Recently, China’s Ministry of National Defence (MND) opened itself to the rest of the world through an exclusive website, available in Chinese and English. While the initiative is only on a trial basis, it could stay put. Given the curiosities, controversies and the criticisms surrounding Chinese military modernization and the PLA itself, having a dedicated website could be a considered step by the Chinese leadership to balance the barrage of criticism and initiate a new discourse on PLA’s transparent functioning.

 

China does not have a proper MND on the pattern of ministries of finance, foreign affairs, commerce etc. In fact, the MND itself only serves as liaison body representing the Central Military Commission (CMC) and the PLA when dealing with foreign militaries or ministries for exchange and cooperation. It has no command and control over the PLA. The ‘August 1st Building’ in Beijing that houses the MND, also houses the CMC, the real master of PLA and country’s defence related matters. The CMC is indeed the most powerful institution in Chinese politics and is invariably under the direct control of the President. Further, unlike other countries, Chinese defence minister always come from the ranks and is rather a serving official. This dichotomy has often confused outsiders. The website could well be a step in popularising the apparatus of MND as distinct from PLA, at least for diplomatic purposes.

China’s institutional discreetness is complicated by a series of allegations about the PLA modernisation. First, as the modernization processes entered a crucial phase towards the later half of nineties, the West began to doubt China’s strategic objectives as being merely ‘defensive.’ China’s emergence as the largest importer of weapons and its suspicious role in nuclear and missile proliferation added weight to such doubts and led to emergence of ‘China threat’ theory. Second, the PLA was also accused of indulging in cyber espionage through Chinese hackers who have been entering government and defence computer networks in US, Germany and even India. Third, the world is also worried by sustained double digit growth in PLA budget for the last two decades and China’s actual defence expenditures since PLA’s posture will shape the Asian security calculus.

 

Logically therefore, China has been under increased international pressure to reflect greater transparency in its modernization process and strategic objectives. The US Congress legislated in 2000 asking the Pentagon to publish a report on China’s military power annually. Since then, its annual reports have become the most sought after resource for a glimpse into the real world of Chinese defence modernization. Many other countries, including China’s neighbours such as Japan or friends such as Australia have cast doubts over China’s defence modernization. The international media has also criticised the ‘veil of secrecy’ in Chinese defence modernization and insists that China adhere to global proliferation norms, accounting procedure and institutional requirements such as regular reporting to the UN Register of Arms.

 

China has taken incremental steps to thwart sustained international criticism. Propagation of China’s ‘peaceful rise’ theory apart, it has expanded the information basket through biannual defence white papers, in vogue for almost a decade. Simultaneously, China has engaged many countries in bilateral and multilateral security dialogues and has been participating in cooperative security meetings and joint military exercises, apart from inviting foreign observers in its own war games. In recent times, the activities of the PLA have also increased manifold. Whether the Beijing Olympics, relief operations in Sichuan Province, ethnic unrest in Tibet and Xinjiang, or the external power projection in the Gulf of Aden or the UN peacekeeping operations, the PLA is involved in everything. The MND website is part of this exercise for propagation of authoritative views on PLA and other military activities of China.

 

Unfortunately, the website falls short of expectations. First, there is hardly anything new on the web that is not available elsewhere, the PLA Daily itself, and on the other ‘sponsored’ websites of the PLA. Second, it doesn’t provide real time information and has quite old databases in many cases and is no match for the US Department of Defence website. The latter is a one-stop solution for all information related to America’s defence. Third, the basket of information still does not provide complete information on issues related to defence modernization, budgeting, acquisitions and strategic objectives, and therefore, the knowledge gap between western perceptions and China’s force development and strategic capabilities remains. The web site is rather propagandist and seeks wide publicity for its activities such as military exchanges, military exercises and peacekeeping through elaborate and structured news dissemination.

 

Nevertheless, as PLA’s aggressive modernization drive enters critical stage, many countries in the Asia-Pacific region will be watching China’s hitherto unpredictable external behaviour that could lead to an unimaginable future. The website may not assuage the security dilemmas of these countries and may not answer numerous doubts related to China’s defence modernization, but will certainly offer an observable tool for judging China’s role, both internally and internationally.

 

Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.