An Asia-Centric Foreign Policy for Japan
04 Sep, 2009 · 2963
Rajaram Panda speculates on possible changes in Japan’s foreign policy orientation
The historic landslide victory by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) in the elections to the House of Representatives (Lower House) held on 30 August reflects the ascendancy of centre-left politics in Japan. The Liberal Democratic Party of Japan (LDP), which ruled the nation for over half a century suffered a crushing defeat, losing nearly two-thirds of its seats. While the DPJ increased its tally from the outgoing house of 113 to 308 in a 480-seat House, the LDP could garner only 119 seats.
DPJ’s victory is being described by political pundits around the world as stunning, epoch-making, historic, and decisive. It is also being hailed as a political tsunami, heralding a seismic power shift in Japan’s political landscape. Political analysts see the beginning of two-party systems in Japan, which is a good thing for democracy.
Despite its pre-election posturing on reviewing Japan’s security alliance with the United States, no major changes in Japan’s foreign policy are likely to take place as domestic issues will dominate in the government debate for a while.
What would be the direction of the likely new PM Hatoyama’s foreign policy? That the DPJ’s foreign policy platform is going to be less reliant on the US comes out clearly in the manifesto, which enunciated five major foreign policy prescriptions : (i) build a close and equal Japan-US relationship; (ii) strengthen Japan’s foreign relations in Asia with the aim of building an East Asian Community; (iii) North Korea must not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons; (iv) realize world peace and prosperity; and (v) take the lead in working for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and remove the threat of terrorism.
Hatoyama’s foreign policy focus will be directed more towards China and the rest of Asia. His government wants to reconsider the fate of US military facilities on Okinawa. The Okinawa issue, however, is unpopular only locally and might not be priority item in Japan’s foreign policy radar at least in the first year. Japan might make some noise in refusing to refuel US ships in the Indian Ocean after the current Japanese law allowing such facility expires in January 2010.
In August 2009 Hatoyama wrote in a Japanese magazine that “the era of US-led globalism is coming to an end and we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multi-polarity.” The DPJ, however, lacks foreign policy experience.
Hatoyama’s Asia policy is likely to be more robust. Economically, Japan has grown closer to China and South Korea, and China is now its No.1 trading partner, with about $236 billion in combined trade in 2008. China, too, for its part would strive to deepen the reciprocal and strategic relationship with Japan.
There is no indication in DPJ’s manifesto as to how the new government will view Japan’s relations with India. During their election campaign, none of the DPJ leaders ever made any reference what the new government’s policy towards India would be. In contrast, the DPJ manifesto in 2005 did mention India as integral to Asian economic development along with China, South Korea and ASEAN.
Hatoyama’s foreign policy focus in Asia is likely to remain East Asia-centric, focusing more on North East Asia. Does that mean that India is falling off Japan’s foreign policy radar? That is clearly not the case. In view of Japan’s over-arching global economic interests, Japan cannot put all its eggs in one or limited number of baskets. India-Japan economic relations are already on the upswing and the overall trade volume is beginning to balloon from $10 billion in 2008 to a projected figure of $150 billion by 2015.
In addition, India is only the third country, after the US and Australia, with which Japan has a defence agreement. In view of increasing Chinese naval power, it is in Japan’s interests to seek naval cooperation with India to protect its maritime trade and safeguard critical sea lanes of communications. Japan is positioned to play an important role in forging a closer India-Japan-China triangular cooperative partnership that would contribute to Asian peace and stability.
At the bilateral level, not much change is foreseen and one can expect continuity in the existing ties. Prime Ministerial visits have been taking place for the last few years and a return visit to India by the Japanese Prime Minister is due after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in October 2008. Hatoyama is expected to participate in the UN General Assembly late this month where he is expected to make a speech in support of nuclear disarmament. That would be his first encounter with President Obama. If Hatoyama’s foreign policy is truly Asia-centric, and if he chooses India for one of his first overseas visits, that will be a powerful message and may well boost Indo-Japanese relations to a higher plan.
DPJ’s victory is being described by political pundits around the world as stunning, epoch-making, historic, and decisive. It is also being hailed as a political tsunami, heralding a seismic power shift in Japan’s political landscape. Political analysts see the beginning of two-party systems in Japan, which is a good thing for democracy.
Despite its pre-election posturing on reviewing Japan’s security alliance with the United States, no major changes in Japan’s foreign policy are likely to take place as domestic issues will dominate in the government debate for a while.
What would be the direction of the likely new PM Hatoyama’s foreign policy? That the DPJ’s foreign policy platform is going to be less reliant on the US comes out clearly in the manifesto, which enunciated five major foreign policy prescriptions : (i) build a close and equal Japan-US relationship; (ii) strengthen Japan’s foreign relations in Asia with the aim of building an East Asian Community; (iii) North Korea must not be permitted to possess nuclear weapons; (iv) realize world peace and prosperity; and (v) take the lead in working for the elimination of nuclear weapons, and remove the threat of terrorism.
Hatoyama’s foreign policy focus will be directed more towards China and the rest of Asia. His government wants to reconsider the fate of US military facilities on Okinawa. The Okinawa issue, however, is unpopular only locally and might not be priority item in Japan’s foreign policy radar at least in the first year. Japan might make some noise in refusing to refuel US ships in the Indian Ocean after the current Japanese law allowing such facility expires in January 2010.
In August 2009 Hatoyama wrote in a Japanese magazine that “the era of US-led globalism is coming to an end and we are moving away from a unipolar world toward an era of multi-polarity.” The DPJ, however, lacks foreign policy experience.
Hatoyama’s Asia policy is likely to be more robust. Economically, Japan has grown closer to China and South Korea, and China is now its No.1 trading partner, with about $236 billion in combined trade in 2008. China, too, for its part would strive to deepen the reciprocal and strategic relationship with Japan.
There is no indication in DPJ’s manifesto as to how the new government will view Japan’s relations with India. During their election campaign, none of the DPJ leaders ever made any reference what the new government’s policy towards India would be. In contrast, the DPJ manifesto in 2005 did mention India as integral to Asian economic development along with China, South Korea and ASEAN.
Hatoyama’s foreign policy focus in Asia is likely to remain East Asia-centric, focusing more on North East Asia. Does that mean that India is falling off Japan’s foreign policy radar? That is clearly not the case. In view of Japan’s over-arching global economic interests, Japan cannot put all its eggs in one or limited number of baskets. India-Japan economic relations are already on the upswing and the overall trade volume is beginning to balloon from $10 billion in 2008 to a projected figure of $150 billion by 2015.
In addition, India is only the third country, after the US and Australia, with which Japan has a defence agreement. In view of increasing Chinese naval power, it is in Japan’s interests to seek naval cooperation with India to protect its maritime trade and safeguard critical sea lanes of communications. Japan is positioned to play an important role in forging a closer India-Japan-China triangular cooperative partnership that would contribute to Asian peace and stability.
At the bilateral level, not much change is foreseen and one can expect continuity in the existing ties. Prime Ministerial visits have been taking place for the last few years and a return visit to India by the Japanese Prime Minister is due after Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Japan in October 2008. Hatoyama is expected to participate in the UN General Assembly late this month where he is expected to make a speech in support of nuclear disarmament. That would be his first encounter with President Obama. If Hatoyama’s foreign policy is truly Asia-centric, and if he chooses India for one of his first overseas visits, that will be a powerful message and may well boost Indo-Japanese relations to a higher plan.
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