Crisis in Thailand: Regional Implications
05 May, 2009 · 2860
Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 29 April 2009
Report of the IPCS Seminar held on 29 April 2009
Chair: Amb AN Ram, Former Ambassador to Thailand
Speaker: Dr Shankari Sundararaman, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
AN Ram
Thailand has historically had a feudal system of governance that has leaned toward autocratic rule. The oligarchy’s power has tended to heavily influence the strength of the democratic movement in the country, dictating its direction and evolution; to a certain extent, democracy has been used for tactical reasons by the elite. Bangkok remains the symbol and centre of these elites in contrast to the rural areas of the nation and the struggle that stems from them. It is the anger of the rural people, and of students and the unemployed, which has given genesis to the current turmoil and which has been exploited by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The royalists have failed to gauge the true mood of the people with regard to democratic sentiments and this has put them on the wrong side of history. Ultimately, Thailand stands at a crossroads and much depends on the reaction to the crisis as it unfolds, of His Majesty, who commands enormous respect and reverence from his people.
Shankari Sundararaman
Thailand’s current crisis highlights that domestic developments have a wider regional impact. This is not the first episode of crisis in Thailand and it serves as further indication of the fractured nature of the nation. What happens in terms of resolution of the current turmoil will to a large degree dictate the direction of Thailand’s path to democracy.
The dispute between the “red shirts” and “yellow shirts,” the anti- and pro-Thaksin groups, respectively, is proving extremely intractable. It has its roots in the 2006 army-led coup that led to the abrogation of the 1997 constitution. Prior to this coup, the period from 2001 had been relatively peaceful and quite stable. The 1997 constitution was generally seen as a reformist “people’s constitution.” Following 2006, there was a return to factionalism and further entrenchment of the split between Thaksin supporters and the opposition. Today, there are two very distinct power networks in Thailand - Thaksin’s rural supporters, particularly in the north and northeast of the country and certain members of the middle class, the “red shirts”, and the anti-Thaksin movement who are reasonably cohesive but generally form the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the “yellow shirts”. PAD supporters include urban and educated Thais, businessmen and members of the elite.
Since 2007, when Thaksin’s People’s Power Party (PPP), led by Somchai Wonsawat, was elected there has been increased factionalism and constant confrontation between red and yellow. The popular view is that the current coalition civilian government is weak and a “compromise” government and that it therefore lacks political legitimacy and mass support. Essentially, the factionalism that has occurred is representative of the ever-increasing urban/rural divide that has been triggered by Thaksin’s policies and actions, such as vote buying in rural constituencies.
Important questions raised by the crisis include what role the military and judiciary play, and will continue to play, in Thailand’s internal dynamics and the thinking of the monarchy over the crisis and regarding the problem of political succession.
What is clear is that there must be a concerted shift towards national reconciliation and that there is a substantial need to recognise that the military and judiciary are not political actors and should not behave as such. Whether or not there will be elections in the near future depends on whether stability can be reasserted. Democratic elections cannot take place successfully in an unstable environment.
The wider regional implications of the crisis can be witnessed on three key fronts. First, the economy has been negatively impacted by the unrest. The current global economic downturn has been amplified by a drastic reduction in tourists visiting Thailand. As tourism is the major industry in the country the effect of this loss of earnings has been significant. Second, the security challenges faced by Thailand have complicated its relationship with the US, which is caught in the middle, unsure as to whether to provide support or to denounce the protests. The two countries have become more distant and there has been a reduction in military aid. China has stepped in to fill the void that has been created and this has implications for the region.
Third, continuing violence in southern Thailand in retaliation to draconian laws and mass arrests has created a situation so severe that it appears akin to civil war in that part of the country. Overall there is no coherent government policy toward the violence, largely because the state’s writ or control does not extend past Bangkok. The cancellation of the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya is an example of the state’s inability to impose law and order outside of Bangkok. This has resulted in the widespread perception that the state is unable to lead. Ultimately, if Thailand does not want to slip back into authoritarian-style governance, this internal crisis must be addressed and resolved.
• If the state’s control is limited to Bangkok, who is controlling the regions outside the capital?
• What will be the effect of the economic crisis (particularly regarding tourism) in the longer term?
• Is India’s Look East policy worth the investment it has made? How will the crisis impact India?
• Can the judiciary play a role in resolving the crisis?
• What are the factions within the military and how did this come about? What is the military’s perception of its role in Thailand?
• How much does the Thai nationality angle come into play in politics?
• What are the implications of the strong influence of the military on ties with Myanmar for Thai-Myanmar relations as well as for India?
• What is the role of the monarchy in this crisis? What does the silence of the King signify?
