Pakistan Army’s Complex Counter-Militancy Strategy
10 Jun, 2009 · 2890
RK Bhonsle points out the dynamics of Rawalpindi’s counterinsurgency strategy
The Pakistan Army’s counter-militancy strategy has remained largely an enigma. In the past, the Army has been reluctant to engage in classic counterinsurgency operations despite the spread of rebellion across vast tracts of territory in the FATA and its spillover into Punjab. While the government is continually raising the bogey of loss of sovereignty due to the drone attacks on Al Qaeda in its territory, it feigns ignorance of the absence of its writ in these very areas. The recent military operation launched by the Army in Swat, Buner and Dir has once again focused attention on Pakistan’s approach to counter-militancy.
There are two components to Pakistan’s counter-militancy strategy, the military and the political. The military approach is fairly straightforward. The Army uses high-intensity kinetic operations for search and destroy missions as seen in Swat using fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy artillery and ground troops to target militant strong points, hideouts, ammunition and logistics dumps and command and control centres. The aim is to destroy the physical infrastructure of militancy and reclaim territory. This invariably results in generating a stream of refugees running into millions in the recent operation in the Malakand Agency, while the Taliban manages to get away. During the Swat operations it is believed that approximately 1,100 militants were killed or injured out of an estimated total of 4,000-5,000 indicating that almost three-fourths escaped the Army dragnet.
On reestablishing control, the Army hands over such areas to the Frontier Corps or its poorer cousin, the Frontier Constabulary, who lack arms, training, equipment and motivation to fight, “jihadi” militancy with its emphasis on martyrdom. Thus, the Taliban invariably reoccupy their old positions and target civilians who have acted against their interests, publicly beheading or assassinating them. In Swat, the Army has announced that it would continue to stay on for a year or so while simultaneously asking the civil population to assist the Army in vigilance against the Taliban. Given past experience including its penchant to raise the India bogey, there is no surety this time around that the Army will stick to its word.
Thus, the Pakistan Army’s reluctance to put boots on the ground remains its greatest failing and its refusal to directly engage with society caught in the cleft of the Taliban and the military has resulted in thousands of refugees. In fourth-generation warfare, the people and society are centres of gravity and by refusing to recognize this central facet, the Army’s approach has remained kinetic and will possibly continue to be so.
The Pakistan Army’s military strategy is simple but results in complex outcomes and while its political strategy is more sophisticated, it results in even more unpredictable consequences. This was evident in the Razmak Cadet College kidnapping incident recently. By placing its faith in the Taliban leader Gul Bahadur from North Waziristan to escort the Razmak cadets, the lives of many were put at peril. At what cost the release of the cadets was obtained is not clear but the Taliban would have certainly extracted many concessions. Yet the Army is perhaps willing to humour such groups regarded as, “strategic assets” as long as they restrict their activities towards forces inimical to Pakistani interests without realizing that this seriously undermines Pakistan’s role as an ally in any joint counter-militancy campaign with other countries.
The structure of governance in Pakistan’s tribal areas with the political agent, the frontier corps, the army, the intelligence agency, tribal leadership and the Taliban is also manipulated to advantage as a part of this political strategy by making peace deals and political contracts to relieve pressure whenever the Army finds itself in a corner. Most recently, the Army used the tribal leaders and the mullahs to engage Baitullah Mehsud in peace talks when the Army launched operations in Swat, while President Zardari announced that the next objective was Waziristan. This ensured that Mehsud did not provide any support to Fazlullah in the North.
The Army also manipulates the Taliban and tribal leaders by splitting them from time to time. Thus, the three main Taliban groupings in North and South Waziristan, led by Mehsud, Maulvi-Nazir of Wana and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan have been successfully separated so far, thereby avoiding a joint confrontation. Sowing seeds of dissent has always been a part of the overall army strategy to prevent the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan from joining hands and fight together.
