GHQ Attack and Nuclear Security
22 Oct, 2009 · 2986
Jasbir Rakhra assesses the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets in the wake of recent attacks
The General Headquarters (GHQ) siege has proved that Pakistan is badly bruised because of the pillage caused by the nexus between Taliban, al Qaeda and the ‘Punjabis’. The threat is from every direction and the question is – What after GHQ? An attack on the Majlis-e-Shoora or turning Minar-e-Pakistan into rubble? None of them stood as tall as GHQ, a symbol of glory and honour, pivotal in the national decision-making process. Next in the line of fire could well be Pakistan’s nuclear installations, seen as a symbol of Pakistan’s military might. What would extremists gain by attacking such installations? Can we consider these installations secure enough from any terrorist adventure? According to the latest Congressional report, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are safe and secure. The report says that Pakistan has taken a number of steps to win international confidence in its ability to secure its nuclear materials and installations. After 9 September 2001, Pakistan has initiated several positive changes in its nuclear command and control structure and taken a number of steps to implement various programmes towards increased nuclear security. Given that the dimensions of international terrorism have changed today and Pakistan itself is the new battleground, this report needs review.
The epitome of Pakistan’s security – Pakistan’s Army GHQ, supposedly invincible from any terrorist attack, was targeted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) outfit. The Pakistan Army Headquarters would not be less secure than any nuclear installation or weapons storage sites in Pakistan. A new debate has thus begun after terrorist attempts to penetrate the impregnable establishment, guarded by soldiers equivalent to the strength of an infantry battalion. The vulnerabilities in the security apparatus exposed by this attack have raised many questions on the fate of nuclear installations in Pakistan. Security experts are fearful of the implications. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are now less secure than they were a few years ago, especially before the Pakistan Army’s alliance with US forces in the region to fight against the Taliban. Pakistan has already experienced three attacks on nuclear related facilities at Sargodha, Kamra and Wah. Despite the initiatives taken by Islamabad, there is a constant danger of Pakistan’s fundamentalist extremist groups attacking such establishments. At present threat perceptions have been aggravated since the motives of insurgent elements seem to be different from those assumed earlier. In the near future, if any nuclear facility comes under a terrorist attack, it seems that the attack would not be launched to acquire a weapon but to achieve a symbolic victory by striking the nation’s pride leading to national destabilization.
Can we consider Strategic Plans Division’s (SPD) nuclear security policies valid in the present context? The emerging issue regarding nuclear security is not related to the levels of security arrangement but the personnel employed within that arrangement. The treachery of one with an extremist bent of mind could lead the country towards devastation; this fear gain credence given that serving or former members of the security establishment had been involved in major terrorist adventures. The Congressional report expressed satisfaction in terms of the selection procedure of the personnel for the security of the installations. Though SPD has implemented special provisions to screen its personnel; doubts over the credibility of the system persist. In the recent GHQ attack, the leader of the attackers, Aqeel alias Dr Usman is a former Army Medical Corps soldier and hails from ‘Kahuta’.
There are qualms over the integrity of SPD. With respect to the reliability of the personnel, the maximum intake in the SPD’s security division is said to be from the Punjab province, considered to have fewer links with the extremists groups. Unfortunately, out of ten terrorist involved in GHQ attack, five belonged to the Punjab province including their leader Aqeel and rest were from South Waziristan – a Taliban stronghold. Would it then be appropriate to say that ‘Punjabis’ are not prone to extremist fundamentalism? Especially since the claims of attack are made by the Ahmad Farooqi group of TTP – a Punjabi dominated group. Further, security clearances and checks are performed on prospective employees by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence personnel. There is no reliable way to perform a security check on ISI personnel as they too may have strong affiliations with the Taliban, which is a distinct possibility given the history of ISI in the region.
Islamabad came up with a robust nuclear command and control structure but issues of reliability of personnel and coercive intrusions of extremists in the system requires serious thought and needs to be addressed through comprehensive measures. Pakistan may resort to a comprehensive security arrangement on technical issues with United States. But this is unlikely due to Pakistan’s stand on the global nuclear regime. Pakistan has only recently begun ‘Operation Raah-e-Nizaat’ against the Taliban in South Waziristan. Although the outcomes of this are yet to be seen, total elimination of extremists is not a realistic expectation. A massive retaliation by the extremists however, remains distinctly probable. Where and what form might this retaliation take? No one knows. The question remains the same – What after GHQ?
The epitome of Pakistan’s security – Pakistan’s Army GHQ, supposedly invincible from any terrorist attack, was targeted by the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) outfit. The Pakistan Army Headquarters would not be less secure than any nuclear installation or weapons storage sites in Pakistan. A new debate has thus begun after terrorist attempts to penetrate the impregnable establishment, guarded by soldiers equivalent to the strength of an infantry battalion. The vulnerabilities in the security apparatus exposed by this attack have raised many questions on the fate of nuclear installations in Pakistan. Security experts are fearful of the implications. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are now less secure than they were a few years ago, especially before the Pakistan Army’s alliance with US forces in the region to fight against the Taliban. Pakistan has already experienced three attacks on nuclear related facilities at Sargodha, Kamra and Wah. Despite the initiatives taken by Islamabad, there is a constant danger of Pakistan’s fundamentalist extremist groups attacking such establishments. At present threat perceptions have been aggravated since the motives of insurgent elements seem to be different from those assumed earlier. In the near future, if any nuclear facility comes under a terrorist attack, it seems that the attack would not be launched to acquire a weapon but to achieve a symbolic victory by striking the nation’s pride leading to national destabilization.
Can we consider Strategic Plans Division’s (SPD) nuclear security policies valid in the present context? The emerging issue regarding nuclear security is not related to the levels of security arrangement but the personnel employed within that arrangement. The treachery of one with an extremist bent of mind could lead the country towards devastation; this fear gain credence given that serving or former members of the security establishment had been involved in major terrorist adventures. The Congressional report expressed satisfaction in terms of the selection procedure of the personnel for the security of the installations. Though SPD has implemented special provisions to screen its personnel; doubts over the credibility of the system persist. In the recent GHQ attack, the leader of the attackers, Aqeel alias Dr Usman is a former Army Medical Corps soldier and hails from ‘Kahuta’.
There are qualms over the integrity of SPD. With respect to the reliability of the personnel, the maximum intake in the SPD’s security division is said to be from the Punjab province, considered to have fewer links with the extremists groups. Unfortunately, out of ten terrorist involved in GHQ attack, five belonged to the Punjab province including their leader Aqeel and rest were from South Waziristan – a Taliban stronghold. Would it then be appropriate to say that ‘Punjabis’ are not prone to extremist fundamentalism? Especially since the claims of attack are made by the Ahmad Farooqi group of TTP – a Punjabi dominated group. Further, security clearances and checks are performed on prospective employees by the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) and Military Intelligence personnel. There is no reliable way to perform a security check on ISI personnel as they too may have strong affiliations with the Taliban, which is a distinct possibility given the history of ISI in the region.
Islamabad came up with a robust nuclear command and control structure but issues of reliability of personnel and coercive intrusions of extremists in the system requires serious thought and needs to be addressed through comprehensive measures. Pakistan may resort to a comprehensive security arrangement on technical issues with United States. But this is unlikely due to Pakistan’s stand on the global nuclear regime. Pakistan has only recently begun ‘Operation Raah-e-Nizaat’ against the Taliban in South Waziristan. Although the outcomes of this are yet to be seen, total elimination of extremists is not a realistic expectation. A massive retaliation by the extremists however, remains distinctly probable. Where and what form might this retaliation take? No one knows. The question remains the same – What after GHQ?
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