Cambodia-China Relations and Recent Developments
31 Dec, 2009 · 3035
Tuli Sinha reviews Cambodia-China relations in light of recent deportation of Uighurs by Cambodia
Recently, Cambodia's decision to deport asylum seekers, who were in the process of applying for refugee status at the office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), is a reminder that Beijing's oppression of the Uighurs does not stop at China's borders. Visiting Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping thanked Cambodia for deporting 20 Muslim asylum-seekers by providing aid worth US$1.2 billion. Cambodia’s Prime Minister Hun Sen has labeled China Cambodia's "most trustworthy friend," during Chinese Vice President Xi Jinping’s visit to Phnom Penh on 20 December. Cambodia, though a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, turned a deaf ear to the entreaties of the US and other democratic countries on behalf of these Uighur asylum seekers. Phnom Penh's decision was clearly influenced by enormous Chinese pressure, backed by hundreds of millions of dollars in aid and a reported US$1 billion in foreign direct investment. The deportation of the Uighurs in Cambodia is a sign of China's increasing ability to resist international pressure regarding its human-rights violations.
In this context, it becomes significant to analyze the growing bilateral relations in the light of numerous strategic interests of China in the region. Cambodia’s geographical, economical, and cultural landscapes as well as multifaceted mutual influences and interactions between the two countries have allowed Cambodia-China bilateral relations to take a vital position in Beijing’s foreign policy. Currently, the relations of the two countries have reached a new peak in terms of political, diplomatic, military, economic, and social aspects.
In areas of cooperation, first, the two countries share a long historical experience and cordial relationship for more than a thousand years. Cambodia has spoken out for China at the United Nations, while China helped try to reconcile Cambodia during the 1970s and 1980s. Second, Cambodia occupies a very good strategic location in the region, which is useful for China to position itself for military purposes. More importantly, Cambodia has a deep seaport in Sihanoukville city, which is a good strategic point for military purposes for China since China's increasing exports and demand for oil are driving the Chinese navy to pay more attention to sea-lanes. This is reflected by the plan to augment the existing three fleets with a roving fourth force to reinforce the other fleets and to project power into the South China Sea and the Pacific and Indian oceans. Third, both countries want to maintain good relations with each other as well as other countries in the region in order to create a peaceful and stable environment. Such an environment would enable Cambodia and China to focus on economic development.
But an assessment of China's direct and indirect application of various crucial instruments of national power to achieve objectives in Cambodia that contribute to China's national security reveals a lopsided outcome for Cambodia. Clearly China has exercised all four significant instruments of power namely, diplomatic, informational, economic, and military to improve its relationship with Cambodia. In doing so, it continues to promote its national strategy of building regional alliances to counter US influence and to strengthen its own security in Southeast Asia. However, Cambodia should be aware that if it mainly depends on China for economic aid and military aid, this may ruin its democracy and the existence of human rights which has already beginning to show. Moreover, closer ties with China would most likely affect the main foreign direct investments from other countries adversely, mainly the US, Japan, and the EU. Understandably, these nations might not support a close strategic relationship between Cambodia and China. If Chinese relations with the West, particularly the US or Japan were to deteriorate in future, investor countries’ sentiment could quickly shift against China and its allies. Depending solely on China for political, economical, and military aids is dangerous for Cambodia in terms of its authoritarian tendencies. Therefore, Cambodia should promote democracy, better its human rights record and maintain security and peace in order to attract more foreign direct investments from other countries, particularly the US, EU, or other Asian nations. More specifically, if proper allocation of wealth is attained from the 2 billion barrels of oil and 14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas found in 2004, Cambodia can aspire to become an exemplary self sufficient economy. However, on a more pragmatic level and for the continued peace and prosperity of both nations as well as the region as a whole, Cambodia should maintain a good relationship with China to a degree that will not deter foreign investment and tourists from other important investor countries. Amidst all the condemnation by the United Nations and the United States, Cambodia has managed to carve its own niche in the eyes of China but the real talent lies in maintaining equally cordial relations with United States which is another key international player in the region.
But an assessment of China's direct and indirect application of various crucial instruments of national power to achieve objectives in Cambodia that contribute to China's national security reveals a lopsided outcome for Cambodia. Clearly China has exercised all four significant instruments of power namely, diplomatic, informational, economic, and military to improve its relationship with Cambodia. In doing so, it continues to promote its national strategy of building regional alliances to counter US influence and to strengthen its own security in Southeast Asia. However, Cambodia should be aware that if it mainly depends on China for economic aid and military aid, this may ruin its democracy and the existence of human rights which has already beginning to show. Moreover, closer ties with China would most likely affect the main foreign direct investments from other countries adversely, mainly the US, Japan, and the EU. Understandably, these nations might not support a close strategic relationship between Cambodia and China. If Chinese relations with the West, particularly the US or Japan were to deteriorate in future, investor countries’ sentiment could quickly shift against China and its allies. Depending solely on China for political, economical, and military aids is dangerous for Cambodia in terms of its authoritarian tendencies. Therefore, Cambodia should promote democracy, better its human rights record and maintain security and peace in order to attract more foreign direct investments from other countries, particularly the US, EU, or other Asian nations. More specifically, if proper allocation of wealth is attained from the 2 billion barrels of oil and 14 trillion cubic feet of natural gas found in 2004, Cambodia can aspire to become an exemplary self sufficient economy. However, on a more pragmatic level and for the continued peace and prosperity of both nations as well as the region as a whole, Cambodia should maintain a good relationship with China to a degree that will not deter foreign investment and tourists from other important investor countries. Amidst all the condemnation by the United Nations and the United States, Cambodia has managed to carve its own niche in the eyes of China but the real talent lies in maintaining equally cordial relations with United States which is another key international player in the region.