Sri Lanka has called for presidential elections two years ahead of schedule. According to the Election Commission, the elections will be held on 26 January 2010. While current president Mahinda Rajapakse will bid for a second term, the opposition parties have sponsored General Sarath Fonseka, under whose military leadership Sri Lanka defeated the LTTE in May this year. There is also a third candidate, Wickramabahu Karunaratna of the Left Front. Why should Rajapakse advance presidential elections by two years and hold them even before the parliamentary elections due in April 2010? Who has a fair chance of winning the next presidential bid? What will it mean for Sri Lanka, especially the ethnic minorities?

 

Although President Rajapakse claims that the election was forced on him by the Opposition, there is clear indication that he wishes to capitalize on the prevailing sense of triumph that victory over the once invincible LTTE has brought. This was tested in a series of provincial council elections recently. The ruling United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) expects over 70 per cent popular support to Rajapakse. After winning the presidential bid, Rajapakse intends to hold parliamentary elections and garner the two-thirds majority required to change the Constitution. Since the President is more popular than his government, it is believed that this sequence should work electorally. The time is also considered opportune since the Opposition led by the United National Party (UNP) is not only weak, but also lacks any credible alternative.

The Opposition, however, is confident of a victory as it has roped in General Sarath Fonseka to run in the elections. Fonseka is considered  as popular as Rajakapse because it was his military leadership that was responsible for “liberating the motherland from terrorism.” Interestingly, he is a candidate acceptable to both UNP and Janata Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), which are otherwise poles apart in their ideology and outlook. Fonseka, who fell apart from the present regime, is considered the only credible candidate to take-on the ever charismatic Rajapakse. The aim of the Opposition is to use Fonseka, dethrone Rajapaksa and capture power. In this regard, the UNP has already laid 10 conditions including abolition of the executive presidency, formation of a caretaker government to hold fair general elections and resettlement of Tamil detainees, in return for its support to the former military leader. While President Rajapakse is planning to offer a detailed roadmap for development, Fonseka has declared that he would dedicate himself “to secure the weakening democracy, human rights, media freedom, social justice and secure communal harmony....” Issues like weak economy, and the present regime’s dominant characteristic of “of the family, by the family, and for the family” are also likely to play in favour of the Opposition.

Despite the advantages, when compared to Rajapakse, Fonseka  clearly lacks political experience. The battle field is very different from the political field. The 14-party Opposition that is willing to support Fonseka are strange bedfellows. They may fall apart any time. Also, the stand of Muslims and Tamils, who form about 20 per cent of the population, is crucial in deciding who the next president will be. In a recent conference in Zurich, Tamil and Muslim parties expressed “full commitment to a common forum among representatives of all Tamil-speaking people.” Yet, given the inherent and traditional fissures, a joint forum on the issue of supporting a particular candidate for president may not be possible, although a unity on the ethnic issue is feasible. Already, People’s Liberation Organisation of Tamil Eelam (PLOTE) has extended support to Rajapakse; Eelam People’s Democratic Party (EPDP) has always been part of the SLFP-led alliance; Tamil National Alliance (TNA), which was considered pro-LTTE, may not support either of the principal candidates; Ceylon Working Congress (CWC) was categorical in supporting Fonseka; Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) is part of the UFPA, while Sri Lankan Muslim Congress (SLMC) has been with the United National Front (UNF).

As of today, Rajapakse has fair chances of retaining his Presidency. However, the result depends on how events unfold and how the present government handles the economy, rehabilitation of the conflict displaced and gives hope to all people in the next two months. None of the candidates has clear roadmap on facilitating the recovery of the economy. On the ethnic issue, both the main camps have hardliners that can spoil the prospect of conceding decent packages to minorities. Rehabilitation, by and large, depends on international aid and assistance. For their own benefit, the minority parties may strike a deal with either of the candidates they think would win, for post-poll sops in return for their support. Such an option instead of abstention seems practical, at least for Tamils.