Why the 2009 NPT PrepCom was Not a Failure
05 Jun, 2009 · 2886
Yogesh Joshi sees several positives in the final meeting of the preparatory committee for the 2010 NPT RevCon
For two weeks in the month of May, delegates from 122 countries, signatories of the Non-Proliferation Treaty discussed the procedural agenda and substantive recommendations for the 2010 NPT Review Conference (RevCon). Chaired by Ambassador Boniface Chidyausiku of Zimbabwe, the third and final Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) for 2010 RevCon, unlike the PrepCom of 2004, was able to approve an agenda for 2010 but failed to provide a recommendation, as in 2004, on substantive issues beleaguering the NPT regime in particular and the universal discourse on disarmament in general. Though one can easily tout the differences on substantive recommendations as an outright failure, it is important to look at various positives from the PrepCom.
If we look through a minimalistic prism, the PrepCom was successful in at least in one regard. It was able to consensually arrive at an agenda which basically revolved around the “principles and objectives” of the 1995 Review and Extension conference and the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A reference to the 1995 and 2000 RevCon meant a clear indication to return to the pre-Bush administration approach to arms control. No serious efforts to ratify the CTBT and the unilateral American withdrawal from the ABM treaty clubbed with counter-proliferation measures such as Proliferation Security Initiative and Container Security Initiative led to the moribund state in which the NPT regime found itself at the end of the Bush administration. The revival of “NPT spirit” was singularly possible because of the change of guard at the White House and the recent goodwill generated by a revisionist (in relation to the previous administration) nuclear policy of the Obama administration. President Obama’s assertion that he would work for the ratification of the CTBT and for strategic arms reduction with Russia brought back, in some measure, the legitimacy of the regime by proclaiming disarmament to be the central tenet of the NPT regime.
Further, during the course of the PrepCom, the US adopted a non-confrontational approach evident in the address of the Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, to the PrepCom, reiterating unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and by the absence of any direct reference to Iran. Earlier in 2004, the US eschewed any reference to disarmament commitments, focussed only on potentially proliferating states and even rejected the 13 steps of the 2000 RevCon. This change in attitude of the superpower allowed for a modicum of cooperation in the PrepCom. Among the P-5, only France and China appeared to be laidback and un-cooperating and were definitely not prepared for the doctrinal changes accompanying the revised US policy. They were initially reluctant to refer to the disarmament commitments as well as over the verification clause in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty but could do little against the changed environment. A more calm and stable diplomatic milieu was definitely an advantage over the chaos of the earlier meetings.
Though no substantive recommendations could be made to the 2010 RevCon, the discussions on various other aspects related to the three pillars of NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses nuclear energy – were a welcome development. The Nuclear Fuel Bank (NFB) and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) were two important issues which were highlighted during the negotiations on the recommendations. In debates over the NFB, there was a clear omission of the Global Nuclear Energy Initiative, proposed by the Bush Administration in 2006 authorising some states to enrich nuclear fuel and relegating others to buy from a select few. The inclusion of multilateral approaches as proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and IAEA were supported by most states and all were quick to recognise the importance of the NWFZ in strengthening the NPT regime. The 1995 RevCon recommendation for a NWFZ in the Middle East was revisited and strong appeals were made to rework the arrangement. A Nuclear Weapons Convention banning nuclear weapons on the lines of the CWC and provisions for making ‘Negative Security Assurances’ ( assurance from Nuclear Weapon States of not using nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States) legally binding were also discussed and supported by a host of states.
Since concrete measures for global disarmament are not visible in the conclusion of the PrepCom, one can argue that tactical requirements to serve one’s interests can lead to symbolism and this is precisely what US is trying to do. The argument that equating disarmament with non-proliferation, renouncing unilateralism, being more accommodative are short-term measures indicating efforts to make up for the blunders of the Bush Administration is to miss the whole point of the importance of norms and rules. The US acceptance of the NPT regime as the legitimate authority for global disarmament, a more multilateral approach for countering nuclear threats and a voluntary recognition of the responsibilities it shares with the international community highlights the importance of legitimacy and shared understanding in resolving contentious issues.
A superpower with legitimacy is hard to contend with.
If we look through a minimalistic prism, the PrepCom was successful in at least in one regard. It was able to consensually arrive at an agenda which basically revolved around the “principles and objectives” of the 1995 Review and Extension conference and the “13 practical steps” of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. A reference to the 1995 and 2000 RevCon meant a clear indication to return to the pre-Bush administration approach to arms control. No serious efforts to ratify the CTBT and the unilateral American withdrawal from the ABM treaty clubbed with counter-proliferation measures such as Proliferation Security Initiative and Container Security Initiative led to the moribund state in which the NPT regime found itself at the end of the Bush administration. The revival of “NPT spirit” was singularly possible because of the change of guard at the White House and the recent goodwill generated by a revisionist (in relation to the previous administration) nuclear policy of the Obama administration. President Obama’s assertion that he would work for the ratification of the CTBT and for strategic arms reduction with Russia brought back, in some measure, the legitimacy of the regime by proclaiming disarmament to be the central tenet of the NPT regime.
Further, during the course of the PrepCom, the US adopted a non-confrontational approach evident in the address of the Assistant Secretary of State, Rose Gottemoeller, to the PrepCom, reiterating unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament and by the absence of any direct reference to Iran. Earlier in 2004, the US eschewed any reference to disarmament commitments, focussed only on potentially proliferating states and even rejected the 13 steps of the 2000 RevCon. This change in attitude of the superpower allowed for a modicum of cooperation in the PrepCom. Among the P-5, only France and China appeared to be laidback and un-cooperating and were definitely not prepared for the doctrinal changes accompanying the revised US policy. They were initially reluctant to refer to the disarmament commitments as well as over the verification clause in the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty but could do little against the changed environment. A more calm and stable diplomatic milieu was definitely an advantage over the chaos of the earlier meetings.
Though no substantive recommendations could be made to the 2010 RevCon, the discussions on various other aspects related to the three pillars of NPT – disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses nuclear energy – were a welcome development. The Nuclear Fuel Bank (NFB) and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zones (NWFZ) were two important issues which were highlighted during the negotiations on the recommendations. In debates over the NFB, there was a clear omission of the Global Nuclear Energy Initiative, proposed by the Bush Administration in 2006 authorising some states to enrich nuclear fuel and relegating others to buy from a select few. The inclusion of multilateral approaches as proposed by the Nuclear Threat Initiative and IAEA were supported by most states and all were quick to recognise the importance of the NWFZ in strengthening the NPT regime. The 1995 RevCon recommendation for a NWFZ in the Middle East was revisited and strong appeals were made to rework the arrangement. A Nuclear Weapons Convention banning nuclear weapons on the lines of the CWC and provisions for making ‘Negative Security Assurances’ ( assurance from Nuclear Weapon States of not using nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear Weapon States) legally binding were also discussed and supported by a host of states.
Since concrete measures for global disarmament are not visible in the conclusion of the PrepCom, one can argue that tactical requirements to serve one’s interests can lead to symbolism and this is precisely what US is trying to do. The argument that equating disarmament with non-proliferation, renouncing unilateralism, being more accommodative are short-term measures indicating efforts to make up for the blunders of the Bush Administration is to miss the whole point of the importance of norms and rules. The US acceptance of the NPT regime as the legitimate authority for global disarmament, a more multilateral approach for countering nuclear threats and a voluntary recognition of the responsibilities it shares with the international community highlights the importance of legitimacy and shared understanding in resolving contentious issues.
A superpower with legitimacy is hard to contend with.
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