Nuclear Disarmament: Not in Obama’s Lifetime?
12 May, 2009 · 2865
Arundhati Ghose argues that the American President has outlined no real initiatives towards achieving disarmament
President Obama’s speech in Prague on 5 April in which he called for the cause of global nuclear disarmament, has its own symbolic importance. The Prague spring refers to the historic uprising of 1968 when the people of Prague stood up against the despotic communists demanding democracy and political freedom. It was an incident that promised much, but died an early death when faced with reality. In the current context, Obama’s speech, perhaps is similar in effect, as expectations have been raised of concrete steps by the US towards the elimination of nuclear weapons, that may, in fact, not be met- certainly not, as he himself said, “in his lifetime”.
Since the April speech, two reports of bipartisan US task forces, both on US nuclear policy, have become available: first, a Congressionally mandated Commission on Strategic Posture of the US, and the second, a task force of the Council for Foreign Relations. Both have supported the resumption of negotiations with Russia on START and the reduction of nuclear weapons of both sides. Both have agreed with Obama’s view that prevailing conditions did not allow the elimination of nuclear weapons, and agreed that a safe and secure nuclear force was needed to reassure America’s allies, which, without that protection might seek to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Clearly, the reference is to Japan, as it would be surprising if Australia or any European ally is indicated in this rather sweeping statement.
The Congressional Task Force could not, however, reach agreement on the CTBT, while the Council on Foreign Relations was in agreement that the US should ratify that Treaty. To recall the position of the earlier Administration - the Secretaries of State, Energy and Defense, had pushed the Congress for approval of the Renewable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a condition for CTBT ratification.
President Obama’s speech must have been made after consultation with all stakeholders in the US nuclear weapon industry, including the labs, the corporations and many agencies involved. It could, however, also only be an outline of what the parameters of US policy could be, in terms of desirables and achievable, in the context of the forthcoming 2010 NPT RevCon, rather than a considered policy statement. The pronouncements made so far by the Obama team on non-proliferation reflect traditional Democrat positions on non-proliferation issues, which seem to belong to at least a decade ago.
Taking these factors into account, Obama’s Prague speech, may just be gestures to ease the tensions that caused the last NPT RevCon to fail. The international community, that is, some NPT states and their allies, have been vociferous in their support for the ‘eventual’ goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In their view, the risks of another failure of the RevCon could be serious. With a nuclear renaissance on the horizon, Iran and North Korea refusing to back down on their chosen nuclear paths (Iran recently claimed to have mastered the full fuel cycle technology) and perhaps the increased dangers of nuclear terrorism or more worrying, of the nuclear arsenal of a major non-NATO ally coming under the control of people of extremist persuasion, the present inability of the NPT to deal with these challenges might lead to its total unraveling. Even Obama recognized this situation in his speech.
It is evident from his speech that he had no really new disarmament initiatives in mind, the concentration was on nonproliferation. Most of the areas for action are from the old agenda-the CTBT, the FMCT, the PSI and the Global Initiative to counter nuclear terrorism. His announcement of a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years is an extension of the idea of the FMCT and its voluntary counterpart, the FMCI. Even the proposal for a global Summit on Nuclear Security, hosted by the US, appears, in the absence of any details, an expansion of the IAEA’s activities in this field-at the summit level. It is interesting to note that he has supported mechanisms set up by the Bush Administration outside the NPT; it is the tenor, not the substance that has changed.
If this interpretation of the US approach is correct - that while pursuing the nonproliferation agenda, the US, as stated by the Congressional Task Force, maintains an effective nuclear deterrent force - the forthcoming RevCon will be in for difficult times. Obama, as a master manipulator of public opinion, may be able to paper over differences by drawing attention to what the US considers as threats to its security, but positive movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is not today on the cards.
Since the April speech, two reports of bipartisan US task forces, both on US nuclear policy, have become available: first, a Congressionally mandated Commission on Strategic Posture of the US, and the second, a task force of the Council for Foreign Relations. Both have supported the resumption of negotiations with Russia on START and the reduction of nuclear weapons of both sides. Both have agreed with Obama’s view that prevailing conditions did not allow the elimination of nuclear weapons, and agreed that a safe and secure nuclear force was needed to reassure America’s allies, which, without that protection might seek to develop their own nuclear arsenals. Clearly, the reference is to Japan, as it would be surprising if Australia or any European ally is indicated in this rather sweeping statement.
The Congressional Task Force could not, however, reach agreement on the CTBT, while the Council on Foreign Relations was in agreement that the US should ratify that Treaty. To recall the position of the earlier Administration - the Secretaries of State, Energy and Defense, had pushed the Congress for approval of the Renewable Replacement Warhead (RRW) as a condition for CTBT ratification.
President Obama’s speech must have been made after consultation with all stakeholders in the US nuclear weapon industry, including the labs, the corporations and many agencies involved. It could, however, also only be an outline of what the parameters of US policy could be, in terms of desirables and achievable, in the context of the forthcoming 2010 NPT RevCon, rather than a considered policy statement. The pronouncements made so far by the Obama team on non-proliferation reflect traditional Democrat positions on non-proliferation issues, which seem to belong to at least a decade ago.
Taking these factors into account, Obama’s Prague speech, may just be gestures to ease the tensions that caused the last NPT RevCon to fail. The international community, that is, some NPT states and their allies, have been vociferous in their support for the ‘eventual’ goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. In their view, the risks of another failure of the RevCon could be serious. With a nuclear renaissance on the horizon, Iran and North Korea refusing to back down on their chosen nuclear paths (Iran recently claimed to have mastered the full fuel cycle technology) and perhaps the increased dangers of nuclear terrorism or more worrying, of the nuclear arsenal of a major non-NATO ally coming under the control of people of extremist persuasion, the present inability of the NPT to deal with these challenges might lead to its total unraveling. Even Obama recognized this situation in his speech.
It is evident from his speech that he had no really new disarmament initiatives in mind, the concentration was on nonproliferation. Most of the areas for action are from the old agenda-the CTBT, the FMCT, the PSI and the Global Initiative to counter nuclear terrorism. His announcement of a new international effort to secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within four years is an extension of the idea of the FMCT and its voluntary counterpart, the FMCI. Even the proposal for a global Summit on Nuclear Security, hosted by the US, appears, in the absence of any details, an expansion of the IAEA’s activities in this field-at the summit level. It is interesting to note that he has supported mechanisms set up by the Bush Administration outside the NPT; it is the tenor, not the substance that has changed.
If this interpretation of the US approach is correct - that while pursuing the nonproliferation agenda, the US, as stated by the Congressional Task Force, maintains an effective nuclear deterrent force - the forthcoming RevCon will be in for difficult times. Obama, as a master manipulator of public opinion, may be able to paper over differences by drawing attention to what the US considers as threats to its security, but positive movement towards the elimination of nuclear weapons is not today on the cards.
In the light of the aforesaid arguments, it is absolutely necessary that India should clarify its thinking on the issue of nuclear disarmament - the what, why and how, and seek to build as large a national consensus on its official position. The fallout of NPT RevCon over the Indo-US nuclear deal is an important issue area and therefore ‘the deal’ has to be taken into consideration while articulating our position on disarmament. A credible position on nuclear disarmament from India is the need of the hour.
Note: Excerpts from a presentation at the IPCS on "Obama and Nuclear Disarmament: A New Push?," 8 May 2009.
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