Arunachal Pradesh’s Border Roads
29 Jul, 2009 · 2924
Mirza Zulfiqur Rahman points out the poor state of physical infrastructure in the state
The state of Arunachal Pradesh in India’s northeastern frontier has been appearing quite regularly in the Indian national security and strategic imagination for some years now. Strident Chinese territorial claims, particularly over the Tawang hill tract, have managed to unsettle New Delhi and the Indian strategic community. Against this backdrop and given that Arunachal is the largest state in India’s northeastern region in terms of territory, it becomes important to assess the border roads infrastructure and connectivity in this strategically-crucial frontier state.
The state was a theatre in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, in which India had faced major losses and had to fight in extremely unprepared conditions, with almost no road connectivity . While Indian forces did manage to resist strongly at several border points the fall of Tawang and Bomdi La towns were without resistance as there was no proper supply and road infrastructure to maintain Indian army positions. Air dropped supplies sometimes, fell into the hands of the Chinese who had occupied Tawang. This was 50 years ago but the road infrastructure and connectivity in Arunachal Pradesh still leaves a lot to be desired in terms of strategic preparedness for the Indian Army and for the general economic development of the state.
The need to construct proper roads in Arunachal Pradesh dawned on the Indian government only after it suffered in the war against the Chinese, and a skeletal network of roads was built subsequently in this difficult terrain mostly aimed at maintaining military posts and supplies in various strategic parts of the state. This was the first layer of work done on roads in the state, and only fed specific sectors such as Bhalukpung-Bomdi-La-Tawang, Itanagar-Ziro-Along-Mechuka, and the eastern sector which included a maze of roads with no inter-connectivity. The Assam government has four-laned the Stilwell Road in its territory but on the Arunachal side, the Road remains perennially under construction.
Internal connectivity within Arunachal Pradesh remains one of the pressing problems which need urgent attention - to travel to five different towns in Arunachal Pradesh, one has to cross back into Assam as many times. Air dropping of essential civil and military supplies in remote areas of Arunachal Pradesh is the prevailing norm and a number of AN-32 transport aircraft are used on a daily basis from the Guwahati, Jorhat and Dibrugarh supply bases in Assam.
The road that leads to the central part of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly to its capital Itanagar, falls mostly in Assam and has been over the years ill-maintained and is prone to annual floods. The Border Roads Organisation which is in charge of maintaining these crucial roads have done a decent job, keeping in mind the difficult terrain, high rainfall and frequent landslides which sometimes sweep entire stretches of roads away, but overall, the effort is woefully inadequate..
The Trans-Arunachal Highway project which was announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008, has failed to pick up pace with preliminary feasibility studies still being conducted in many parts of the state. The Highway project comes very late, as the pressure on the existing road infrastructure has already increased manifold given the burden of civil supplies as also the massive convoys of army supplies and movement which has become necessary due to the current policy of trying to match Chinese army mobilization across the border. The need for a second network of border roads in Arunachal Pradesh is almost 10-15 years late, and will certainly take another 10-15 years, if not more, to come to fruition. It has been noted that in many parts of Northeast India, the second layer of road connectivity and infrastructure development has begun only when the pressure on the current infrastructure has become enormously high, often compounding implementation woes; the consistent and painful delays in project implementation, can be attributed to a clear policy planning failure on the part of both the central and state governments.
Similarly, the Bogibeel project for a bridge over the river Brahmaputra in Dibrugarh in Assam, was mooted more than a decade back, but saw work begin only just some years ago, and is now estimated to be completed only in the year 2030. This bridge has the potential to connect the middle and eastern parts of Arunachal Pradesh and save on traveling time, as these areas are now dependent on the Kaliabhoomoora Bridge across the Brahmaputra in Tezpur.
The central government still seems to be sleeping on major bottlenecks in terms of road infrastructure and connectivity as is evident in various parts of Northeast India. Major road expansion work is overdue in critical stretches such as Numaligarh-Kohima-Imphal and Guwahati-Shillong-Silchar-Aizawl, which has resulted in clogging the streets of major state capitals like Kohima, Shillong and Aizawl. The Trans-Asian Highway too, has made little progress. There needs to be greater urgency in policy implementation in order to serve the needs of not just Arunachal but the Northeast and the nation as a whole in terms of economic development and strategic military preparedness.
