The furious debate on who will replace MK Narayanan as the new National Security Adviser (NSA) may seem unusual. Isn’t this another routine bureaucratic transition? There lies the rub. The NSA is not another bureaucrat. Narayanan had increased his powers, extended his empire, hoping to remain until the UPA continued in office. Narayanan had converted himself into what the media calls an ‘intelligence czar’.
In fairness, Narayanan’s predecessors in office, Brajesh Mishra and JN (Mani) Dixit had also converted themselves into ‘intelligence czars’. Even after becoming the NSA when the NDA came to power in March 1998, Mishra continued as the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee. The Cabinet Secretary became a nominal functionary although he is the recognized head of the Civil Services. But the locus of real power lay in the Prime Minister’s Office, headed by the Principal Secretary/NSA. In this capacity Mishra conducted negotiations with the Chinese, Japanese, French, Russians and Americans; became the pivotal link between the political and civil-military officials in the Nuclear Command Authority, and the arbiter of India’s foreign policy. A belief was circulated that a full-time NSA would be appointed in due course. This never happened.
Ultimately, a change of NSA became possible after the UPA government came to power in 2004. JN (Mani) Dixit was appointed the NSA with support in the relevant quarters, but without Mishra’s banyan-tree stature. Dixit did utilize his foreign policy expertise in framing high policy, but was unable to extricate himself from the demands of petty administration. For instance, he spent quality time negotiating (unsuccessfully) with the French to waive their prohibition on Sikh girls wearing headbands. After Dixit’s untimely demise in office, Narayanan was inducted as the NSA and immersed himself in overseeing the intelligence agencies, with which he was familiar, but also with conducting negotiations with China, Pakistan and so on, with which he was unfamiliar. It was also rumored that he spent quality time promoting the interests of the IB over the R&AW, and ensuring that ‘reliable’ officers joined important posts in the bureaucracy.
Where does the management of national security come into this picture? How was coordination between the several intelligence agencies and Ministries concerned with national security effected? Were institutional processes devised? Was the National Security Council advised on seminal issues like nuclear security or internal security? Nothing is known about this, but the grapevine informs that the NSA was too busy with other important issues to be concerned about such minor matters.
The limitations of bureaucrats being in the NSA’s post are painfully evident. A little history would be helpful to reveal how this happened, which goes back to the later eighties and stirrings in New Delhi that a National Security Council (NSC) was needed. A discussion paper, written out at that time, envisaged a basic problem. The National Security Council had only flourished in the United States, which has a Presidential system. Would that work in a Parliamentary democracy? Narasimha Rao was unconvinced, and rhetorically asked, “How is this body different from the Cabinet Committee on Security.” An anemic NSC was ultimately established with a 150-member non-official National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) that was designed to squabble and agree on nothing. In the event the NSC did not meet and the NSAB withered away.
Going back to the discussion paper, it strongly recommended that a heavyweight political personage in the confidence of the Prime Minister be appointed as the NSA. He would be a member of the NSC with full authority over all matters relating to national security. All intelligence agencies would function under him, since it was apparent that the distinction between external and internal security shades over each other. Unfortunately, the political class saw the NSA’s post as intended to sideline the ambitious, while the bureaucracy saw it as a comfortable post-retirement billet. The rest, to use the familiar cliché, is history. Of course, the theoretical question could be asked where is the political personage available to man the NSA’s post? Several could be identified. Whether they would be acceptable is another matter. The Indian democracy still lacks the confidence to appoint personages on the basis of talent rather than political acceptability.
Coming back to the present several retired bureaucrats jockeyed for the NSA’s post, the mantle has finally descended on Shiv Shankar Menon, a former Foreign Secretary. History has re-enacted itself as another farce, bit an additional complexity has been added. The Home Minister desires to establish a National Counter Terrorism Centre with a Director General holding responsibility for internal security, with oversight over the intelligence agencies and operational Ministries. How will this new ‘intelligence czar’ interact with the new NSA? Will internal and external security be separated with predictable disastrous results?
