After the London Afghanistan Conference earlier this year, allies pledged to reinforce ISAF with another 9,000 soldiers. Germany, the third largest contributor to ISAF and the lead nation for Regional Command North (RC-N), agreed to moderately increase its troop contingent by an additional 500 soldiers. Besides the new deployments, the government reconfigured its Afghanistan strategy, finally reacting to the deteriorating situation in Northern Afghanistan. The new mandate was discussed and passed by parliament on 26 February 2010, but not without being disputed. During the debate, commotions resulted in the expulsion of the Left party due to unlawful demonstrations in the chamber.

The current German strategy is guided by the principle of ‘responsible hand-over’, laying an emphasis on reconstruction, training, and protection. With regard to reconstruction efforts, financial aid will be doubled to 430 million Euros a year to achieve four main objectives until 2013;  programs to create employment and income in rural areas shall reach about 75% of the population in the northern provinces (from 30%); constructing additional 700kms of all-seasoned accessible roads to improve infrastructure and help connecting rural areas with the provinces and districts; supply of electricity and clean drinking water for all provincial and half of the district capitals, increasing accessibility to 50% of the population (from 22%); training teachers and building schools to provide access to education for 60% of the population (from 25%). Germany will also contribute 50 million Euros to the fund aimed at reintegrating insurgents.

The strategy concludes that a greater emphasis has to be put on protecting the population and training the Afghan Security Forces. In order to expedite developing capabilities of the 209th ANA Corps, German forces will be reorganized. Two light battalions partly composed of new forces and units stationed at Mazar-e-Sharif and Kunduz will be responsible for training and protection, increasing manpower in this field form 280 to 1,400. Also, the number of federal police advisors will be raised from 123 to 200. An 11-month program, ‘Focused District Development’, will train and qualify 2,500 officers to take over responsibility in 40 districts. The number of German experts for the CSDP-EUPOL mission will be increased from 45 to 60.

Essentially in the right direction, the German strategy nevertheless, still lacks the robust commitment necessary to improve overall stability and security, without which reconstruction and proper training for Afghan forces is not feasible. In the past, an incomprehensible reluctance to actively and preemptively engage insurgents has resulted in a deteriorating security environment in the RC-N. German forces were primarily confined to their bases and only left for standardized patrols, making them prone to ambushes, losing contact with the population, dismantling protection for civil reconstruction teams, and thus providing the Taliban with an opportunity to regain territory in the north. A case in point was the alarmingly low number of troops designated for training and protection and the fact that the German Quick Reaction Force was stationed at relatively peaceful Mazar-e-Sharif instead of Kunduz. Indeed, the present strategy acknowledges the need to show more presence in the field, by taking territory and remaining there to secure it, but the means provided to do so are far from being adequate. Dissolving the Quick Reaction Force to integrate the soldiers into the training and protection battalions deprives German forces of an indispensable tactical reserve. As the German strategy failed to secure and stabilize the Northern provinces in the past and falls short of the necessary means to do so at present, the US is creating a fait accompli by deploying 2,500 – 5,000 troops to RC-N. Apparently, Germany not only refuses to participate in vital operations in the south, but also lacks the capacity and will to conduct these operations in the north. “I Saw Americans Fighting” must not become the slogan for Germany when an offensive in the north, like operation Moshtarak, is launched.

Meanwhile back home, public opinion surveys show that support for the ISAF mission is at an all-time low, with only 50% of the population backing it and 49% wanting an immediate withdrawal. But public opinion seems to be confused, if not even unqualified. Only 51% have heard of ISAF and actually know something about it, the rest has merely heard of it but doesn’t know anything about the mission. 75% want German forces to help with reconstruction, but reconstruction needs a secure environment and only 59% support the idea of German soldiers providing it. While this is still a majority, only 34% want German troops to fight the Taliban and only 31% are in favor of reinforcing the contingent.

Finally, the repercussion of the fatal air strike near Konduz last year has come to haunt the government again. Minister of Defense, Jung had to resign, and the armed forces chief of staff, General Schneiderhahn, as well as state secretary Wichert were sacked. The opposition parties are making political capital from the parliamentary enquiry into the air strike, and all this leaves observers with only one question: Is Germany really capable of conducting a demanding military operation like the ISAF in Afghanistan?