The CTBT: To Sign or not to sign

12 Jan, 2000    ·   304

Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 31 Dec 1999
Speakers: Mr. Bharat Karnad, Mr. P.R.Chari & Gen. V.R.Raghavan

 

 

The debate centered on the issue of signing the CTBT. Opinion was divided into two opposing camps reflecting various concerns regarding national security, upgrading India 's nuclear capability, the need for further nuclear testing, existing US sanctions against India and broader Indo-US relations.

 

 

Bharat Karnad

 

 

Bharat Karnad advocated not signing the CTBT for three reasons.

 

 

·  This would buy India time and the legal space to resume testing which is required to attain a thermonuclear capability.

 

 

·  India needs time to define its role as a global player in the 21st century and its nuclear capability needs to expand.

 

 

·  Not signing the CTBT would level the strategic playing field and India can wait for a less discriminatory treaty.

 

 

Providing the technical background to the nuclear tests in May 1998, He stressed the need to achieve a thermonuclear capability. The nuclear tests in May 1998 did not achieve a thermonuclear burn. It was a boosted fission device. Of all the tests conducted, only one involved an actual weapon. The rest involved devices and not weapons assemblies. India , therefore, does not have a workable nuclear deterrent. Further testing is a must for building a credible minimum deterrent. 

 

 

Besides, the fate of the CTBT within the US itself is undecided. The next US government may or may not ratify the treaty. In fact, the Republican Presidential candidate, George Bush Jr., has referred to the CTBT as an ‘unwise treaty’. India is being asked to sign a treaty that the US will not sign for the next 9- 10 years. 

 

 

By signing the CTBT India hopes to gain on two fronts, (a) lifting of the G-8 sanctions against India , imposed after the nuclear tests and (b) easier access to more sophisticated nuclear technology. As far as the economic sanctions are concerned, creating a conducive climate for foreign investment will ensure that sanctions are rendered irrelevant. India is far too big a market for the US to ignore. The competition between different MNCs to capture the market in India will ensure that India gets access to superior industrial technology. 

 

 

However, the US has not shared sophisticated nuclear technology and dual-use technology with its closest NATO allies. Hence, it would be unrealistic to hope that it would be passed on to India . Moreover, there are other countries like France that have this technology and may be willing to sell it to India for a price. 

 

 

Sub-critical capability.

 

 

India does not have the necessary nuclear establishment to conduct a sub-critical test. Nor can it afford to spend $6 billion that it would cost to build one. India has an inertial confinement facility with one laser beam, which is not sufficient for producing the high temperature, required for the purposes of conducting a sub-critical test. Therefore, India must be wary of American assurances that, despite signing the CTBT, India will be able to conduct sub-critical tests either for safety reasons or to upgrade and improve upon its existing weapons designs. 

 

 

Hence there is no reason to sign a dead treaty like the CTBT in face of no possible benefits for India . 

 

 

P R Chari  

 

 

India needs to make an informed decision on signing the CTBT and greater transparency regarding the decision. The following questions need to be answered.

 

 

-Can India ’s national security be ensured without further testing?

 

 

-Was it a thermonuclear or boosted fission device that was exploded in Pokharan?

 

 

-Has India acquired the capability to conduct sub-critical tests?

 

 

-Have five tests generated enough archival data to conduct computer-simulation exercises?

 

 

The issue of further testing needs to be examined in the context of the precise nuclear capability India wants to achieve. A true nuclear capability, or the triad as envisaged in the nuclear doctrine, must be premised on thermonuclear weapons. There is a difference of opinion between Indian nuclear scientists and defence scientists on further testing. According to the nuclear scientists, no more tests are required. However, the defence scientist is more ambitious to derive full nuclear capabilities. According to Richard Garwin, “Without nuclear tests of substantial yield, it is difficult to build compact and light fission weapons and essentially impossible to have any confidence in a large two-stage thermonuclear weapon or hydrogen bomb which can be readily be made in the megaton class. Furthermore, even in the yield range accessible to fission weapon, thermonuclear weapons are attractive because of their economy of fissile material, their compact size and their improved safety. ” Thermonuclear weapons are ten times lighter than fission weapons; hence they can be successfully mounted on missiles that may be launched from submarines. 

 

 

Another issue in the CTBT debate is the current urgency for India to evolve a consensus regarding signing the treaty. Perhaps it is an effort to sweeten the atmosphere for the American President’s visit to India . However, it must be borne in mind that Bill Clinton is a lame duck President, and the Republicans are lukewarm towards the treaty. Hence, this sudden urgency gives rise to the question of some deal having been struck between the Indian and American negotiators. Following the nuclear tests the Government declared that it was prepared to adhere by the undertakings in the CTBT, subject to “a number of reciprocal activities”. Further, the Prime Minister indicated that India would cooperate in ensuring the CTBT coming into force in September 1999, provided the other relevant countries (read the five nuclear weapons powers) “will adhere to this Treaty without conditions”. Hence, the ball is not in the Indian court and India has not gone back on its earlier promises.

 

 

India has option sign but not ratify the treaty till the US does. However, according to the Vienna Convention, signing a treaty imposes its obligations upon the signatories. The second option for India would be to sign now and later withdraw if it so wishes. However, there would be tremendous international opprobrium because this has never been done. North Korea had threatened to withdraw from the NPT but had later given up the threat. This, anyway, is not a commendable example.

