India and the CTBT: Renewing the Debate
23 May, 2009 · 2876
Priyanka Subramaniam argues it is time India came out with a well-thought out position on the treaty
Commenting on the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) in September 1996, the then Minister for External Affairs, IK Gujral said “It is not a ‘comprehensive treaty,’ (as) it permits the nuclear weapon states to continue their weapons related research and development activity using non-explosive technologies; it lacks any meaningful commitment to nuclear disarmament and instead of being the definitive first step of the nuclear disarmament process, it only serves to perpetuate the existing discriminatory status quo.” This was the keystone of India’s stand on the CTBT in the 1990s.
Should there now be a renewed debate on the CTBT in India following the numerous developments that have taken place since at the national and international level relating to nuclear armament and disarmament? In the last 11 years, India has conducted six nuclear tests, maintained its moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and more recently in 2008 under the Bush and Singh administrations signed the Indo-US nuclear deal, effectively bringing an end to India’s nuclear isolation of thirty years.
The original Indian debate on the CTBT has four direct objections to the CTBT. The first was that the issue of time-bound disarmament had been shelved; the N5 had not put forward a schedule for disarming their existing weapons. The CTBT was focused more on non-proliferation than disarmament. Second, the CTBT was non-comprehensive and zero-yield; it made no mention of nuclear testing and refining of old systems through computer simulations. Third, it increased the divide between the haves and the have-nots; those already possessing nuclear technology were at an advantage and could withdraw from the treaty without fear of repercussions. Finally, Article XIV, the entry-into-force clause which required 44 nuclear-enabled states (including India) to ratify the Treaty before it came into force, would place India under unwarranted international pressure to ratify the Treaty.
There were other political objections too. The verifications schemes were seen as threatening sovereignty. Instead, India adopted a ‘nuclear option’ that implied development of nuclear weapon systems was only for the purpose of deterrence and adopted a self-imposed moratorium on testing coupled with a no first-use policy. After the 1998 nuclear tests, there were minor changes in India’s position to the CTBT. Jaswant Singh, then the BJP External Affairs Minister stated that “… (India) will henceforth observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. It has also indicated a willingness to move toward a de jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT is thus met: to undertake no more nuclear tests. Since India already subscribes to the substance of the test ban treaty, all that remains is its actual signature."
The Indo-US nuclear deal and recent political changes in US and India is likely to renew the CTBT debate. In India those who favour the CTBT see it as a way of improving relationships with the US; the opponents see the deal as a road towards India ratifying the CTBT. The CTBTO urged India to sign the Treaty again while the Indo-US nuclear deal went through its defining moments in August 2008, India held firm, maintaining that it has not broken its moratorium on testing and as a result has met all the conditions for non-proliferation.
Barack Obama has made the CTBT a priority in his non-proliferation policy and has vowed to seek Senate ratification of the Treaty. The former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, during a conference in New Delhi recently, noted that the US would get strict on the CTBT. The Ministry of External Affairs chose to take this merely as Blackwill’s personal opinion, although, Manmohan Singh’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Issues and Climate Change, Shyam Saran, recently acknowledged in Washington that that the CTBT was a potentially, contentious issue facing India and the US. Before the Indo-US bilateral talks in March, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, too mentioned that India would not stand in the way, if the CTBT were to actively contribute to nuclear disarmament.
There will be extreme pressure on India, once the US ratifies the CTBT. What will be India’s position? To quote Shyam Saran again, “if the world moves categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible time-frame, the Indo-US differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the background.”
Should India sign the CTBT? Or link it to complete nuclear disarmament and stand in the way, if the former is not addressed? What is in India’s interests? Clearly, there is a need to debate and this debate should be based on the changed atmosphere at regional and international level relating to India’s nuclear interests and not based on old rhetoric.
Should there now be a renewed debate on the CTBT in India following the numerous developments that have taken place since at the national and international level relating to nuclear armament and disarmament? In the last 11 years, India has conducted six nuclear tests, maintained its moratorium on nuclear testing since 1998 and more recently in 2008 under the Bush and Singh administrations signed the Indo-US nuclear deal, effectively bringing an end to India’s nuclear isolation of thirty years.
The original Indian debate on the CTBT has four direct objections to the CTBT. The first was that the issue of time-bound disarmament had been shelved; the N5 had not put forward a schedule for disarming their existing weapons. The CTBT was focused more on non-proliferation than disarmament. Second, the CTBT was non-comprehensive and zero-yield; it made no mention of nuclear testing and refining of old systems through computer simulations. Third, it increased the divide between the haves and the have-nots; those already possessing nuclear technology were at an advantage and could withdraw from the treaty without fear of repercussions. Finally, Article XIV, the entry-into-force clause which required 44 nuclear-enabled states (including India) to ratify the Treaty before it came into force, would place India under unwarranted international pressure to ratify the Treaty.
There were other political objections too. The verifications schemes were seen as threatening sovereignty. Instead, India adopted a ‘nuclear option’ that implied development of nuclear weapon systems was only for the purpose of deterrence and adopted a self-imposed moratorium on testing coupled with a no first-use policy. After the 1998 nuclear tests, there were minor changes in India’s position to the CTBT. Jaswant Singh, then the BJP External Affairs Minister stated that “… (India) will henceforth observe a voluntary moratorium and refrain from conducting underground nuclear test explosions. It has also indicated a willingness to move toward a de jure formalisation of this declaration. The basic obligation of the CTBT is thus met: to undertake no more nuclear tests. Since India already subscribes to the substance of the test ban treaty, all that remains is its actual signature."
The Indo-US nuclear deal and recent political changes in US and India is likely to renew the CTBT debate. In India those who favour the CTBT see it as a way of improving relationships with the US; the opponents see the deal as a road towards India ratifying the CTBT. The CTBTO urged India to sign the Treaty again while the Indo-US nuclear deal went through its defining moments in August 2008, India held firm, maintaining that it has not broken its moratorium on testing and as a result has met all the conditions for non-proliferation.
Barack Obama has made the CTBT a priority in his non-proliferation policy and has vowed to seek Senate ratification of the Treaty. The former US Ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, during a conference in New Delhi recently, noted that the US would get strict on the CTBT. The Ministry of External Affairs chose to take this merely as Blackwill’s personal opinion, although, Manmohan Singh’s Special Envoy for Nuclear Issues and Climate Change, Shyam Saran, recently acknowledged in Washington that that the CTBT was a potentially, contentious issue facing India and the US. Before the Indo-US bilateral talks in March, Foreign Secretary Shivshankar Menon, too mentioned that India would not stand in the way, if the CTBT were to actively contribute to nuclear disarmament.
There will be extreme pressure on India, once the US ratifies the CTBT. What will be India’s position? To quote Shyam Saran again, “if the world moves categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible time-frame, the Indo-US differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the background.”
Should India sign the CTBT? Or link it to complete nuclear disarmament and stand in the way, if the former is not addressed? What is in India’s interests? Clearly, there is a need to debate and this debate should be based on the changed atmosphere at regional and international level relating to India’s nuclear interests and not based on old rhetoric.
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