From this approach of the Pakistan Army it is evident that it continues to remain ambivalent on the role of the Taliban, frequently mixing the, “good” and the “bad” to tactical advantage. There is reluctance to put boots on the ground, establish a counterinsurgency grid and facilitate development and governance. This also results in employment of kinetic operations and the attendant fallout of displacement. Grassroots political activity is substituted by political manipulation and narrow parochial institutional interests undermine the larger good of the people and the state. Whether the Pakistani Army changes this approach, will determine the success or failure of the counter-militancy campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
There are two components to Pakistan’s counter-militancy strategy, the military and the political. The military approach is fairly straightforward. The Army uses high-intensity kinetic operations for search and destroy missions as seen in Swat using fighter aircraft, attack helicopters, heavy artillery and ground troops to target militant strong points, hideouts, ammunition and logistics dumps and command and control centres. The aim is to destroy the physical infrastructure of militancy and reclaim territory. This invariably results in generating a stream of refugees running into millions in the recent operation in the Malakand Agency, while the Taliban manages to get away. During the Swat operations it is believed that approximately 1,100 militants were killed or injured out of an estimated total of 4,000-5,000 indicating that almost three-fourths escaped the Army dragnet.
On reestablishing control, the Army hands over such areas to the Frontier Corps or its poorer cousin, the Frontier Constabulary, who lack arms, training, equipment and motivation to fight, “jihadi” militancy with its emphasis on martyrdom. Thus, the Taliban invariably reoccupy their old positions and target civilians who have acted against their interests, publicly beheading or assassinating them. In Swat, the Army has announced that it would continue to stay on for a year or so while simultaneously asking the civil population to assist the Army in vigilance against the Taliban. Given past experience including its penchant to raise the India bogey, there is no surety this time around that the Army will stick to its word.
Thus, the Pakistan Army’s reluctance to put boots on the ground remains its greatest failing and its refusal to directly engage with society caught in the cleft of the Taliban and the military has resulted in thousands of refugees. In fourth-generation warfare, the people and society are centres of gravity and by refusing to recognize this central facet, the Army’s approach has remained kinetic and will possibly continue to be so.
The Pakistan Army’s military strategy is simple but results in complex outcomes and while its political strategy is more sophisticated, it results in even more unpredictable consequences. This was evident in the Razmak Cadet College kidnapping incident recently. By placing its faith in the Taliban leader Gul Bahadur from North Waziristan to escort the Razmak cadets, the lives of many were put at peril. At what cost the release of the cadets was obtained is not clear but the Taliban would have certainly extracted many concessions. Yet the Army is perhaps willing to humour such groups regarded as, “strategic assets” as long as they restrict their activities towards forces inimical to Pakistani interests without realizing that this seriously undermines Pakistan’s role as an ally in any joint counter-militancy campaign with other countries.
The structure of governance in Pakistan’s tribal areas with the political agent, the frontier corps, the army, the intelligence agency, tribal leadership and the Taliban is also manipulated to advantage as a part of this political strategy by making peace deals and political contracts to relieve pressure whenever the Army finds itself in a corner. Most recently, the Army used the tribal leaders and the mullahs to engage Baitullah Mehsud in peace talks when the Army launched operations in Swat, while President Zardari announced that the next objective was Waziristan. This ensured that Mehsud did not provide any support to Fazlullah in the North.
The Army also manipulates the Taliban and tribal leaders by splitting them from time to time. Thus, the three main Taliban groupings in North and South Waziristan, led by Mehsud, Maulvi-Nazir of Wana and Hafiz Gul Bahadur of North Waziristan have been successfully separated so far, thereby avoiding a joint confrontation. Sowing seeds of dissent has always been a part of the overall army strategy to prevent the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan from joining hands and fight together.
From this approach of the Pakistan Army it is evident that it continues to remain ambivalent on the role of the Taliban, frequently mixing the, “good” and the “bad” to tactical advantage. There is reluctance to put boots on the ground, establish a counterinsurgency grid and facilitate development and governance. This also results in employment of kinetic operations and the attendant fallout of displacement. Grassroots political activity is substituted by political manipulation and narrow parochial institutional interests undermine the larger good of the people and the state. Whether the Pakistani Army changes this approach, will determine the success or failure of the counter-militancy campaign in Pakistan and Afghanistan.
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