The state was a theatre in the 1962 Sino-Indian war, in which India had faced major losses and had to fight in extremely unprepared conditions, with almost no road connectivity . While Indian forces did manage to resist strongly at several border points the fall of Tawang and Bomdi La towns were without resistance as there was no proper supply and road infrastructure to maintain Indian army positions. Air dropped supplies sometimes, fell into the hands of the Chinese who had occupied Tawang. This was 50 years ago but the road infrastructure and connectivity in Arunachal Pradesh still leaves a lot to be desired in terms of strategic preparedness for the Indian Army and for the general economic development of the state.
The need to construct proper roads in Arunachal Pradesh dawned on the Indian government only after it suffered in the war against the Chinese, and a skeletal network of roads was built subsequently in this difficult terrain mostly aimed at maintaining military posts and supplies in various strategic parts of the state. This was the first layer of work done on roads in the state, and only fed specific sectors such as Bhalukpung-Bomdi-La-Tawang, Itanagar-Ziro-Along-Mechuka, and the eastern sector which included a maze of roads with no inter-connectivity. The Assam government has four-laned the Stilwell Road in its territory but on the Arunachal side, the Road remains perennially under construction.
Internal connectivity within Arunachal Pradesh remains one of the pressing problems which need urgent attention - to travel to five different towns in Arunachal Pradesh, one has to cross back into Assam as many times. Air dropping of essential civil and military supplies in remote areas of Arunachal Pradesh is the prevailing norm and a number of AN-32 transport aircraft are used on a daily basis from the Guwahati, Jorhat and Dibrugarh supply bases in Assam.
The road that leads to the central part of Arunachal Pradesh, particularly to its capital Itanagar, falls mostly in Assam and has been over the years ill-maintained and is prone to annual floods. The Border Roads Organisation which is in charge of maintaining these crucial roads have done a decent job, keeping in mind the difficult terrain, high rainfall and frequent landslides which sometimes sweep entire stretches of roads away, but overall, the effort is woefully inadequate..
The Trans-Arunachal Highway project which was announced by Prime Minister Manmohan Singh in 2008, has failed to pick up pace with preliminary feasibility studies still being conducted in many parts of the state. The Highway project comes very late, as the pressure on the existing road infrastructure has already increased manifold given the burden of civil supplies as also the massive convoys of army supplies and movement which has become necessary due to the current policy of trying to match Chinese army mobilization across the border. The need for a second network of border roads in Arunachal Pradesh is almost 10-15 years late, and will certainly take another 10-15 years, if not more, to come to fruition. It has been noted that in many parts of Northeast India, the second layer of road connectivity and infrastructure development has begun only when the pressure on the current infrastructure has become enormously high, often compounding implementation woes; the consistent and painful delays in project implementation, can be attributed to a clear policy planning failure on the part of both the central and state governments.
Similarly, the Bogibeel project for a bridge over the river Brahmaputra in Dibrugarh in Assam, was mooted more than a decade back, but saw work begin only just some years ago, and is now estimated to be completed only in the year 2030. This bridge has the potential to connect the middle and eastern parts of Arunachal Pradesh and save on traveling time, as these areas are now dependent on the Kaliabhoomoora Bridge across the Brahmaputra in Tezpur.
The central government still seems to be sleeping on major bottlenecks in terms of road infrastructure and connectivity as is evident in various parts of Northeast India. Major road expansion work is overdue in critical stretches such as Numaligarh-Kohima-Imphal and Guwahati-Shillong-Silchar-Aizawl, which has resulted in clogging the streets of major state capitals like Kohima, Shillong and Aizawl. The Trans-Asian Highway too, has made little progress. There needs to be greater urgency in policy implementation in order to serve the needs of not just Arunachal but the Northeast and the nation as a whole in terms of economic development and strategic military preparedness.