Fighting the Taliban in Pakistan

17 Aug, 2009    ·   2950

Chiranjib Haldar emphasizes the need for a multidimensional approach to win the battle against the Taliban


Pakistan President Asif Ali Zardari’s announcements on the nation’s 63rd Independence day were undoubtedly path-breaking and if implemented could march the country into the modern comity of nations. Political, judicial and administrative eforms for the tribal areas, allowing political activities in Federally administered Territories, setting up an appellate tribunal, curtailing rbitrary powers of political agents, giving people the right to appeal and ail, excluding women and children from the territorial responsibility clause and envisaging audit of accounts by the auditor general are some of the positive steps proposed by Islamabad. The two most turbulent areas in Pakistan today, Swat and FATA, merit special focus.
 
The rejuvenation of much of Swat has allowed for the return of some 765,000 displaced residents and the elimination of Taliban supreme commander Baitullah Mehsud and has given Pakistan an important edge in its struggle against the Taliban. There are however, important considerations that have to be kept in mind in order to ensure continued progress.

Though the Swat Taliban have been dealt a blow, they have not been entirely defeated This will not happen until their leadership is captured or killed or until they cannot recruit new fighters from their madrasas. As displaced residents return to the region, a massive amount of reconstruction and development work is necessary to prevent unrest that the Taliban could exploit. Restoring the writ of the state entails the re-establishment of political administration and local law enforcement, and there are other areas in the NWFP especially the districts that run parallel to the FATA that also need to be brought back under government control.
 
In Waziristan and the rest of the Federally Administered Territories, Mehsud’s death  has wounded the Taliban but they are firmly entrenched in the region, along with their Al Qaeda and other transnational allies. Any counterinsurgency campaign in the tribal areas is going to be exponentially more difficult than the offensive in Swat. This is why the military is now aligning itself with pro-Pakistani tribal and militant forces to try and
root out those waging war against the state. Being able to distinguish between those militants hostile to Pakistan and those focused on Afghanistan is going to be hard not only because of the fluidity of the Taliban phenomenon but also because it complicates US-Pakistani relations.

Then there is the matter of how Islamabad balances its efforts to re-assert state control over areas on its side of the border with an international move to talk to the Taliban in Afghanistan. The challenge for Pakistan is to regain influence with its western neighbour by reviving its contacts and thus influence with the Afghan Taliban while rolling back Talibanization in its own Pashtun areas. Efforts to neutralize FATA-based domestic rebels impacts Taliban groups focused on Afghanistan, whose support Pakistan needs to crush the domestic insurgency and re-establish its influence in Afghanistan.
 
While Pakistan’s Pashtun areas are most affected by Talibanization, the phenomenon has made considerable inroads into Pakistan’s hinterland, where the Taliban, like the LeT/JuD, manifest themselves more as a social movement. This is why, in addition to the counterinsurgency and counter terrorism campaign, Pakistan has also begun focusing on anti-extremism and de-radicalization efforts — the ideological battle — which is designed to address the circumstances within which  the jihadists are able to grow and operate. While Pakistani public opinion has turned against the Taliban in a meaningful manner, there are still significant pockets of social support and a large number of people who remain ambivalent about the need for a comprehensive campaign against the jihadists.
 
Pakistan’s ability to successfully press ahead with this multidimensional effort depends on its ability to contain political instability within tolerable limits and improve economic conditions. While the judicial crisis ended with the reinstatement of the chief justice fired by former President Pervez Musharraf, political stability remains elusive because of the country’s fragmented political landscape and the weakness of its civilian institutions. And while a loan from the International Monetary Fund has helped Pakistan avoid bankruptcy, it will be some time before the economic conditions begin to improve to the point where Islamabad is able to meet its routine financial obligations and pay the multi billion-dollar cost of fighting the Taliban.
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