• The longer term impact of the crisis on the economic situation of Thailand will be considerable. The political turmoil has severely impacted the tourist trade.
• It is unlikely that this current crisis will impact India to any degree, such as the crisis in Sri Lanka has done for example. However the crisis does produce both opportunities and challenges. In terms of the India-Thailand relationship, it has not been negatively affected. Ultimately, it would be better of course if Thailand was a democracy but India is going to do business with Bangkok regardless. Meanwhile, the FTA is a problem that needs a solution, in that it needs to be signed, but this will happen eventually when the crisis is resolved.
• The judiciary is weak and has played a dichotomous role in the crisis. Because judges are both elected and appointed, there is room for the elite to manipulate the system and business interests do come into play. In reality, the judiciary tends to cater to the elite and its decision-making has been questioned by the pro-Thaksin movement.
• Factionalism in the military is the result of the fact that the 2006 changes introduced were unacceptable to the Prime Minister and the Chief of Security.
• Thailand pursues a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ regarding Myanmar. This, however, is a euphemism for ‘business as usual’ and although the relationship is complex, Thailand is not exactly uncomfortable doing business with Myanmar. This is an example of the flexibility of the Thais; they are very adaptable. During the monks’ rebellion in Myanmar in September 2007, there was really no comment at all from Thailand.
• China has taken better advantage of the situation than India. It has delivered a financial package and provided political support. India has not followed suit and to a large degree the slow momentum on Thailand’s FTA with India has been India’s fault.
• The role of the monarchy is limited, and is possibly weakening. There is a view that it is less cohesive than it previously was. It is interesting that there has been no call for national reconciliation by the monarchy. The role of the monarchy is also such that the King is above politics. He has a great deal of moral authority, not because of his neutrality or the constitution essentially, but because he is so highly respected and viewed as the father of the nation by all Thais.
Concluding Remarks
The bottom line is that developments in Thailand are part of a longer journey towards establishing a representative government within the contours of the constitution. There is no place for conflict and violence here as these are anathema to democracy. Thailand continues to be an important neighbour of India’s, with the potential for further cooperation in economic terms (BIMSTEC) and political and cultural terms as well.
Chair: Amb AN Ram, Former Ambassador to Thailand
Speaker: Dr Shankari Sundararaman, Associate Professor, School of International Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi
AN Ram
Thailand has historically had a feudal system of governance that has leaned toward autocratic rule. The oligarchy’s power has tended to heavily influence the strength of the democratic movement in the country, dictating its direction and evolution; to a certain extent, democracy has been used for tactical reasons by the elite. Bangkok remains the symbol and centre of these elites in contrast to the rural areas of the nation and the struggle that stems from them. It is the anger of the rural people, and of students and the unemployed, which has given genesis to the current turmoil and which has been exploited by former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. The royalists have failed to gauge the true mood of the people with regard to democratic sentiments and this has put them on the wrong side of history. Ultimately, Thailand stands at a crossroads and much depends on the reaction to the crisis as it unfolds, of His Majesty, who commands enormous respect and reverence from his people.
Shankari Sundararaman
Thailand’s current crisis highlights that domestic developments have a wider regional impact. This is not the first episode of crisis in Thailand and it serves as further indication of the fractured nature of the nation. What happens in terms of resolution of the current turmoil will to a large degree dictate the direction of Thailand’s path to democracy.
The dispute between the “red shirts” and “yellow shirts,” the anti- and pro-Thaksin groups, respectively, is proving extremely intractable. It has its roots in the 2006 army-led coup that led to the abrogation of the 1997 constitution. Prior to this coup, the period from 2001 had been relatively peaceful and quite stable. The 1997 constitution was generally seen as a reformist “people’s constitution.” Following 2006, there was a return to factionalism and further entrenchment of the split between Thaksin supporters and the opposition. Today, there are two very distinct power networks in Thailand - Thaksin’s rural supporters, particularly in the north and northeast of the country and certain members of the middle class, the “red shirts”, and the anti-Thaksin movement who are reasonably cohesive but generally form the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), the “yellow shirts”. PAD supporters include urban and educated Thais, businessmen and members of the elite.
Since 2007, when Thaksin’s People’s Power Party (PPP), led by Somchai Wonsawat, was elected there has been increased factionalism and constant confrontation between red and yellow. The popular view is that the current coalition civilian government is weak and a “compromise” government and that it therefore lacks political legitimacy and mass support. Essentially, the factionalism that has occurred is representative of the ever-increasing urban/rural divide that has been triggered by Thaksin’s policies and actions, such as vote buying in rural constituencies.
