When Home secretary GK Pillai said at a function in IDSA on 5 March 2010 that “the hardest fighting was still to come” against the Naxalites, few could have visualized that his statement would be proved right within a month. On 6 April 2010, the Maoist rebels killed 75 paramilitary policemen in an ambush in the thick forests of Mukrana in the Dantewada district of Chattisgarh (one of the strongholds of the Maoists). There were apprehensions expressed at the feelers coming from the Home Ministry that Operation Green Hunt had started yielding results and now when that apprehension has been proved right one needs to explore as to what went wrong with the Government’s comprehensive offensive against the Naxalites.

Insurgency can’t be won without cooperation and coordination from the state police forces and yet it turned out that merely one local constable was accompanying the CRPF personnel. It has been debated time and again among the security analysts that the key to success in any counter-insurgency happens to be the knowledge of the terrain and yet the para-military forces were moving with only one local constable who was familiar with the terrain. 

The incident also points towards a lack of strategic thinking on the part of the Ministry which led to the forces falling into the trap laid out by the Naxals. The forces were caught near Chintalnar-Tarmetla village and the CRPF team had been camping in the interiors of Tarmetla jungles for the last three days as part of a combing operation and area domination exercise as revealed by Dantewada Superintendent of Police, Amresh Mishra. In any counter-insurgency operation, a large force has proved to be counter-productive. It has been debated among the security analysts that smaller size force in a thinner jungle would be counter-productive and vice-versa. Untrained in specialist jungle warfare skills and operating in company-sized formations, the CRPF personnel had restricted themselves. Therefore, one finds a lot of depth in the statement made by KPS Gill that each person in the patrol was carrying a considerable load. How can anyone be expected to keep that level of alertness after such grueling march through the forest? Sending out a company on a four-day patrol into the forest was a ridiculous concept since Naxalites are not wandering around in these forests as big gangs to counter the police and yet it seems that no thought was given to these details before sending the CRPF on the task of area domination. 

Information coming from the Home Ministry points that the CRPF men were lured by false information provided by some informer despite the fact that the CRPF has no independent intelligence capability. How much the intelligence gathered really helps the counter-insurgency force is itself questionable considering that fact that the problem lies in locating exactly where the Naxals are hiding in deep forest which is very difficult to penetrate. The Naxals usually create their camp near an elevated land and place their sentries on top of the hill to keep track of the arriving police forces through night vision. They will easily retreat as and when they perceive that the battle is not going to be in their favour.

The Chattisgarh ambush was no different. The Maoists had hidden themselves and also laid the surrounding hillocks and bushes with mines knowing well that in case of an offensive, the security forces would be forced to recede to the surrounding hillocks and bushes. According to counterinsurgency manual the troops are supposed to move on foot and in small numbers and yet almost 80 CRPF personnel were present and that too on a vehicle which could easily be spotted from a distance. There was gross violation of the basics of fighting guerilla warfare and the troops paid heavily for the neglect.

It wasn’t a prudent step on the part of the Home Ministry to plan an offensive against the Naxalites under the guidance and supervision of the CRPF. It is the police who apart from having the knowledge of the culture, the ethos, and language of the people have a bond with the people. They also have a better chance of gathering information from local sources. The success of Greyhounds has shown how effective a trained state police force could be in fighting the insurgents and yet no lessons have been learnt from that.

It is true that success of counter-insurgency force in one state would lead to Naxalites taking refuge in the adjoining areas and to counter that one needs a coordinated and comprehensive offensive between the centre and the state. However in every state it should be the trained state police force who should lead the operation and the central forces should be assisting them. Every state affected with Naxalism should raise its own Special task forces (much on the pattern of Greyhounds) and then coordination should be sought among the Special Task Forces of different Naxal affected states. The role of the Centre should be to provide the resources and coordinate.