Politics of Obstruction and Confrontation
31 Dec, 2009 · 3034
Padmaja Murthy evaluates political developments in Nepal during 2009
In 2009, the focus in Nepal should have been on taking forward the peace process through consensus-building and writing a new inclusive constitution by 2010. Ironically, the dominant debate in Nepal signaled the politics of obstruction and confrontation. The current impasse can be attributed to the competing agendas of all political parties concerned.
The year 2009 began with the Maoists in power. Though they had won the highest number of seats at the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections of April 2008, they could form a coalition government only in August 2008. The path since then has not been easy. The Nepali Congress (NC) followed a policy of obstructing the functioning of the legislative parliament till they were assured that their demands relating to return of the seized property to its rightful owners, abiding by the past agreements and understandings, scrapping of paramilitary structure of the Yong Communist League (YCL) would be adequately addressed and implemented. They also boycotted the House over the Maoists action of seeking clarification from the Army Chief on the three controversial issues of recruitment of 3010 soldiers, reinstatement of eight retired Brigadier generals, and the boycott of the National games by the army. The NC also warned that it would wage a strong nationwide protest movement against the government if the Maoist-led government were to sack Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud Katawal. Some other parties too obstructed the House on some or the other grievance.
Once the Maoist-led government decision to sack the Army chief was revoked by the President and the Army Chief was reinstated, Prachanda resigned as the Prime Minister in May. Now, it was the Maoists’ turn to obstruct the House. They have since implemented a three phase protest movement demanding that the President’s action be termed as ‘unconstitutional’ as it challenges ‘civilian supremacy’. They decided to obstruct the functioning of the regular session of the parliament; protest in the parliament and the streets; and obstruct all public programs of the President, Prime Minister and other ministers. In the second phase starting in November, they organised torch rallies, picketed the district administration office and village development committees across the country and blocked the office gates to prevent the employees from entering inside. In the third phase which began on 11 December, they declared over a period of one week 13 autonomous states based on ethnicity and region. On 25 December, they launched the fourth phase of the protest movement where the party will campaign for national independence and sovereignty. They said that an indefinite general strike will be launched if the coalition government fails to address the issue of civilian supremacy by 24 January 2010. The silver lining is that just before the launch of the fourth phase, the UCPN (Maoist) decided to end the house obstruction and instead adopt a different strategy of protest inside the House for civilian supremacy.
It is interesting to note that the debates preceding the three issues of discord with the army, as and when they arose, clearly show that the Maoists failed to build a consensus. Their actions and statements got no definitive approval from any quarter in the legislative parliament. The question is not whether the Maoists were right or wrong, the fact is that they were isolated. Confrontation was already there and focusing solely on the Presidents action or inaction deflects from the layers of discord which exist. It is therefore not surprising that they have not been able to garner enough support and consensus from the other parties to term the Presidents action as ‘unconstitutional’. The parties suggest that statues and the interim constitution can be amended clarifying the jurisdiction of the President instead. Their suggestion that they should be allowed to lead a national government has also not found much support.
At the end of 2009, Nepal has not much to show regarding the progress made in the peace process. If anything, there is fear and apprehension that the country might again plunge into turmoil. The Maoists have the most to gain from the success of the peace process. They waged an insurgency to have an elected CA and a new inclusive constitution to be written. Their method of obstruction and confrontation undermines these very vital mechanisms. The Maoists need to reflect over ways to redress the existing trust deficit between them and other political parties in order to move forward on the peace process.
The year 2009 began with the Maoists in power. Though they had won the highest number of seats at the Constituent Assembly (CA) elections of April 2008, they could form a coalition government only in August 2008. The path since then has not been easy. The Nepali Congress (NC) followed a policy of obstructing the functioning of the legislative parliament till they were assured that their demands relating to return of the seized property to its rightful owners, abiding by the past agreements and understandings, scrapping of paramilitary structure of the Yong Communist League (YCL) would be adequately addressed and implemented. They also boycotted the House over the Maoists action of seeking clarification from the Army Chief on the three controversial issues of recruitment of 3010 soldiers, reinstatement of eight retired Brigadier generals, and the boycott of the National games by the army. The NC also warned that it would wage a strong nationwide protest movement against the government if the Maoist-led government were to sack Chief of Army Staff General Rookmangud Katawal. Some other parties too obstructed the House on some or the other grievance.
Once the Maoist-led government decision to sack the Army chief was revoked by the President and the Army Chief was reinstated, Prachanda resigned as the Prime Minister in May. Now, it was the Maoists’ turn to obstruct the House. They have since implemented a three phase protest movement demanding that the President’s action be termed as ‘unconstitutional’ as it challenges ‘civilian supremacy’. They decided to obstruct the functioning of the regular session of the parliament; protest in the parliament and the streets; and obstruct all public programs of the President, Prime Minister and other ministers. In the second phase starting in November, they organised torch rallies, picketed the district administration office and village development committees across the country and blocked the office gates to prevent the employees from entering inside. In the third phase which began on 11 December, they declared over a period of one week 13 autonomous states based on ethnicity and region. On 25 December, they launched the fourth phase of the protest movement where the party will campaign for national independence and sovereignty. They said that an indefinite general strike will be launched if the coalition government fails to address the issue of civilian supremacy by 24 January 2010. The silver lining is that just before the launch of the fourth phase, the UCPN (Maoist) decided to end the house obstruction and instead adopt a different strategy of protest inside the House for civilian supremacy.
It is interesting to note that the debates preceding the three issues of discord with the army, as and when they arose, clearly show that the Maoists failed to build a consensus. Their actions and statements got no definitive approval from any quarter in the legislative parliament. The question is not whether the Maoists were right or wrong, the fact is that they were isolated. Confrontation was already there and focusing solely on the Presidents action or inaction deflects from the layers of discord which exist. It is therefore not surprising that they have not been able to garner enough support and consensus from the other parties to term the Presidents action as ‘unconstitutional’. The parties suggest that statues and the interim constitution can be amended clarifying the jurisdiction of the President instead. Their suggestion that they should be allowed to lead a national government has also not found much support.
At the end of 2009, Nepal has not much to show regarding the progress made in the peace process. If anything, there is fear and apprehension that the country might again plunge into turmoil. The Maoists have the most to gain from the success of the peace process. They waged an insurgency to have an elected CA and a new inclusive constitution to be written. Their method of obstruction and confrontation undermines these very vital mechanisms. The Maoists need to reflect over ways to redress the existing trust deficit between them and other political parties in order to move forward on the peace process.