It is likely, consequently, that things will remain the same, while appearing to be different, with the bureaucracy continuing to dominate the scene.
In fairness, Narayanan’s predecessors in office, Brajesh Mishra and JN (Mani) Dixit had also converted themselves into ‘intelligence czars’. Even after becoming the NSA when the NDA came to power in March 1998, Mishra continued as the Principal Secretary to Prime Minister Vajpayee. The Cabinet Secretary became a nominal functionary although he is the recognized head of the Civil Services. But the locus of real power lay in the Prime Minister’s Office, headed by the Principal Secretary/NSA. In this capacity Mishra conducted negotiations with the Chinese, Japanese, French, Russians and Americans; became the pivotal link between the political and civil-military officials in the Nuclear Command Authority, and the arbiter of India’s foreign policy. A belief was circulated that a full-time NSA would be appointed in due course. This never happened.
Ultimately, a change of NSA became possible after the UPA government came to power in 2004. JN (Mani) Dixit was appointed the NSA with support in the relevant quarters, but without Mishra’s banyan-tree stature. Dixit did utilize his foreign policy expertise in framing high policy, but was unable to extricate himself from the demands of petty administration. For instance, he spent quality time negotiating (unsuccessfully) with the French to waive their prohibition on Sikh girls wearing headbands. After Dixit’s untimely demise in office, Narayanan was inducted as the NSA and immersed himself in overseeing the intelligence agencies, with which he was familiar, but also with conducting negotiations with China, Pakistan and so on, with which he was unfamiliar. It was also rumored that he spent quality time promoting the interests of the IB over the R&AW, and ensuring that ‘reliable’ officers joined important posts in the bureaucracy.
Where does the management of national security come into this picture? How was coordination between the several intelligence agencies and Ministries concerned with national security effected? Were institutional processes devised? Was the National Security Council advised on seminal issues like nuclear security or internal security? Nothing is known about this, but the grapevine informs that the NSA was too busy with other important issues to be concerned about such minor matters.
The limitations of bureaucrats being in the NSA’s post are painfully evident. A little history would be helpful to reveal how this happened, which goes back to the later eighties and stirrings in New Delhi that a National Security Council (NSC) was needed. A discussion paper, written out at that time, envisaged a basic problem. The National Security Council had only flourished in the United States, which has a Presidential system. Would that work in a Parliamentary democracy? Narasimha Rao was unconvinced, and rhetorically asked, “How is this body different from the Cabinet Committee on Security.” An anemic NSC was ultimately established with a 150-member non-official National Security Advisory Board (NSAB) that was designed to squabble and agree on nothing. In the event the NSC did not meet and the NSAB withered away.
Going back to the discussion paper, it strongly recommended that a heavyweight political personage in the confidence of the Prime Minister be appointed as the NSA. He would be a member of the NSC with full authority over all matters relating to national security. All intelligence agencies would function under him, since it was apparent that the distinction between external and internal security shades over each other. Unfortunately, the political class saw the NSA’s post as intended to sideline the ambitious, while the bureaucracy saw it as a comfortable post-retirement billet. The rest, to use the familiar cliché, is history. Of course, the theoretical question could be asked where is the political personage available to man the NSA’s post? Several could be identified. Whether they would be acceptable is another matter. The Indian democracy still lacks the confidence to appoint personages on the basis of talent rather than political acceptability.
Coming back to the present several retired bureaucrats jockeyed for the NSA’s post, the mantle has finally descended on Shiv Shankar Menon, a former Foreign Secretary. History has re-enacted itself as another farce, bit an additional complexity has been added. The Home Minister desires to establish a National Counter Terrorism Centre with a Director General holding responsibility for internal security, with oversight over the intelligence agencies and operational Ministries. How will this new ‘intelligence czar’ interact with the new NSA? Will internal and external security be separated with predictable disastrous results?
It is likely, consequently, that things will remain the same, while appearing to be different, with the bureaucracy continuing to dominate the scene.
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