The forthcoming visit in January to India of Bangladesh’s Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina will be keenly watched. It has been a long awaited visit, as she has already been in office for a year. She has been circumspect in not rushing, at the same time also not fearing to tread. Her Indian counterpart Manmohan Singh is preparing to lay on the red-carpet. There will doubtless be much pomp and panoply, but both sides will be   eager to demonstrate a modicum of substantive achievements to mollify the naysayers who are also legion. January is the month that Hasina assumed her office in 2009. It is also the month that her father, Bangabandhu Sheikh Mujibur Rahman returned to Bangladesh to a hero’s welcome from Pakistani prison in 1972, via India. The emotional content associated with the timing will not be lost on either side. Such matters are important in Asian diplomacy.

While both current governments are generally viewed as friendly towards each other, not necessarily a frequent phenomenon among South Asian leaderships, Bangladesh–India relations have been fraught with complexities since the emergence of the newest South Asian state in 1972. This despite, and as some would say perhaps because of, the support Bangladesh’s independence struggle was accorded by India. Physically, Bangladesh found itself nearly ‘India-locked’. The great challenge for Dhaka is to be able to live in consonance with but distinct from its much larger and powerful neighbor. This was essential to underscore its sovereign status, so important to the new nation. For India the challenge has been to live-down its obvious pre-eminent position in the region and treat Bangladesh as an equal. While there are no bilateral disputes that would warrant serious conflicts, there are most certainly issues that would require urgent addressing.

From the Bangladeshi side these issues would comprise questions of maritime security, diversion of water upstream in river systems, shootings by border guards, the burgeoning trade imbalance, demarcation of land and maritime boundaries, and the persistence problem of enclaves. From the Indian side there would be interest in enhanced connectivity, transit facilities, non-provision of safe haven to Indian insurgents and greater cooperation in different international fora. Both sides should be careful not to bite off more than can be chewed, and would do well to begin with the ‘low hanging fruits’, the less complicated issues, and working their way up to more difficult ones.

Despite some twists and turns in Bangladesh’s democratic evolution, democracy in the state now proved sustainable. It is widely perceived as a responsible international actor, focused on development and claiming success in socio-economic indices like poverty-alleviation and gender-mainstreaming. These are tendencies that India will wish to encourage. India, on the ‘rise’ is most blessed in South Asia in terms of size, population, resources and military power. If it wants to play its due role in the global arena, it realizes that it must carry the regional powers with it. Bangladesh is an important neighbour with its own web of international linkages. The Indian leadership intellectually accepts its disproportionate responsibility in ensuring regional harmony without always looking to reciprocity. Hasina’s visit  will be a litmus-test if such a strategy can succeed. It better, for detractors on either side will be watching.