infrastructure and putting all their eggs in Karzai’s basket. A simple answer is – with the US exit, the Karzai regime goes; and with his regime goes India’s interests.