Hasina's Visit: Nothing Concrete on Burning Issues
18 Jan, 2010 · 3046
Harun ur Rashid assesses the outcomes of Hasina’s Delhi visit
Sheikh Hasina’s visit to India has opened a new chapter of relations between the two countries. The 51-paragraph joint communiqué describes the aspirations, intentions and actions on all possible bilateral issues, the solutions to which have remained elusive since 1974.
The visit is a political one and common wisdom says that if the political climate is good and friendly, economic relations get deepened and a close interdependence between political and economic relations is widely recognized.
The visit has created an environment of mutual trust at a political level between the two countries and in that sense the visit can be termed as a success. Mistrust and suspicion have bedeviled bilateral relations and each country blamed the other for deterioration of ties. No bilateral issue moved forward except the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty and that was only under the earlier Sheikh Hasina’s government.
It was frustrating for Bangladesh not to be able to resolve bilateral issues as India held the key to settling these. India is either unwilling or reluctant to address the issues as they are not considered important for India.
Since independence in 1947, India has wrestled with two unsettling security issues, one is the Kashmir dispute and the other is the insurgency in the northeastern states and at one stage Nagaland, one of the seven states in northeast declared independence from India.
Bad relations between India and Pakistan had an impact on security issues. When Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan, it is alleged that Pakistan assisted the Indian separatists and sheltered them in East Pakistan. In response India had assisted the Shanti Bahini of Chittagong Hill Tracts.
In 1962 the brief war between India and China left contested border issues. While India attempted to stir trouble in Tibet in the 60s, China in return was reportedly involved in northeast India and India was gravely concerned about the security of its northeast frontier. In recent times China’s new confrontational stance over its claim to much of the one of the northeast states, Arunachal Pradesh, has been a concern for India.
One of the reasons for India’s assistance to the birth of Bangladesh, according to many observers, was not only to weaken Pakistan but also to dismantle the network used to assist separatists in India’s northeast.
Another motivation for India to turn a new page with Bangladesh is that given the depth of Chinese influence in Myanmar, India fears that Bangladesh could also come under China’s sway if it does not sincerely address Bangladesh’s needs.
Given this background, Bangladesh is strategically important to India and cooperation with Bangladesh is required. However, India perceived that Bangladesh was not playing its part in meeting the security challenges of India. India realised that Bangladesh became a safe haven for separatists and could be used as a transit in the flow of arms and weapons to northeast India.
During the days of Bangladesh government from 2001 to 2006, New Delhi had often accused Dhaka of providing shelter to militant groups active in India’s northeast. Bangladesh robustly denied the accusation but India was not convinced by the denial.
The scenario has dramatically changed with the Shekh Hasina’s government coming into power on 6 January 2009. The fact that has been of significant impact on India has been the commitment of the Sheikh Hasina government to get rid of extremists and militants that has led many insurgents including some prominent ULFA leaders of North East India to surrender to BSF and the government of India has taken full note of it.
On an examination of the contents of joint communique, it appears India could have removed at least 200 items (instead of only 47) from its negative list, and provided more time-bound framework to settle sea boundary and land boundary issues, although in water sharing, the communique has provided an early meeting at the Ministerial level by April 2010.
Indian diplomats earlier mentioned that there would be some “surprises” during the visit but the Bangladeshi people did not find any surprise in the promises except the credit line of $1 billion dollars, (reportedly the largest by India to any country in one go) for infrastructural development in Bangladesh.
It cannot be denied that there exist anti-India sentiments among certain people in Bangladesh because of India’s uncooperative policy towards Bangladesh in the past and the sentiment can only be removed if India quickly begins its process of implementing the promises on water sharing, land boundary and sea boundary as enumerated in the joint communiqué.
As they say the taste of pudding lies in eating. Bangladesh people want some of the intentions described in the joint communiqué to be in the process of implementation within 3 months because many in Bangladesh do not take India’s promises seriously. In the past, either the promises were not delivered or were put into cold storage due to the federal-state bureaucratic maze in India.
The visit is a political one and common wisdom says that if the political climate is good and friendly, economic relations get deepened and a close interdependence between political and economic relations is widely recognized.
The visit has created an environment of mutual trust at a political level between the two countries and in that sense the visit can be termed as a success. Mistrust and suspicion have bedeviled bilateral relations and each country blamed the other for deterioration of ties. No bilateral issue moved forward except the 1996 Ganges Water Treaty and that was only under the earlier Sheikh Hasina’s government.
It was frustrating for Bangladesh not to be able to resolve bilateral issues as India held the key to settling these. India is either unwilling or reluctant to address the issues as they are not considered important for India.
Since independence in 1947, India has wrestled with two unsettling security issues, one is the Kashmir dispute and the other is the insurgency in the northeastern states and at one stage Nagaland, one of the seven states in northeast declared independence from India.
Bad relations between India and Pakistan had an impact on security issues. When Bangladesh was a part of Pakistan, it is alleged that Pakistan assisted the Indian separatists and sheltered them in East Pakistan. In response India had assisted the Shanti Bahini of Chittagong Hill Tracts.
In 1962 the brief war between India and China left contested border issues. While India attempted to stir trouble in Tibet in the 60s, China in return was reportedly involved in northeast India and India was gravely concerned about the security of its northeast frontier. In recent times China’s new confrontational stance over its claim to much of the one of the northeast states, Arunachal Pradesh, has been a concern for India.
One of the reasons for India’s assistance to the birth of Bangladesh, according to many observers, was not only to weaken Pakistan but also to dismantle the network used to assist separatists in India’s northeast.
Another motivation for India to turn a new page with Bangladesh is that given the depth of Chinese influence in Myanmar, India fears that Bangladesh could also come under China’s sway if it does not sincerely address Bangladesh’s needs.
Given this background, Bangladesh is strategically important to India and cooperation with Bangladesh is required. However, India perceived that Bangladesh was not playing its part in meeting the security challenges of India. India realised that Bangladesh became a safe haven for separatists and could be used as a transit in the flow of arms and weapons to northeast India.
During the days of Bangladesh government from 2001 to 2006, New Delhi had often accused Dhaka of providing shelter to militant groups active in India’s northeast. Bangladesh robustly denied the accusation but India was not convinced by the denial.
The scenario has dramatically changed with the Shekh Hasina’s government coming into power on 6 January 2009. The fact that has been of significant impact on India has been the commitment of the Sheikh Hasina government to get rid of extremists and militants that has led many insurgents including some prominent ULFA leaders of North East India to surrender to BSF and the government of India has taken full note of it.
On an examination of the contents of joint communique, it appears India could have removed at least 200 items (instead of only 47) from its negative list, and provided more time-bound framework to settle sea boundary and land boundary issues, although in water sharing, the communique has provided an early meeting at the Ministerial level by April 2010.
Indian diplomats earlier mentioned that there would be some “surprises” during the visit but the Bangladeshi people did not find any surprise in the promises except the credit line of $1 billion dollars, (reportedly the largest by India to any country in one go) for infrastructural development in Bangladesh.
It cannot be denied that there exist anti-India sentiments among certain people in Bangladesh because of India’s uncooperative policy towards Bangladesh in the past and the sentiment can only be removed if India quickly begins its process of implementing the promises on water sharing, land boundary and sea boundary as enumerated in the joint communiqué.
As they say the taste of pudding lies in eating. Bangladesh people want some of the intentions described in the joint communiqué to be in the process of implementation within 3 months because many in Bangladesh do not take India’s promises seriously. In the past, either the promises were not delivered or were put into cold storage due to the federal-state bureaucratic maze in India.
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