Important questions raised by the crisis include what role the military and judiciary play, and will continue to play, in Thailand’s internal dynamics and the thinking of the monarchy over the crisis and regarding the problem of political succession.
What is clear is that there must be a concerted shift towards national reconciliation and that there is a substantial need to recognise that the military and judiciary are not political actors and should not behave as such. Whether or not there will be elections in the near future depends on whether stability can be reasserted. Democratic elections cannot take place successfully in an unstable environment.
The wider regional implications of the crisis can be witnessed on three key fronts. First, the economy has been negatively impacted by the unrest. The current global economic downturn has been amplified by a drastic reduction in tourists visiting Thailand. As tourism is the major industry in the country the effect of this loss of earnings has been significant. Second, the security challenges faced by Thailand have complicated its relationship with the US, which is caught in the middle, unsure as to whether to provide support or to denounce the protests. The two countries have become more distant and there has been a reduction in military aid. China has stepped in to fill the void that has been created and this has implications for the region.
Third, continuing violence in southern Thailand in retaliation to draconian laws and mass arrests has created a situation so severe that it appears akin to civil war in that part of the country. Overall there is no coherent government policy toward the violence, largely because the state’s writ or control does not extend past Bangkok. The cancellation of the ASEAN Summit in Pattaya is an example of the state’s inability to impose law and order outside of Bangkok. This has resulted in the widespread perception that the state is unable to lead. Ultimately, if Thailand does not want to slip back into authoritarian-style governance, this internal crisis must be addressed and resolved.
DISCUSSION
Comments
• If the state’s control is limited to Bangkok, who is controlling the regions outside the capital?
• What will be the effect of the economic crisis (particularly regarding tourism) in the longer term?
• Is India’s Look East policy worth the investment it has made? How will the crisis impact India?
• Can the judiciary play a role in resolving the crisis?
• What are the factions within the military and how did this come about? What is the military’s perception of its role in Thailand?
• How much does the Thai nationality angle come into play in politics?
• What are the implications of the strong influence of the military on ties with Myanmar for Thai-Myanmar relations as well as for India?
• What is the role of the monarchy in this crisis? What does the silence of the King signify?
Responses
• The crisis has had a significant effect on ASEAN. ASEAN’s Vision 2020 charter promotes democracy for all its members and therefore any democratic reversal in Thailand impacts widely on other member states. The domestic situation of all member countries is tied in with the wider framework of ASEAN. At the same time, the impact on ASEAN should not be overstated; the crisis in Thailand will not make or break the organisation. There are similar tensions over Vietnam and Myanmar as well.
• The longer term impact of the crisis on the economic situation of Thailand will be considerable. The political turmoil has severely impacted the tourist trade.
• It is unlikely that this current crisis will impact India to any degree, such as the crisis in Sri Lanka has done for example. However the crisis does produce both opportunities and challenges. In terms of the India-Thailand relationship, it has not been negatively affected. Ultimately, it would be better of course if Thailand was a democracy but India is going to do business with Bangkok regardless. Meanwhile, the FTA is a problem that needs a solution, in that it needs to be signed, but this will happen eventually when the crisis is resolved.
• The judiciary is weak and has played a dichotomous role in the crisis. Because judges are both elected and appointed, there is room for the elite to manipulate the system and business interests do come into play. In reality, the judiciary tends to cater to the elite and its decision-making has been questioned by the pro-Thaksin movement.
• Factionalism in the military is the result of the fact that the 2006 changes introduced were unacceptable to the Prime Minister and the Chief of Security.
• Thailand pursues a policy of ‘constructive engagement’ regarding Myanmar. This, however, is a euphemism for ‘business as usual’ and although the relationship is complex, Thailand is not exactly uncomfortable doing business with Myanmar. This is an example of the flexibility of the Thais; they are very adaptable. During the monks’ rebellion in Myanmar in September 2007, there was really no comment at all from Thailand.
• China has taken better advantage of the situation than India. It has delivered a financial package and provided political support. India has not followed suit and to a large degree the slow momentum on Thailand’s FTA with India has been India’s fault.
• The role of the monarchy is limited, and is possibly weakening. There is a view that it is less cohesive than it previously was. It is interesting that there has been no call for national reconciliation by the monarchy. The role of the monarchy is also such that the King is above politics. He has a great deal of moral authority, not because of his neutrality or the constitution essentially, but because he is so highly respected and viewed as the father of the nation by all Thais.
Concluding Remarks
The bottom line is that developments in Thailand are part of a longer journey towards establishing a representative government within the contours of the constitution. There is no place for conflict and violence here as these are anathema to democracy. Thailand continues to be an important neighbour of India’s, with the potential for further cooperation in economic terms (BIMSTEC) and political and cultural terms as well.
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