 

 

The reasons cited for signing the CTBT have certain inherent problems. Firstly, India believes that signing the CTBT would lead to withdrawing of sanctions. This saves the government from taking tough financial measures at home. However, it is hardly consistent with the present government’s rhetoric on self -reliance or the primacy of national security or claims to be a ‘hard’ state. Secondly, If Indian signs the CTBT, it would end India ’s isolation in this regime, which has been signed by over 120 countries and is not a discriminatory treaty. However, after India signs, all the provisions of the CTBT would apply to it. 

 

 

Finally, for greater transparency in handling this issue the Government should establish a broad-based committee of eminent scientists, Like the Jason Committee in the US , to opine on whether more tests are required for establishing a credible minimum deterrent. And the government should also clarify its present urgency to sign the CTBT when the US, Russia and China have not ratified it. 

 

 

Lt. Gen. V. R. Raghavan

 

 

The CTBT issue in India should not be focussed upon in a narrow perspective of whether to sign the treaty or not. Rather such a decision should be determined by what role India would like to play in the next five to ten years and the role nuclear weapons would play in this. Questions such as whether the CTBT and other related treaties, such as the FMCT, are in India ’s interests, whether India can keep out of the CTBT forever, need to be answered first.

 

 

The argument that the CTBT will not come into existence, because the US would not ratify it is not entirely true. There are many even in the US who believe that the Republicans, once in power, will revive the CTBT.

 

 

However, there is no need for India to sign the treaty at present. Since the US Senate rejected the CTBT, India should use this time, to revive a dialogue with the US and improve its status among the nuclear weapon states fraternity. India , for the next two years, should use its signature to the CTBT as a leverage in its talks with the US , especially the transfer of technology. During this period, India should also unambiguously let the whole world know that the CTBT is in the interests of every one and India will come on board, once the others do. This would increase pressure on the other nuclear weapon states to sign the CTBT.

 

 

Discussion

 

 

In the ensuing discussion, opinion was again divided into two views.

 

 

The following issues underlined the argument not to sign the CTBT. It is a discriminatory treaty and, if it is not good enough for the US , there is no reason that India should sign it. More importantly, there are certain secret side agreements among the P-5 that the others are not party to. These agreements should be made available and publicly debated in India , before a decision can to sign may be taken. The CTBT is a dead treaty, as the US Senate rejected it. It is necessary to keep in mind that the US Senate rejected it because it feels the need for further testing to ensure US national security in the long run. The CTBT, as it stands today, does not ensure India 's national security. Moreover, it hampers India 's development into a global player. India may not face a nuclear attack, but it could face coercive diplomacy based on nuclear weapons, and needs to be prepared to handle that to its advantage.

 

 

Further, India stands to gain no tangible benefits by signing the CTBT. It cannot hope to receive crucial nuclear technology such as the dual use technology from the US . In fact, it would serve Indian interests better to either look to other nuclear powers such as France for this technology or attempt to develop it indigenously. The issue of economic sanctions against India is not enough to persuade the Indian government to sign the CTBT because over time the sanctions will have to be removed since they harm commercial interests of the US too. Finally, the issue of a seat in the UN Security Council is a non-issue in this debate as signing the CTBT does not ensure India a seat or even a promise of its consideration in the near future.

 

 

The argument to sign the CTBT was based on the following considerations:

 

 

In a unipolar world, India cannot afford to alienate itself from the US . In fact, it must strive to build a strategic partnership with the US . For this, India must seek more common ground with the US , including a mutual agreement on the CTBT. For India , comprehensive nuclear disarmament is more important than any other country and the CTBT goes a long way towards achieving this. It is not a discriminatory treaty because each member country is entitled to ask for intrusive inspection of the other member country's nuclear installations. The CTBT is also not a dead treaty. Mounting international opposition against nuclear testing will soon revive the treaty, and the P5 shall have to ratify it sooner or later. Further, national security has a broader definition than military security and India must consider its economic situation before going in for further testing. Signing the CTBT at this moment will help improve India 's relations with US, ensure that economic sanctions against India are removed, and contribute to the goal of nuclear disarmament.

 

 

Response

 

 

Bharat Karnad: Nuclear disarmament is dangerous for India , as we cannot afford to unendingly upgrade our conventional weapons. And, in the long run, nuclear upgradation turns out to be cheaper than repeated modernization of the conventional military capability. And this is a must to ensure India 's national security.

 

 

P R Chari : Greater transparency is required regarding a decision on the CTBT. A committee of scientists needs to review the tests and make a definitive pubic statement regarding the efficacy of India 's nuclear tests. The issue of sub-critical testing too needs to be clarified in terms of India 's capabilities. 

 

 

The Chairman, Lt. Gen. Vohra wound up the seminar with the following comment: Though greater transparency is required regarding a decision on the CTBT, a lack of it should not translate into a suspicion of the motives of the government. And finally, India needs to make up its mind about what kind of nuclear power it wants to be and evaluate the CTBT in that context. The CTBT is dead but not buried. The International community will not tolerate up with further testing and the treaty shall be ultimately revived.

 

 

 

 

 

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