Taking China Seriously
27 Jul, 2009 · 2919
Bhartendu Kumar Singh calls for greater Indian investment in China studies
The recent publication of the Indian Ministry of Defence (MoD) Annual Report 2008-09 has a welcome note - unlike previous reports, when military and strategic developments in China were either ignored or marginally treated, the latest report elaborates on China’s progress in defence modernization at some length and reflects India’s official concerns. While the seriousness is well taken, India is still way behind in understanding China and remains largely clueless about handling challenges that come from across the Himalayas. All this could be attributed to one factor: our casual treatment of China.
It is now widely believed that mutual misperceptions, apart from other reasons, led to the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Chinese misperceptions notwithstanding, India lived under an illusion that China would not attack India. Almost five decades later, many such misperceptions continue. While a section of Sinologists believes that China and India will not go to war since they know each other better and have high stakes in the bilateral relationship another group is confident that India can handle any Chinese misadventures and that any future war between the two countries would be a zero-sum game. Both the propositions are overly optimistic if not fallacious. They ignore China’s defence modernization trends, its strategic consolidation in Tibet and near Indian waters and are yet to crack the code hidden beneath the doctrinal revision that talks of ‘local wars under informationized conditions.’
While other great powers have analyzed Chinese defence modernization from their own perspectives, Indian lags behind. Will China’s defence modernization play a role in the ongoing border talks between the two counties and encourage it to seek a military solution? Is Chinese leadership only waiting for an opportune moment? Is the Sino-Indian military rivalry limited to the border or could it spill over to other parts of the geopolitical chessboard? Where do the two countries figure in each other’s security calculus? Can India defend itself militarily against China without losing any territory? These are the questions that matter if India has to understand China and engage it. Unfortunately, when our policymakers look for pillars of intellectual support, what they get is casual and under-researched feedbacks.
Moreover, China’s defence modernization is just one aspect of our ‘ignorance basket.’ In recent times, trade was considered one of the most promising aspects of bilateral relations. On the face of it, it is true since Sino-Indian trade has grown by leaps and bounds defying all expectations and benchmarks and indeed China has been India’s top trading partner since 2008. Probe more closely however, and the fissures are already evident. After enjoying a trade surplus with China for a long time, India has been running huge deficits (US$10 billion in 2008) in bilateral trade. Besides, India has emerged as a primary products exporter while China exports finished goods. Worse, the acrimony over Chinese cheap products and India’s quantitative and qualitative restrictions are threatening to turn into a trade war. Unfortunately, leading Indian business and trade associations have come out with little policy feedback to enable the government to turn the tide.
Also, despite China and India witnessing phenomenal growth in economic, political and military relationships, there has been little effect in other areas. China and India remain two distinct societies, looking in different directions with negligible cultural exchange between populations. The two counties send more tourists to their other neighbours than to each other. The recent efforts of many newspapers notwithstanding, quality reporting on China has been missing so far. Universities and research institutions still look for official support for exploring China rather than making it an autonomous process and there has been little effort made to produce quality research on China that addresses India’s concerns.
Most countries with stakes in peaceful relations with China have invested in having a primary database on China’s economic and military rise. In the US, apart from universities and research institutions, the government generates comprehensive reports on defence and other aspects of China’s rise on a regular basis. In addition, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), established by an act of Congress, closely monitors all China-related developments and reports back to Congress. The same is true of Japan and many European countries.
If India has to live in peace with China, the most economical method would be to develop a futuristic vision of China’s military and economic empowerment. The annual report by the MoD notwithstanding, India needs to generate exclusive reports on China both within the government and outside it. It will be ridiculous to presume that such reports will create new tensions between the two countries. On the contrary, it will help India to identify issues that need to be raised in various dialogue platforms and interactive channels with China. A lesson needs to be learnt from the American experience.
Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.
It is now widely believed that mutual misperceptions, apart from other reasons, led to the Sino-Indian War in 1962. Chinese misperceptions notwithstanding, India lived under an illusion that China would not attack India. Almost five decades later, many such misperceptions continue. While a section of Sinologists believes that China and India will not go to war since they know each other better and have high stakes in the bilateral relationship another group is confident that India can handle any Chinese misadventures and that any future war between the two countries would be a zero-sum game. Both the propositions are overly optimistic if not fallacious. They ignore China’s defence modernization trends, its strategic consolidation in Tibet and near Indian waters and are yet to crack the code hidden beneath the doctrinal revision that talks of ‘local wars under informationized conditions.’
While other great powers have analyzed Chinese defence modernization from their own perspectives, Indian lags behind. Will China’s defence modernization play a role in the ongoing border talks between the two counties and encourage it to seek a military solution? Is Chinese leadership only waiting for an opportune moment? Is the Sino-Indian military rivalry limited to the border or could it spill over to other parts of the geopolitical chessboard? Where do the two countries figure in each other’s security calculus? Can India defend itself militarily against China without losing any territory? These are the questions that matter if India has to understand China and engage it. Unfortunately, when our policymakers look for pillars of intellectual support, what they get is casual and under-researched feedbacks.
Moreover, China’s defence modernization is just one aspect of our ‘ignorance basket.’ In recent times, trade was considered one of the most promising aspects of bilateral relations. On the face of it, it is true since Sino-Indian trade has grown by leaps and bounds defying all expectations and benchmarks and indeed China has been India’s top trading partner since 2008. Probe more closely however, and the fissures are already evident. After enjoying a trade surplus with China for a long time, India has been running huge deficits (US$10 billion in 2008) in bilateral trade. Besides, India has emerged as a primary products exporter while China exports finished goods. Worse, the acrimony over Chinese cheap products and India’s quantitative and qualitative restrictions are threatening to turn into a trade war. Unfortunately, leading Indian business and trade associations have come out with little policy feedback to enable the government to turn the tide.
Also, despite China and India witnessing phenomenal growth in economic, political and military relationships, there has been little effect in other areas. China and India remain two distinct societies, looking in different directions with negligible cultural exchange between populations. The two counties send more tourists to their other neighbours than to each other. The recent efforts of many newspapers notwithstanding, quality reporting on China has been missing so far. Universities and research institutions still look for official support for exploring China rather than making it an autonomous process and there has been little effort made to produce quality research on China that addresses India’s concerns.
Most countries with stakes in peaceful relations with China have invested in having a primary database on China’s economic and military rise. In the US, apart from universities and research institutions, the government generates comprehensive reports on defence and other aspects of China’s rise on a regular basis. In addition, the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC), established by an act of Congress, closely monitors all China-related developments and reports back to Congress. The same is true of Japan and many European countries.
If India has to live in peace with China, the most economical method would be to develop a futuristic vision of China’s military and economic empowerment. The annual report by the MoD notwithstanding, India needs to generate exclusive reports on China both within the government and outside it. It will be ridiculous to presume that such reports will create new tensions between the two countries. On the contrary, it will help India to identify issues that need to be raised in various dialogue platforms and interactive channels with China. A lesson needs to be learnt from the American experience.
Note: The author is on deputation to the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS). The views expressed herein are those of the author alone.
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