On 24 July the Indian Agriculture Minister announced a contingency plan to tackle the water crisis affecting India’s north. Well-below average monsoon rainfall has led several states to declare drought and more states look likely to follow suit.  It is estimated that by 2025, over half of the world’s inhabitants will be directly affected by water scarcity. Most of them will live in either China or India. China has access to about seven per cent of the world’s water resources, but is home to around 20 per cent of the global population, while India possesses around four per cent of water resources with only a slightly smaller populace.  Both countries, along with eight other Asian nations and 47 per cent of the world’s people, are heavily dependent on the Tibetan Plateau for water.

Despite the prominence afforded to Tibet’s political unrest, an actual standoff between India and China over the disputed region is likely to hinge more on control of Tibetan resources. As the economies of India and China grow, the two countries will compete not only for oil and gas but also for valuable water resources.

Conflict over water can be considered at two levels. First, there is the possibility of internal political conflict due to the inability of governments to provide sufficient water to various dependants. Second, there is the possibility of international or inter-regional conflict over trans-boundary water supplies. Analysts posit that countries or regions that already face internal unrest are particularly vulnerable to resource conflicts. As water scarcity becomes a genuine threat to national security it transforms into a flashpoint, over which the likelihood for conflict increases exponentially.  

Conversely, others argue that water scarcity should lead to cooperation rather than conflict. Many nations have proven that it is possible to successfully manage water in highly contested areas without clashing. The 2006 UN report, “From water wars to bridges of cooperation: Exploring the peace-building potential of a shared resource,” details just a small number of these instances. Dialogue around water might provide an avenue for engagement when all other discussions have failed. However, this optimistic scenario may not continue due to states being confronted by what the Hague Centre for Strategic Studies calls “water stress.” Research indicates that in the near future, India and China will most likely find themselves confronted by just such high levels of water stress.  

Six major Asian river basins begin in the Tibetan Plateau - the Indus (India, Pakistan); the Ganges (Nepal, India, Bangladesh); the Brahmaputra (India, Bangladesh); the Salween (China, Burma, Thailand); the Mekong (China, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam); and the Yangtze (China). Over 45,000 glaciers seasonally drain into these rivers, but experts warn that due to global warming they are shrinking at twice the rate of other glaciers worldwide. This factor, combined with increasing water consumption, desertification, rapid industrialization and pollution, mean that demand for the pristine and previously plentiful water of the Tibetan Plateau is increasing. Yet, it is also drying up. Trans-boundary water supply is developing into a major, if largely unremarked upon as yet, politico-security issue for Asia’s two giants.

The Chinese Ministry of Water Resources’ 2005 report, “Tibet's Water Will Save China,” underscores the strategic importance of Tibet vis-à-vis water. It discusses the controversial South-North Water Transfer Project, which entails three man-made rivers channelling water from the Plateau to China’s arid north. This scheme will divert water from the Yarlung Tsangpo, Dadu and Jinsha rivers, which rise in the Plateau, and carry it to the Yellow River (Huang He) to provide water for human consumption, farming and industry. Three diversion routes are involved in the project but it is the diversion of the Yarlung Tsangpo that is the most controversial and technologically challenging of the three routes. The river flows eastwards through southern Tibet before making a spectacular U-turn at its easternmost point, called the Shuomatan Point or the “Great Bend,” just prior to entering India. Here it is joined by two other major rivers and from this point of confluence it is known as the Brahmaputra. It is also here that China plans to divert water.  This diversion will mean that the amount of water in the Brahmaputra will fall significantly, affecting India's northeast and Bangladesh. It will also severely affect agriculture and fishing due to an increase in water salinity and silting downstream.

Reports indicate that the South-North Water Transfer Project is underway, though China officially denies that it has begun work on the Yarlung Tsangpo diversion route. India and China have no water-sharing treaty and although they had agreed to set up a joint expert-level mechanism on interstate river waters, the latter has failed to show any enthusiasm on moving forward with the proposal. As the upstream nation and predominant regional power, there are few constraints on China’s behaviour. Further given China’s propensity to act in a manner that is often economically and politically hegemonic, India looks to be largely at the mercy of Beijing with regard to the Brahmaputra waters. China’s Water Transfer Project arguably enhances its strategic capability and enables it to pursue a subtle, coercive style of water diplomacy towards India. India may be right to worry.