Xinjiang: China’s Achilles Heel
14 Jul, 2009 · 2904
Avinash Godbole profiles the recent outbreak of ethnic violence between Uighurs and Hans in China
In yet another episode of ethnic violence in China, more than 180 people have died in the riots in the minority province of Xinjiang. The death toll is bound to rise as more than a hundred are critically injured according to the official media. Besides the death count, these riots have left more than a thousand injured and led to massive destruction of property in Urumqi. The riots took place after a protest march by ethnic Uighur people demanding justice for the two Uighur workers who died during ethnic clashes with Han workers in a toy factory in the Guangdong province in June. These clashes were caused because of the rumoured atrocities of Uighur workers that were never proved.
The violent conflict between the majority Han and the minority Uighur is an important issue in itself but more than that, it is a symptom of a larger problem for the People’s Republic . China has 56 ethnic groups identified as ‘nationalities’ or ‘minzu’. The majority nationality, Han comprises about 92 percent of the Chinese population while the remaining 8 percent is a mix of minority nationalities. The issue becomes tricky for the state, as the minorities are located in China’s border provinces that are underdeveloped but have rich energy resources. Most importantly, the minority nationalities also share ethnic ties across the international borders, including with the nation-states formed after the split of the former Soviet Union. China sees this as a cause for concern as ethnic nationalism challenges Beijing’s rule in these border provinces.
In general, the Party State’s approach has oscillated between accommodation and assimilation towards the minority nationalities. It is well-reflected in the country’s different policies towards minority languages in different phases, sometimes insisting on the supremacy of Mandarin alone and allowing bilingual education on other occasions. It also reflects in the different approaches taken by the Party towards self-determination by minority regions before and after Liberation. Recognising the separatist threat since the dissolution of Soviet Union and creation of new states on ethnic lines, China has taken steps to develop its minority provinces. It has also tried to assimilate the populace within the mainstream even if the state’s approach has retained a pluralist façade. This includes token concessions such as the creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), a more liberal birth control policy for minority nationalities and so on. In the name of development, a large number of Han migrants have settled in the minority regions. Although inevitable, this has caused a sense of resentment among the minorities who believe that while their region has developed they themselves have not benefited. The perception is that the Han immigrants alone have benefited.. Therefore, the Han neighbourhoods become first targets in ethnic conflicts.
Uighur migrants to other parts of China usually get low-paying, high-risk jobs adding to disaffection and alienation. In addition, in many parts of the country, Uighurs have been blamed for petty crimes and been punished without evidence. This has lent strength to the extremist and militant factions of the Uighur population. The extremist faction is represented by East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is a banned organisation. It is believed to be behind many of the bombings in China in the 1990s including one at a paramilitary border police headquarters last year that killed 16 personnel. This group’s activities peaked in 1997 but a heavy crackdown including more than 200 death penalties has nearly eliminated it. Since then China tends to label all extremism in the region as part of the ETIM.
The efforts towards development have been insensitive towards the cultural heritage of the local people and nuclear tests conducted in the region have threatened local life. The local language, something that could have eased the Uighurs’ entry into the mainstream, has also been ignored. . Thus, the development efforts of the Chinese state are beginning to be counterproductive in the province of Xinjiang.
The Chinese state’s response to the protests and subsequent rioting is also interesting. While it has allowed the images of the riots to go out to the international community, it has blocked internet and telephone lines in Xinjiang. Beijing has tried to project the recent violence as a domestic conflict fuelled by some elements of the international community and consistently blamed the World Uighur Congress (WUC) as having instigated the violence by spreading misinformation. China wants the WUC to be banned in Europe and the US and are particularly targeting the exiled Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer. China’s efforts to treat the extremism in Xinjiang as part of global terrorism, is a line which China has consistently taken since the fight against global terrorism came to forefront in the wake of 9/11.
These protests remind one of the last year’s Tibetan protests which had rocked the Chinese leadership as the nation was preparing to host the Beijing Olympics. Embarrassing as they are, protests in the minority regions are becoming more violent and thus pose serious challenges to Beijing.
The violent conflict between the majority Han and the minority Uighur is an important issue in itself but more than that, it is a symptom of a larger problem for the People’s Republic . China has 56 ethnic groups identified as ‘nationalities’ or ‘minzu’. The majority nationality, Han comprises about 92 percent of the Chinese population while the remaining 8 percent is a mix of minority nationalities. The issue becomes tricky for the state, as the minorities are located in China’s border provinces that are underdeveloped but have rich energy resources. Most importantly, the minority nationalities also share ethnic ties across the international borders, including with the nation-states formed after the split of the former Soviet Union. China sees this as a cause for concern as ethnic nationalism challenges Beijing’s rule in these border provinces.
In general, the Party State’s approach has oscillated between accommodation and assimilation towards the minority nationalities. It is well-reflected in the country’s different policies towards minority languages in different phases, sometimes insisting on the supremacy of Mandarin alone and allowing bilingual education on other occasions. It also reflects in the different approaches taken by the Party towards self-determination by minority regions before and after Liberation. Recognising the separatist threat since the dissolution of Soviet Union and creation of new states on ethnic lines, China has taken steps to develop its minority provinces. It has also tried to assimilate the populace within the mainstream even if the state’s approach has retained a pluralist façade. This includes token concessions such as the creation of Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region (XUAR), a more liberal birth control policy for minority nationalities and so on. In the name of development, a large number of Han migrants have settled in the minority regions. Although inevitable, this has caused a sense of resentment among the minorities who believe that while their region has developed they themselves have not benefited. The perception is that the Han immigrants alone have benefited.. Therefore, the Han neighbourhoods become first targets in ethnic conflicts.
Uighur migrants to other parts of China usually get low-paying, high-risk jobs adding to disaffection and alienation. In addition, in many parts of the country, Uighurs have been blamed for petty crimes and been punished without evidence. This has lent strength to the extremist and militant factions of the Uighur population. The extremist faction is represented by East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is a banned organisation. It is believed to be behind many of the bombings in China in the 1990s including one at a paramilitary border police headquarters last year that killed 16 personnel. This group’s activities peaked in 1997 but a heavy crackdown including more than 200 death penalties has nearly eliminated it. Since then China tends to label all extremism in the region as part of the ETIM.
The efforts towards development have been insensitive towards the cultural heritage of the local people and nuclear tests conducted in the region have threatened local life. The local language, something that could have eased the Uighurs’ entry into the mainstream, has also been ignored. . Thus, the development efforts of the Chinese state are beginning to be counterproductive in the province of Xinjiang.
The Chinese state’s response to the protests and subsequent rioting is also interesting. While it has allowed the images of the riots to go out to the international community, it has blocked internet and telephone lines in Xinjiang. Beijing has tried to project the recent violence as a domestic conflict fuelled by some elements of the international community and consistently blamed the World Uighur Congress (WUC) as having instigated the violence by spreading misinformation. China wants the WUC to be banned in Europe and the US and are particularly targeting the exiled Uighur activist Rebiya Kadeer. China’s efforts to treat the extremism in Xinjiang as part of global terrorism, is a line which China has consistently taken since the fight against global terrorism came to forefront in the wake of 9/11.
These protests remind one of the last year’s Tibetan protests which had rocked the Chinese leadership as the nation was preparing to host the Beijing Olympics. Embarrassing as they are, protests in the minority regions are becoming more violent and thus pose serious challenges to Beijing.
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