The US and the CTBT
15 Jun, 2009 · 2893
Priyanka Subramaniam looks at the American position on the Treaty from the Clinton administration on
In 1996, when President Clinton signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), he called it the "longest sought, hardest fought prize in the history of arms control.” While Clinton introduced the CTBT in the Senate for ratification, the following year, in early 1998, Senator Jesse Helms informed the President that, “the CTBT is very low on the [Senate Foreign Relations] Committee’s list of priorities.
In May 1998, when India and Pakistan conducted their respective nuclear tests, they raised concerns about the consequences of the ratification of the Treaty in the face of perceived threats to international security. The P5 needed safety nets that would allow them to resume testing if a country withdrew from the CTBT and the non-nuclear nations feared that the P5 would continue to design and maintain new weapons without testing, the practice of which is known as stockpile stewardship.
Stewardship is an essential component of the CTBT debate. Clinton thus needed to put forward a plan that would allow the US to maintain its nuclear capabilities within treaty limitations. He came up with six ‘safeguards’ saying, “As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness.”
The CTBT had the President’s full support and the support of environmental groups and other influential lobbies. The safeguards were designed to satisfy the Senate’s concerns over future threats to national security. In 1999, the CTBT came up in the Senate for ratification. Needing 67 votes to be approved, the treaty achieved only 48, with 51 senators voting against. The grounds for rejection were primarily that US ratification would not prevent other countries from going forward with their own tests, thereby increasing threats to American national security. Bipartisan politics was also cited as a reason for the failure to ratify; the unanimous Republican opposition to the Clinton administration may have had something to do with it.
During his 2000 campaign, George W Bush said that one of his “highest foreign policy priorities will be to check the contagious spread of weapons of mass destruction.” He however believed that the CTBT “does not stop proliferation, especially in renegade regimes. It is not verifiable. It is not enforceable. And it would stop us from ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation's deterrent, should the need arise.” He also declared, “we can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.”
It was clear that the CTBT would not be a priority during his administration. Colin Powell, Bush’s Secretary of State, who had earlier endorsed the CTBT in 1998, stated that he and the administration believed “that there are still flaws with the treaty as it was voted down in 1999." Although it had decided not to seek ratification, the Bush administration was certain that the moratorium on testing would continue to be maintained and that they would be engaged in preparatory activities such as building International Monitoring System stations.
Barack Obama, during his presidential campaign vowed to “reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date and (then) launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.” His efforts during the first half of 2009 have shown his commitment to the issue. On 5 April, in Prague he said, “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act…We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it.”
For several years in a row the US’ voting rights at the CTBTO have been suspended at the beginning of the calendar year for failure to pay dues. The Obama administration’s budget for the next fiscal year includes US$26 million for the CTBTO. This amount will only meet the due requirements for 2009 but it is the first time since the Clinton administration that such support has been shown for the CTBTO.
The administration still needs 67 votes for ratification of the treaty. Analysts believe that at least 60 votes are certain, but it is a long way from 60 to 67. The international political scene is quite different today from what it was in 1996. The last stages of the Cold War are not so recent in memory, Russia has ratified the CTBT and China seems to be moving toward ratification. India and Pakistan, however, have not settled their differences and the Middle East continues to face instability.
If the Senate finally ratifies the CTBT after almost 13 years of shelving the debate, the response of the international community especially of the nine states that still need to ratify the treaty to satisfy Article XIV, remains to be seen. Will they follow where the US leads or will they use the ratification to further consolidate their bargaining positions?
In May 1998, when India and Pakistan conducted their respective nuclear tests, they raised concerns about the consequences of the ratification of the Treaty in the face of perceived threats to international security. The P5 needed safety nets that would allow them to resume testing if a country withdrew from the CTBT and the non-nuclear nations feared that the P5 would continue to design and maintain new weapons without testing, the practice of which is known as stockpile stewardship.
Stewardship is an essential component of the CTBT debate. Clinton thus needed to put forward a plan that would allow the US to maintain its nuclear capabilities within treaty limitations. He came up with six ‘safeguards’ saying, “As a central part of this decision, I am establishing concrete, specific safeguards that define the conditions under which the United States will enter into a comprehensive test ban. These safeguards will strengthen our commitments in the areas of intelligence, monitoring and verification, stockpile stewardship, maintenance of our nuclear laboratories, and test readiness.”
The CTBT had the President’s full support and the support of environmental groups and other influential lobbies. The safeguards were designed to satisfy the Senate’s concerns over future threats to national security. In 1999, the CTBT came up in the Senate for ratification. Needing 67 votes to be approved, the treaty achieved only 48, with 51 senators voting against. The grounds for rejection were primarily that US ratification would not prevent other countries from going forward with their own tests, thereby increasing threats to American national security. Bipartisan politics was also cited as a reason for the failure to ratify; the unanimous Republican opposition to the Clinton administration may have had something to do with it.
During his 2000 campaign, George W Bush said that one of his “highest foreign policy priorities will be to check the contagious spread of weapons of mass destruction.” He however believed that the CTBT “does not stop proliferation, especially in renegade regimes. It is not verifiable. It is not enforceable. And it would stop us from ensuring the safety and reliability of our nation's deterrent, should the need arise.” He also declared, “we can fight the spread of nuclear weapons, but we cannot wish them away with unwise treaties.”
It was clear that the CTBT would not be a priority during his administration. Colin Powell, Bush’s Secretary of State, who had earlier endorsed the CTBT in 1998, stated that he and the administration believed “that there are still flaws with the treaty as it was voted down in 1999." Although it had decided not to seek ratification, the Bush administration was certain that the moratorium on testing would continue to be maintained and that they would be engaged in preparatory activities such as building International Monitoring System stations.
Barack Obama, during his presidential campaign vowed to “reach out to the Senate to secure the ratification of the CTBT at the earliest practical date and (then) launch a diplomatic effort to bring on board other states whose ratifications are required for the treaty to enter into force.” His efforts during the first half of 2009 have shown his commitment to the issue. On 5 April, in Prague he said, “As the only nuclear power to have used a nuclear weapon, the United States has a moral responsibility to act…We cannot succeed in this endeavor alone, but we can lead it.”
For several years in a row the US’ voting rights at the CTBTO have been suspended at the beginning of the calendar year for failure to pay dues. The Obama administration’s budget for the next fiscal year includes US$26 million for the CTBTO. This amount will only meet the due requirements for 2009 but it is the first time since the Clinton administration that such support has been shown for the CTBTO.
The administration still needs 67 votes for ratification of the treaty. Analysts believe that at least 60 votes are certain, but it is a long way from 60 to 67. The international political scene is quite different today from what it was in 1996. The last stages of the Cold War are not so recent in memory, Russia has ratified the CTBT and China seems to be moving toward ratification. India and Pakistan, however, have not settled their differences and the Middle East continues to face instability.
If the Senate finally ratifies the CTBT after almost 13 years of shelving the debate, the response of the international community especially of the nine states that still need to ratify the treaty to satisfy Article XIV, remains to be seen. Will they follow where the US leads or will they use the ratification to further consolidate their bargaining positions?
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