Tackling Maoist Terror
18 Feb, 2010 · 3064
M Shamsur Rabb Khan emphasizes the need to take the Maoist threat more seriously
In one of the biggest strikes on a state force on 15 February, armed Maoist guerrillas stormed an Eastern Frontier Rifles (ERF) camp at Shilda, 75km from Midnapore town and killed 24 jawans, besides looting 40 weapons. The outrageous and daring attack that took both the unsuspecting cops and the nation by surprise continued for more than an hour. According the Maoist guerrilla wing chief Kishanji, it was in response to Operation Green Hunt - a concerted operation against the Maoist rebels’ jungle bases that was launched in July 2009. Kishanji also warned of more attacks unless this operation was stopped. We have had many such Maoists’ guerrilla style ambushes on security personnel in the recent past, notable among which was the incident at Dantewara in Chattisgarh district where 54 Central Reserve Police Force (CRPF) jawans lost their lives in 2007, while we lost 67 security men in 2008. In 2009, a total of 51 cops have been killed in four separate ambushes in Maoist-infested states.
The Maoists have shown time and again that they can strike at will, and that they will not listen to the government’s appeal to shun violence. From stalling voting in Assembly elections to blowing up railway stations and taking officials hostage, the audacity of the Maoists has grown incrementally. The question is why, after all, have the Maoists been so successful in challenging the government? The answer is linked to how the government has responded to Naxal terror. If the government does not make swift changes in its policy, more and more Shilda-style massacres can be replicated. During the three-day bandh called by the Communist Part of India (Maoist) [CPI (M)] during 7-9 February 2010, the main target of attack was railway property. In the face of open challenge via terror, the government has treaded rather cautiously.
Let us focus on the obvious reasons for the widespread violence that Maiosts have unleashed in recent times. First, the political will to deal with Naxal terror has been mired in electoral politics that has emboldened the left-wing outfit in carrying on its subversive activities. Whether it is the Left government of West Bengal or the rule of Lalu Prasad-led Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) in Bihar, the soft approach of state governments has only aggravated the situation.
Second, the lack of a definite policy prescription to take on the Naxals to the point of finishing their violent ways is one reason why the country has not been able to put an end to the home-grown terrorism. Successive governments have given the least thought about using the army for a once-and-for-all battle against this menace. While the Prime Minister rated the Maoists as the single biggest threat to internal security, the overall approach of the government lacks seriousness in giving a fitting reply to the terror. While P Chidambaram asks the Maoists to shun violence and come for talks, the group shows aggressive increase in violence.
Third is the general perception or difference of strategic thinking in terms of cross-border terrorism and home-grown terrorism. For example, compare two recent terror attacks – the Pune blast and the attack on ERF jawans. In magnitude and number of human lives lost, Midnapore attack surpasses the Pune attack, but in overall media coverage, news space in dailies and nationwide impact, Pune terror attack has dwarfed the Midnapore attack. People, via letters to the editors of leading dailies, have reacted strongly and angrily against Pakistan, and rightly so, voiced their anguish against government. In the case of the Maoist attack however, very few have shown the same concern. We have panel discussions, experts’ views and wide range of opinions on almost all the TV channels, including interviews with various government officials on the possible perpetrators of the Pune blast, there is hardly any live debate on the Maoist ambush of ERF jawans.
Fourth, through their research work and writings, experts, analysts and authors have pointed out the economic disparity and social inequality in rural India, particularly land reform as the one big reason for the spread of Naxalism in poor villages where villagers are taking to arms and joining the violent movement, little has been done by the government to set things right.
Last, the Home Minister, after the Midnapore ambush, has condemned those who have erroneously extended intellectual and material support to the Maoists, thereby providing them with internal support. While in case of Pune-style cross-border attack, local connection and sleeper cells are the prime targets, no such effort has been done to zero in on such sympathizers of Maoists.
How long will the government allow the terror outfit to rule the 55 Naxal affected districts in the nine states where gun-toting guerrillas run a parallel government after sunset? When will the government become serious, like it is on cross-border terror, in tackling Naxal terror? How long will the people, media and sympathizers take to formulate a unified approach in dealing with the threat?
The Maoists have shown time and again that they can strike at will, and that they will not listen to the government’s appeal to shun violence. From stalling voting in Assembly elections to blowing up railway stations and taking officials hostage, the audacity of the Maoists has grown incrementally. The question is why, after all, have the Maoists been so successful in challenging the government? The answer is linked to how the government has responded to Naxal terror. If the government does not make swift changes in its policy, more and more Shilda-style massacres can be replicated. During the three-day bandh called by the Communist Part of India (Maoist) [CPI (M)] during 7-9 February 2010, the main target of attack was railway property. In the face of open challenge via terror, the government has treaded rather cautiously.
Let us focus on the obvious reasons for the widespread violence that Maiosts have unleashed in recent times. First, the political will to deal with Naxal terror has been mired in electoral politics that has emboldened the left-wing outfit in carrying on its subversive activities. Whether it is the Left government of West Bengal or the rule of Lalu Prasad-led Rashtriya Janta Dal (RJD) in Bihar, the soft approach of state governments has only aggravated the situation.
Second, the lack of a definite policy prescription to take on the Naxals to the point of finishing their violent ways is one reason why the country has not been able to put an end to the home-grown terrorism. Successive governments have given the least thought about using the army for a once-and-for-all battle against this menace. While the Prime Minister rated the Maoists as the single biggest threat to internal security, the overall approach of the government lacks seriousness in giving a fitting reply to the terror. While P Chidambaram asks the Maoists to shun violence and come for talks, the group shows aggressive increase in violence.
Third is the general perception or difference of strategic thinking in terms of cross-border terrorism and home-grown terrorism. For example, compare two recent terror attacks – the Pune blast and the attack on ERF jawans. In magnitude and number of human lives lost, Midnapore attack surpasses the Pune attack, but in overall media coverage, news space in dailies and nationwide impact, Pune terror attack has dwarfed the Midnapore attack. People, via letters to the editors of leading dailies, have reacted strongly and angrily against Pakistan, and rightly so, voiced their anguish against government. In the case of the Maoist attack however, very few have shown the same concern. We have panel discussions, experts’ views and wide range of opinions on almost all the TV channels, including interviews with various government officials on the possible perpetrators of the Pune blast, there is hardly any live debate on the Maoist ambush of ERF jawans.
Fourth, through their research work and writings, experts, analysts and authors have pointed out the economic disparity and social inequality in rural India, particularly land reform as the one big reason for the spread of Naxalism in poor villages where villagers are taking to arms and joining the violent movement, little has been done by the government to set things right.
Last, the Home Minister, after the Midnapore ambush, has condemned those who have erroneously extended intellectual and material support to the Maoists, thereby providing them with internal support. While in case of Pune-style cross-border attack, local connection and sleeper cells are the prime targets, no such effort has been done to zero in on such sympathizers of Maoists.
How long will the government allow the terror outfit to rule the 55 Naxal affected districts in the nine states where gun-toting guerrillas run a parallel government after sunset? When will the government become serious, like it is on cross-border terror, in tackling Naxal terror? How long will the people, media and sympathizers take to formulate a unified approach in dealing with the threat?
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