CTBT Redux
30 Mar, 2009 · 2840
Arundhati Ghose analyzes Shyam Saran’s speech at the Brookings Institution on the Indo-US civilian nuclear agreement
Today India is a declared nuclear weapon state, with a nuclear doctrine and a recognition, however reluctant, by the international community that India is a responsible nuclear state with an impeccable proliferation record, except for the die-hard non-proliferation ‘messiahs.’ If India had been able to withstand pressures when it was in a much weaker position, globally, why should there be apprehension that it would not be able to cope with pressures, if any, to sign a treaty, if it did not wish to do so?
In any case, soon after the 1998 Pokhran tests, India entered into negotiations with the US on several issues, including adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Until 2000, India maintained that it was committed to converting its voluntary moratorium on testing into a de jure formalization and that once there was domestic consensus on the subject, it would not stand in the way of the CTBT coming into force provided all other countries mentioned in Article XIV of the Treaty also joined without any preconditions. Clearly, India’s position had changed since 1996, and after the tests. Since then, India has not made any policy statement on the CTBT, except very recently, in the course of the negotiations of the 123 Agreement with the US.
So virulent was the opposition to the Indo-US Agreement, that opponents were not only convinced that it was the ‘entry of the CTBT by the back-door’ but insisted on positions that repeated the stand taken by India in 1996, ignoring post- Pokhran developments. This mindless opposition seemed to have evoked, from the Prime Minister, a reiteration that India would not sign the CTBT, presumably under any circumstances.
At a recent Conference held in the Washington, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, Shyam Saran, in a speech titled, “Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement: Expectations and Consequences,” identified areas where India and the US could either cooperate or disagree. Though newspapers reported that he had reiterated the PM’s latest position that India would not sign the CTBT, a careful reading of his statement, highlights that he has been (deliberately?) vague. He reiterated the objections India had in 1976 and then concluded “…if the world moves categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible time-frame, then Indo-US differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the background.”
He made no reference to the prolonged dialogue held between India and the US after 1998 tests on the subject or on the assurances the Government made on not standing in the way of the Treaty coming into force. He also did not reject categorically the possibility of India signing the Treaty under any circumstance.
At the time of the negotiations of the CTBT, the P-5 had secretly negotiated some agreements among themselves, including an MoU. This became clear during the US Congressional hearings on ratification of the Treaty. Unless the contents of these agreements, is made known, it is unlikely that India would wish to enter a Treaty blindfolded. At the same time, some doubts have been raised about the technologies used or proposed to be used in the verification system; these would have to be discussed before legal steps can be taken. Of course, there is always the option of discussing the technical issues after joining the Treaty - it need not necessarily be a condition for signature.
The question remains as to whether it would be in India’s interests today to sign the CTBT? India is today a nuclear weapon state with a doctrine that stipulates ‘no first use.’ If that is the case, is there a need for further testing? After all, in 1998, we were assured that “the data provided” by the Pokhran tests “have significantly enhanced the capabilities.”
A decision to sign or a refusal to do so would be a political decision and not a military or technical one. In the event the US and China ratify the CTBT, Israel is likely to follow suit. This would leave India and Pakistan, whose lack of agreement would prevent the entry into force of the Treaty according to Article XIV, another political reason for India’s objections.
Another question is: whether India would, in a situation where all other NWS (except Pakistan) have signed the Treaty, and India’s doubts have been met, actually carry out a test in the foreseeable future? India today is a different country, and even if the laws of some countries call for the imposition of sanctions or at least the cessation of cooperation in the event of a test by India, it is extremely unlikely that such action would be taken by countries which are looking to India to cooperate in meeting the exigencies of the current economic meltdown. After the NSG clearance and the progress on civilian nuclear cooperation with several countries, and the gradual opening of hi-tech trade, would India take a decision to throw it all away? It seems unlikely. On the other hand, if the US or China carry out tests, even under Article IX ,which permits withdrawal in the ‘supreme national interest,’ all options then would be thrown wide open.
The call, as Shyam Saran had said on another occasion, would be a purely political one.
In any case, soon after the 1998 Pokhran tests, India entered into negotiations with the US on several issues, including adherence to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). Until 2000, India maintained that it was committed to converting its voluntary moratorium on testing into a de jure formalization and that once there was domestic consensus on the subject, it would not stand in the way of the CTBT coming into force provided all other countries mentioned in Article XIV of the Treaty also joined without any preconditions. Clearly, India’s position had changed since 1996, and after the tests. Since then, India has not made any policy statement on the CTBT, except very recently, in the course of the negotiations of the 123 Agreement with the US.
So virulent was the opposition to the Indo-US Agreement, that opponents were not only convinced that it was the ‘entry of the CTBT by the back-door’ but insisted on positions that repeated the stand taken by India in 1996, ignoring post- Pokhran developments. This mindless opposition seemed to have evoked, from the Prime Minister, a reiteration that India would not sign the CTBT, presumably under any circumstances.
At a recent Conference held in the Washington, the Prime Minister’s Special Envoy, Shyam Saran, in a speech titled, “Indo-US Civil Nuclear Agreement: Expectations and Consequences,” identified areas where India and the US could either cooperate or disagree. Though newspapers reported that he had reiterated the PM’s latest position that India would not sign the CTBT, a careful reading of his statement, highlights that he has been (deliberately?) vague. He reiterated the objections India had in 1976 and then concluded “…if the world moves categorically towards nuclear disarmament in a credible time-frame, then Indo-US differences over the CTBT would probably recede into the background.”
He made no reference to the prolonged dialogue held between India and the US after 1998 tests on the subject or on the assurances the Government made on not standing in the way of the Treaty coming into force. He also did not reject categorically the possibility of India signing the Treaty under any circumstance.
At the time of the negotiations of the CTBT, the P-5 had secretly negotiated some agreements among themselves, including an MoU. This became clear during the US Congressional hearings on ratification of the Treaty. Unless the contents of these agreements, is made known, it is unlikely that India would wish to enter a Treaty blindfolded. At the same time, some doubts have been raised about the technologies used or proposed to be used in the verification system; these would have to be discussed before legal steps can be taken. Of course, there is always the option of discussing the technical issues after joining the Treaty - it need not necessarily be a condition for signature.
The question remains as to whether it would be in India’s interests today to sign the CTBT? India is today a nuclear weapon state with a doctrine that stipulates ‘no first use.’ If that is the case, is there a need for further testing? After all, in 1998, we were assured that “the data provided” by the Pokhran tests “have significantly enhanced the capabilities.”
A decision to sign or a refusal to do so would be a political decision and not a military or technical one. In the event the US and China ratify the CTBT, Israel is likely to follow suit. This would leave India and Pakistan, whose lack of agreement would prevent the entry into force of the Treaty according to Article XIV, another political reason for India’s objections.
Another question is: whether India would, in a situation where all other NWS (except Pakistan) have signed the Treaty, and India’s doubts have been met, actually carry out a test in the foreseeable future? India today is a different country, and even if the laws of some countries call for the imposition of sanctions or at least the cessation of cooperation in the event of a test by India, it is extremely unlikely that such action would be taken by countries which are looking to India to cooperate in meeting the exigencies of the current economic meltdown. After the NSG clearance and the progress on civilian nuclear cooperation with several countries, and the gradual opening of hi-tech trade, would India take a decision to throw it all away? It seems unlikely. On the other hand, if the US or China carry out tests, even under Article IX ,which permits withdrawal in the ‘supreme national interest,’ all options then would be thrown wide open.
The call, as Shyam Saran had said on another occasion, would be a purely political one.
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