The 8 July G-8 summit in L’Aquila, Italy and the agreement among the G-8 members on restrictions over transfers of sensitive technologies like enrichment and reprocessing (ENR) to non-NPT members has created much hullabaloo in New Delhi. The new rules direct G-8 members to implement the provisions of the ‘clean text’ over ENR transfers agreed to by the NSG members in the 20 November 2008 consultative group meeting. This, as argued by some in India who are alarmed by the decision, rolls back the gains the country made under the Indo-US civilian nuclear deal by compromising the clean waiver obtained by India from the NSG last year.  However, the Indian government is not concerned over this new development and asserts that the agreement as inconsequential due to the clean waiver obtained from the IAEA and the NSG. In the light of these claims and counter-claims, a more holistic understanding of the G-8 declaration is required.

The concerns in the Indian camp are primarily based on the assumption that the G-8 decision is based on the decisions of the NSG. The NSG has been trying to reach a consensual framework agreement to guide transfers of ENR technology and equipment for quite some time. In its consultative group meeting last November, the NSG came near developing clear guidelines. With regard to the ‘clear text,’’ it is important to note that its specifics have yet to be revealed.  However, the recent plenary meeting of the group in June this year revealed that the possibility of consensus among the NSG members has a very low probability. Though a silver lining in the cloud, evident last November, resulted from a mutual agreement between Canada and the US over enrichment-related exports, contentions of the past still linger. The question of accepting the Additional Protocol remains unsettled with Brazil and South Africa against imposing any further conditionality on the non-nuclear members of the NPT. The chorus against the new guidelines has been joined by new states like Turkey and South Korea which fear that the guidelines could adversely affect their civilian nuclear programmes. The proposal to further strengthen the NSG guidelines has been postponed for the plenary meeting next year.   

Second, it must be remembered that the declarations of the G-8 are not binding on its member states. Since, the G-8 members are a party to both the IAEA and NSG guidelines and both these organizations have assented to the Indo-US nuclear deal, it cannot be argued that the same states can make legal promises in one international forum and declare them null and void in another forum. Besides, India has signed specific deals with individual G-8 states like France and Russia for purchasing ENR technology and equipment. In December 2008, India concluded fuel supply agreements with Russia and the French nuclear giant Areva. The agreements with the Russians include lifetime supply of nuclear fuel for the four reactors that Russia is building at Kudankulam, and a five-year contract to supply fuel for the US-built reactors at Tarapur. A contract for 300 tons of nuclear fuel has also been concluded with Areva. India also has the right to reprocess this fuel, unlike fuel from the US, in its own reprocessing facilities, provided the fuel is placed under safeguards. One can contend that the scenario has changed after the recent G-8 declaration, but it should be recollected that the G-8 has consistently ruled against nuclear trade with the non-NPT members since 2004 and that the Indo-US nuclear deal was concluded despite these objections.

India must also not forget the lessons of the Zangger Committee. Formed in 1992, it stipulated guidelines for the NSG members regarding transfer of fuel and other related nuclear technologies. India suffered due to these restrictions when its nuclear reactors were paralysed due to the non-availability of fuel. Nevertheless, India was able to acquire fuel and new reactors from Russia under clause 4(a) of the NSG guidelines which exempt “transfers that pertain to agreements or contracts drawn up on or prior to April 3, 1992.” Since the international system works in an unpredictable environment, successful diplomacy needs to pursue a pro-active approach to deal with possible complexities. The lackadaisical attitude of the Indian Foreign Ministry, which seems to be basking in the glory of the Indo-US nuclear deal, has meant that it failed to read the writing on the wall after the new US administration came to power. India needs to reassert the gains it has made in the Indo-US nuclear deal. The first step in this regard would be to start negotiations on the enrichment and reprocessing of nuclear fuel from US companies, as stipulated under section 201 of the 123 agreement.